The problem of a rational good by Gish, Delbert Raymond
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1943
The problem of a rational good
https://archive.org/details/problemofrationa00gish
Boston University






BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Dissertation
THE PROBLEM OF A RATIONAL GOOD
by
Delbert Raymond Gish
(A.B., Bethany-Peniel College, 1932;
M.A. , Oklahoma University, 193A-)
s
submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1943

1 9+3
Approved
by

THE PROBLEM OF A RATIONAL GOOD
Outline
Chapter Page
I. THE PROBLEM 1
1. Statement of the problem 1
2. The definition of « rational' 4
i. Rationality and probability . 8
ii. Methods and techniques versus ends ... 9
1) . The scientific method 11
2) . Method in philosophy 13
iii. A working definition of rationality . . . 16
3. The definition of feood' 17
i. Good versus value and ideal 17
ii. Fundamental assumptions concerned with
the good 20
iii. The claim of good upon rational beings . 24
iv. A working definition of the good .... 26
v. Validation of the definition 26
4. Summary of the chapter 29
5. Sources 31
6. Statement on method and the plan of future
chapters 31
II. OPPOSITION TO THE RATIONAL GOOD 33
1. Review of the definition of the rational good 33
2. The incompleteness of the progress of mind
. . 33

VChapter Page
3. Classifications of various metaphysical
views which fall into irrationality 34
i. First view: mechanism and atomism .... 36
ii. The second view: authoritarianism .... 38
iii. The third view: pessimism and fiction-
alism 40
iv. The fourth view: transvaluation 43
v. The fifth view: mysticism 48
vi. The sixth view: realism or factualism • . 51
4. Epistemological views which make concessions
to the irrational 56
i. Irrational sources of belief 57
ii. The repudiation of reason, scepticism . . 62
iii. Epistemological dualism 66
iv. The will to believe: voluntarism. 70
v. Intuitionism and mysticism 73
5. Summary of the chapter 76
III. THE RATIONAL AND THE GOOD 79
1. The suspicion of conflict between logic
and reality 79
2. The conviction of connection between ration-
ality and goodness 80
i. Plato 81
ii. Urban 82
iii. Kant 82

vi
Chapter Page
3. Intuition, reason, and the good 85
U* Results of the comparison of intuition
and reason for the good .......... 95
5. Summary of the chapter 99
IV. THE RATIONAL GOOD AND THE REAL 100
1. Reality defined 100
2. Modernist and traditional views of the
problem 101
3. Intrinsic and instrumental goods 103
4. Values and goods on the practical plane
are instrumental 104
5. Values and. goods on the theoretical plane . 106
6. Arguments for the objective reality of
good * 107
i. Urban 107
ii. Kohler 107
iii. Alexander 108
iv. Pringle-Pattison 108
v. Other arguments 109
vi. Plato Ill
vii. Lotze Ill
viii. Bowne 112
ix. Leighton 112
x. G-ilson 113

vii
Chapter Page
xi. Results of the arguments 114
7. The meaning and place of evil 115
8. Summary of the preceding section 118
9. The mode of the objective existence of
good 119
i. Good is not a hypostatized abstraction 120
ii. Good exists concretely in personality . 120
10. The good and God 124
11. God's nature and relation to the world . . 126
12. The outcome of the view of God as personal
for the rational good 135
13. Summary of the chapter 139
V. THE RATIONAL GOOD AND, SOCIAL PROGRESS 142
1. Definitions and viewpoints 142
2. Principles of social progress 145
3. Views of the prospects of social progress 149
i. Kant 149
ii. Otto and Santayana 150
iii. Dewey 150
iv. Plato 150
4. Views of the good to be gained and
criticisms 151
5. The problem of social control 157

viii
Chapter Page
i. Contrast of totalitarianism and
democracy .......... 159
ii. National socialism 160
iii. Estimate of the principles of
democracy 165
6. Modes of achieving rational democratic
ends 169
i. Ways of securing co-operation 170
ii. Special value of rational persuasion. . 171
iii« Training in value-appreciation 172
7. Summary of the chapter 173
3. Some final thoughts 175
BIBLIOGRAPHY 179
ABSTRACT 193

CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
1. Statement of the problem
This dissertation is an attempt to find out whether
the good is defined and established altogether by reason,
whether the good is partly rational on the one hand and
partly nonrational, intuitive, emotional, traditional, or
empirical on the other; or whether it is wholly determined
by nonrational factors with reason serving merely as an in-
strument in its realization. Plato and Kant are important
advocates of the first view; the philosophic tradition has
been more generally in the spirit of the second; and var-
ious aspects of the third are being strongly urged in many
quarters today, although it has never lacked supporters.
In the course of the investigation, answers to such
questions as the following will also be sought: In what
form is the good observed or experienced? What are the log-
ical, epistemological, metaphysical and social strands of
the good which need to be explored? Does the good possess
any permanent, self-consistent character? What relation
does good have to the external world beyond finite minds?
In spite of the constant repetition of the term
"good" in the languages and literatures of mankind, there
is a notorious disagreement about ultimate goods; and partic-
ularly is there disagreement about whether goods are in any

2sense rational. If such a good is possible, then it needs
to be brought to clear expression; for in spite of the en-
lightenment of modern nations, their disunity and lack of
orientation toward a common goal speaks of anything but ra-
tionality.
Skepticism and indecision about ends characterize
both nations and individual persons. Wilbur M. Urban des-
cribes the present time as one when "strange contradiction
1
pervades our entire modern culture. . . ," and says that
"the implicit assumption of the meaning, significance and
value of our civilization. . . is being questioned on all
2
sides." In the same mood Blanshard finds that "self-will
and the repudiation of a common standard of judgement and
obligation threaten to extinguish the life of reason alto-
3
gether." Wolfgang Ktthler notes the tendency of educated
and professional men to avoid problems of value, and to dis-
claim any responsibility for making "frames of reference,"
i.e. standards or ideals of worth. Because of this, there
is a lack of convictions, of" stable mental orientation" to
help people stand the strain and stress of trouble. He be-
lieves that science must bear its share of responsibility
—
all learning and research tend to resist the "orientation
1. Urban, IW, 172. (All symbols in bibliography).
2. Ibid., 131.
3. Blanshard, NT, II, 520.

that existed before the era of science." Science has helped
destroy the stabilizing ideals, but apparently has no power
U
to replace them.
It would be unfair to lay the blame for the present
confusion about good wholly at the doors of science, but
considering its bias for description as opposed to evaluation,
and its attempt to eliminate the personal factor as far as
possible, it must bear a considerable part of the responsi-
bility. With science as such, there is no problem of a ra-
tional good,— in fact, no problem of a good at all, for
strictly speaking it recognizes none, or at best describes
beliefs in good as facts, without regard to their validity.
Typical scientific training evades personal evaluations as
far as possible along with moral and ethical entanglements.
The remarkable achievements of the sciences have given them
tremendous influence, and during the last century the dogmat-
ic confidence that science was a panacea for human ills was
created. Most scientists had little inclination to discour-
5
age this feeling. However, the disillusionment has begun,
and the wiser scientists now see that science must be con-
tented to be a part and not the whole of human knowledge.
Good and values contain obstinate elements that will not
yield to the purely descriptive methods of science, but which
still persist as facts in human experience.
U. Kohler, PVWF, 7, 11.
5. See Flewelling, art. (1926), 81-86.

4Among reasons why the rational good becomes a prob-
lem these may be noted: First, as just mentioned, science
is a marvel of the modern age which has had its success in-
dependently (apparently) of the concept of any good at all,
except the assumed good of science. Second, there is no gen-
eral and clear idea of what a rational good means, what it
should require of a society or nation. Third, there is no
guarantee that a rational good is possible. Finally, it has
not been made an actuality, except in an unsatisfactory man-
ner in isolated societies, and much of the gain has been
lost.
Under such circumstances, one might ask, why should
there be any search for a good that is determined by reason?
Why not be content with the intuitive way, the "instincts of
the blood," the drives that underlie the whole complex men-
tal and physical organization of individual persons? Why
not let the good be determined by force, authority, chance,
or its subjective marks? Simply because it is possible that
the discipline and direction of reason can bring more bene-
fits to more people than can any other means. If a rational
good is possible, it should be explored. But in order to
produce a rational good, it seems probable that something
more than rational exploration is required.
2. The definition of rational
Although the terms "good" and "rational" are familiar
and frequently used, they require constant redefinition in

5order- to acquire for them and preserve a basic, sharply de-
lineated meaning. There are are certain loopholes in the
conception o: rationality; it is ambiguous, said Hastings
6
Rashdall, for
It may mean intelligible 1 or reducible to a coherent
system such that one part of it could (with adequate in-
sight) be inferred from another.' In this sense the
Universe might be rational if it were a sort of infernal
machine. Or it may mean (and that is the only sense in
which we ought to talk about a reality which includes
events as 'rational') realizing an end which is abso-
lutely good. It has been part of the legerdemain of a
certain school to prove that the Universe is rational in
the first sense, and then to assume that it must be ra-
tional in the second, and therefore, it is urged, any-
thing in it which strikes us as bad must be mere appear-
ance.
Rashdall' s analysis deals with rationality at a rath-
er high level. At lower less complex levels of explanation,
where immediate practical purposes (e.g. communication), are
involved, customary action and ordinary sanity pass for ra-
tionality. If an idea conveys any intelligible meaning, it
is in some sense rational. However, the term "rational" has
different meanings on the practical level of necessary com-
munication between persons, on the scientific level of pre-
cise description and causal explanation (including the psy-
7
chiatric), and on the philosophical level of explanation by
teleology, synopsis, and system-building. There is of course
no absolute demarcation between these levels concerning the
6. Rashdall, TGE, II, 219, footnote.
7. See Allport, PER, Chap. XIV, 369-399.

meaning of rational, but on the whole the following distinc-
tions will obtain.
On the level of necessary intercommunication rational
means whatever is not purely subjective or arbitrary; the
9
clear, simple, related, or conceivable; the moderate, tem-
10
perate, nonextreme; what is expressible in the language
which is in general use; what is expressible in finite (math-
ematical) terms; whatever is sensible, enlightened, discreet,
11
intelligent, sane, sound; the intelligible, comprehensible,
12
or understandable; and anything which has the power to
satisfy the intellect.
On the scientific level where description, the concept
of mechanical cause, and analysis are extensively used, ra-
13
tional means completely objective and impersonal; factual
rather than speculative, with quantities expressed in exact
mathematical rather than approximate figures; whatever is
least complex and least involved, i.e. as simple as possi-
ble; expressible in terms of causal antecedents and conso-
le 15
quents; experimentally verifiable; predictable; and in
8. Pratt, RC, 333. H. Ayer, LTL, 180-181.
9. Santayana, LOR, 243. I5. Reichenbach, EAP,
H5, 192, 404.
10. Spinoza, ETH, IV, lxi, 183.
11. Century Dictionary , VI.
12. Blanshard, NT, II, UU9*
13. Kohler, PTWF, 36.

7general, rational means for science whatever is fruitful or
promising, as exemplified in ideas or procedures, hypotheses
or methods which yield immediate results.
On the philosophic level rational means interconnected,
16
unified, linked significantly with other objects or ideas;
systematic, grounded upon a substantial supporting concept;^
concrete, organically related, harmonious; conceptual in
character, following largely from deduction, and less from
perception and induction; interpretative rather than des-
criptive; and partaking of coherence, self-consistency,
18
ever- increasing inclusiveness, and the best possible end.
The difference between reasonable and rational should
not be overlooked. A rational plan which effectively con-
nects end and means may be unreasonable in its demands. A
person who is unreasonable (e.g. a convalescent) may be in
19
full possession of his mental powers. But to reiterate
what was said above: the distinctions will not always be
clear-cut; they are intended chiefly to show that there are
grounds for scientists to call philosophers irrational, and
the reverse; and for both to declare irrational an idea
which might satisfy a man of less reflective temperament.
16. Hobhouse, RG, 62-64; Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 239,
260.
17. Bowne, MET (rev. ) , 328; Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 65.
18. Brightman, presidential address at National As-
sociation of Biblical Instructors, Cambridge, Mass.
See also Brightman, art. (1941), 393-414.
19. See Kolnai, WAW, 57.
\
8i. Rationality and probability . Both truth and prob-
ability may be called rational ideas. Truth is an end in
whose direction both rationality and probability aim; but
while probability is at its highest reach when it closely
approximates truth, rationality seeks also other ends which
are conceived as valuable—for example, the good and the
beautiful—and in its highest reaches it partakes fully of
their nature. Thus probability and rationality may be said
to become fellow-travelers on the path toward truth. They
progress together; as a result it turns out that the most
probable account of an event is also the most rational.
Both rationality and probability depend upon the relation
of propositions which are candidates for belief to the evi-
dence upon which they are grounded. The mental task of
testing beliefs for probability and for rationality is never
fully completed, but as its results are achieved a person's
whole system of knowledge and belief is raised to constantly
higher levels of comprehensiveness, clarity, harmony, and
objectivity.
The task is never done. Even at the higher levels
where system-building brings more and more particulars into
intelligible unity, one system-maker may arrive at a synop-
tic view of things which seems to him to solve the metaphys-
ical paradoxes of all time; but another system-builder, view-
ing the same phenomena from another position, finds the solu-
tion as puzzling as the problems. It is with this situation

9
20
in mind that Urban writes the following words:
Among philosophers the lack of a common idiom is no-
torious. Natural 1st ically minded philosophers find
Hegel unintelligible; and it is no less the case that
propositions, which to positivism and naturalism seem
to have meaning, are for critical philosophers little
less than nonsense.
It may well be that the first step toward rationality is a
look at the ways in which men believe it is to be produced.
ii. Methods and techniques versus ends . The intelli-
gibility of any point of view is largely a function of the
method by which that point of view is reached. In the last
analysis, one's ideal of rationality may be attained only if
he employs a method which can satisfy that ideal, and which
will not contradict the ideal. No absolute methods are
known. Philosophers disagree, for example, on whether the
explanation of parts by reference to wholes or the reverse
is more intelligible. But to be logical, which is the min-
imum demand of the rational mind, one must adopt a mode of
21
procedure and follow it through. There is, says Bowne,
need of a critical procedure which shall help the mind
to self-knowledge, define and clarify its aims, secure
consistency in the development of its practical postu-
lates, and adjust their mutual relations. This is the
field of logic; and in this work of development, adjust-
ment, and rectification logic has its inalienable rights
and a function of supreme importance.
Yet the differences of opinion about procedures lead
to many an impasse. Some philosophers advocate the selec-
tion of ends without any criticism of means other than to
20. Urban, IV/, 187, 188(quoting from latter page).
21. Bowne, TTK, 383.
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note their chances for immediate success or failure. It is
irrational from this point of view, to court failure by rea-
son of scruples which prohibit the use of the shortest and
most effective methods possible. Yet other philosophers seem
to say that little attention to ends is necessary if only
self-consistent means are used. The differences reduce to
the question of the remoteness or the immediacy of the ends
considered, and of the emphasis which is to be given the one
or the other. The scientific ideal is characterized by an
emphasis on method. It is in this spirit of confidence in
22
method that Ayer insists upon its primary rtfle.
For to be rational is simply to employ a self-consist-
ent accredited procedure in the formation of all one's
beliefs. ... We define a rational belief as one which
is arrived at by the methods which we now consider re-
liable. There is no absolute standard of rationality. .
• • We trust the methods of contemporary science be-
cause they have been successful in practice. If in the
future we were to adopt different methods, then beliefs
which are now rational might become irrational from the
standpoint of these new methods.
Huxley and Rader make a plea for a balance between
the selection of ends and the employment of techniques. The
former declares that the ideal of charity must govern men of
all ranks, for otherwise "technological progress has merely
23provided us with more efficient means for going backwards."
Ends must not be selected without any attention to means, for
"the means employed determine the nature of the ends pro-
duced." * Rader also takes a view which calls for rational
22. Ayer, LTL, H4-H5.
23. Huxley, EAM, 9.
24. Huxley, EAM, 10.
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means and a rational criticism of ends. His idea is that2 5
A science of means , without a critique of ends , does
not make liYe rational . If there is no way of determin-
ing whether our purposes are reasonable, there can be no
way of judging whether the means are rightly employed.
Every technique may be adapted to a variety of ends. •
. . Clearly, we shall be none the better for all our
technical knowledge unless we have something more—know-
ledge of the good.
Differences in human temperaments are largely respon-
sible for varied emphases on means and ends. It seems to be
part of the fundamental nature of some persons to think ana-
lytically, and to view things atomistically . Theirs is a
scientific turn of mind, and they will ordinarily be perfect-
ers of techniques rather than critic izers of ends. Other
persons naturally think synoptically, view things more read-
ily as organic wholes, and exhibit a philosophic tempera-
ment. What one type of person may regard as an intelligible
approach to the world and its secrets often seems futile and
senseless to the other. Is there no help for this difficul-
ty? At least one will be suggested after a further short ex-
amination of the difficulty itself.
1). The scientific method . Required by the scientif-
ic method are the following assumptions or procedures:
(1) Exclusion of the concepts of value and purpose.
(2) A thoroughly objective approach; the experimenter
to be as inconspicuous as possible, free of bias
and partiality. 26
25. Rader, NC, 53-54. 26. KBhler, PWF, 36.

(3) Results must "be verifiable, and only the suc-
cessful outcome or fruitfulness of a method just-
ifies it; it should give rise to successful pre-
27dictions.
(4) The use of mathematical and quantitative measure-
ments is fundamental.
(5) Terms, categories, and definitions should be
28
standardized as far as possible.
(6) Observance of the principle of parsimony is es-
sential.
(7) Exact observation and discovery rather than dem-
29
onstration is the goal of science.
(8) Analysis is the chief instrument to be used, and
usually takes precedence over synthesis.
(9) Sensory, perceptual knowledge is, as a rule, more
trustworthy than conceptual knowledge, and induc-
tion more valuable than deduction. (Many excep-
tions to this should be granted)
.
Modern science has had success enough to make it tre-
mendously important; through its labors the physical world
has been made more the servant than the master of man. Yet
nothing is more certain, a fact recognized by scientists
27. Ayer, LTL, 180-181.
28. KBhler, FVWF, 36.
29. Dewey, EN, 152.
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themselves, than that something is wrong with the way the
whole matter has worked out. There is a paradox in it; the
results which have the greatest potentiality for human good
often are employed most diligently to the destruction of
the things which humanity ought to prize.
2). Method in philosophy . A somewhat wider range of
starting points is nossible for philosophical study than
for scientificCrestricted as it is by its subject matter).
In philosophical investigation one may begin with the self
(as will, mind, or consciousness) and introspection; with
the objective world (assuming it to be fundamentally either
matter, will, or mind-stuff) ; or with God and the realm of
ideals, goods, and religious values. Otherwise philosophy
will use every method which science uses, the main differ-
ence being that philosophy will attempt to create a system
as inclusive as possible, to get a whole view, while science
is necessarily restrictive. There was a time when little dis-
tinction existed between philosophical and scientific meth-
30
ods. Both traveled the 'high priori road f of deduction from
ultimate propositions. Science has now deserted this path-
way, while philosophy on occasion uses both inductive and de-
ductive methods, both experience and reason, much more read-
ily than does science.
No method is final except the method which makes the
individual mind superior to all modes of procedure. This is
the basis for the removal of the impasse between those who
30. Ayer, LTL, 62; used by Blanshard, NT, II, 403.

u
are scientifically inclined and those who are imbued with
the spirit of philosophy. Often enough a useful way of at-
tacking a problem becomes "a method, then a habit, and final-
31ly a tyranny that defeats the end it was used for." None
of the various aspects of the world can be made intelligible
throughout by a single method, except the method of giving
the active mind free rein. It is of course true, as Bright-
32
man indicates, that
sense-experience lends itself more readily to the meth-
ods of atomistic logic, while values, being true wholes,
can be understood only by what we have called organic
logic.
However, as he would be the first to insist, neither atom-
istic nor organic logic without the active mind can bring
understanding.
Ultimately one must see that method is important as
an aid to the working mind, but that it is not the final
guarantee of success in striving for the rational good,
"There is no simple and compendious standard which will give
the truth by mechanical application. The living mind deal-
33ing with the concrete facts is the only standard." "Atom-
ism is rational, we see, only to the extent to which it sat-
isfies the demand of the mind for that which remains identi-
31. James, APU, 219.
32. Brightman, IPI, 30.
33. Bowne, TTK, 3S5.
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cal without changing . . . ." The older view (a rather
35
extreme teleology) is also but a partial one:
There is plainly much in human experience that can be
brought under the idea of the good, in the sense of be-
ing taken as means to a special and limited end. But
sooner or later the attempt to work this scheme over the
whole field of experience breaks down, and to persist in
it is fanaticism.
Irrationality develops in the exclusive use of one
method or another. In the appropriate circumstances, which
the individual person must decide upon, the "part-working"
of the mind may be most effective, and in other circum-
36
stances the "whole-working" • The search for rationality
cannot rest in methods— in fact, it cannot rest at all. The
37
work of the mind is never done.
Behind all methods, then, is actual thought, living
thought, the rational operation of the whole mind. Methods
should have the same importance as workmen^ tools, no more.
No saw is so important as the carpenter, for it is not so
relevant to a wide variety of situations as he. It has a
limited use. In the same way methods have limited uses, and
important truth should not be required to stand or fall with
methods. For many pursuits (e.g. childtraining) a lively
ingenuity which uses or discards any and all established
34. Russell, art. (1922), 5II-512.
35. Blanshard, NT, II, 441.
36. Terms used by Rufus Jones in Bennett, SGH, xi,
Introduction.
37. Hobhouse, RG, 73, 75.
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methods according to the end that is aimed at is indispen-
sable. In such cases the adherence to a single method
would fall to the inefficient level of "using a square peg
in a round hole." Rationality requires a sense of the fit-
ness of things.
Explanation and intelligibility suffer from the inad-
equacies of language and the aberrations of the mental pow-
ers. The highest level of rationality that can be attained
by finite minds, while worth the effort, is short of the de-
gree of perfection that is to be desired; but at the same
time that they fall short of the full perfection, individ-
ual minds do make encouraging and necessary progress. It
is hard work to be rational, but disastrous not to try to
be. "Reason comes by her own. . . because unreason carried
far enough produces miseries and disasters.
iii. A working definition of rationality . Hence-
forth, rationality as intended in these pages will be used
to designate the goal of a dialectic which in the Socratic
manner leaves no important idea undefined, and in the man-
ner of Hegel attempts to include all facts in the explana-
tory scheme. It will emphasize neither analysis nor syn-
thesis to the exclusion of one or the other; nor will it
ignore the place of feeling and intuition as it explores
reason. Rationality is an achievement of the whole man,
38. Hobhouse, RG, 121.
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not of reason only. In no case will the abdication of rea-
son in a sceptical or agnostic mood be regarded as ration-
al. Rationality will be thought of as having some immedi-
ate and some more ultimate characteristics which differ and
which must be combined in order to attain the highest prac-
tical level of self-consistency possible. In this combin-
ation of the present and partial knowledge of things with
an ideal of reason, there is the first intimation of the
rational good—a good which consists first of all in the
clarity and coherence and truth of thought itself, and af-
terwards in man's realization of its benefits in his en-
vironment. Above all, at its higher levels, rationality
will be thought of as a movement toward a wider inclusion
of facts of experience, and this continually expanding hor-
izon constitutes an ideal aim. To show that a moral act
39is rational is to connect it with a rational end or aim.
3. The definition of good
i. Good versus value and ideal . In order to define
good it is helpful and necessary to distinguish it from two
other closely related concepts, namely value and ideal.
Human experience is complex; within it can be differentiated
the notions of the actually liked and the ought-to-be-liked.
Whatever is actually liked or arouses interest may be said
40
to be or to have a value. The assertion that anything is
39. Hobhouse, RG, 77.
40. See Brightman, ITP, 126; Hobhouse, RG, 66.
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good is a value-claim. Value-claims may refer to true
values, i.e. genuine, objective goods; or they may be mere-
ly subjective, arbitrary, and irrational. Human beings at-
tribute value to numerous sensations, emotions, ideas, and
feelings which they experience; but further experience and
the processes of reason bring them to the point of denying
real and lasting worth to many immediately pleasurable con-
scious states. Value-claims are usually the expressions of
original impulses; a man likes in the sheer immediacy of
liking before he likes for a more valid reason. However,
as a man comes to be ruled more and more by reason, his
value-claims are based increasingly upon what he sees ought
to be liked, rather than upon physiological drives or un-
criticized emotional states. Thus a value-claim may be-
come a true value.
In this dissertation, good is the term which will be
used whenever a true value is meant. It will refer to any
event or fact which makes a valid demand upon rational per-
sons for recognition. Whatever ought to be liked will be
called good. That there is such an aspect of reality is
an assumption without which any further discussion is
blocked. It cannot be proved by anything other than an ap-
peal to rational experience. If a man says "that is good",
he means to assert a characteristic of something in his en-
41. See Brightman, RV, 15, et passim ; also POR, 91-
92, 114-116, 206.
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vironment. Cases often occur in which a man makes this
judgment under logical and ethical compulsion. Even though
the consequences are unpleasant to him, the perception that
a new order of things increases benefits to a great many oth-
er people makes the judgment of value the necessary reaction
to it, called for by its objective validity. It compels
respect because men are in some measure ethical and logi-
cal beings. They see in this order characteristics which
they cannot deny and at the same time retain their integ-
rity; they feel the obligation to recognize it as good.
An ideal is any pattern or concept of a more perfect
state of affairs than the idealizer has yet been able to
make actual; or an ideal is a good end which makes a valid
claim upon a person in so far as it is capable of being re-
alized by him. In their original status ideals are not real
in the sense of existing, but they are real in so far as they
are valid for rational minds. As they represent a ma^s ut-
most capacity to achieve perfection they are true values or
goods. One is not obligated to love an ideal which cannot
be realized at all, but the love of valid ideals makes what
would otherwise be merely change in the world a genuine pro-
gress. Ideals are the counterpart of the capacity of per-
sons to transcend the immediate by perceiving and desiring
a remote good.
From the above discussion it will be seen that ra-
42. See Brightman, POI, Chap. Ill, 62-100.
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tionality as defined in this dissertation includes the ef-
fect of ideals on individual minds, for it has been said
that rationality aims at the good.
In spite of the contention of numerous philosophers
43that good and value are indefinable, one may demur that
when a person has a concept of anything he has an idea
which can in some way, however inadequate, be expressed or
defined. Thus one who has seen the color yellow may grope
for words, but there are propositions about it which have
meaning, according to the intelligence and previous experi-
ence of the person to whom the propositions are addressed.
To regard any term as wholly indefinable seems to reduce a
person to complete inability to say anything significant
about it. Good and value may resist adequate definition,
but some meaningful statements may be made about them. Some
of these follow in the succeeding paragraph.
ii. Fundamental assumptions concerned with the good .
Good will be better understood by examining the postulates
presupposed by the supposition of a rational good. These
are necessitated if good is to have any rational meaning,
and must be seen as implied by the notion of rational good.
The first postulate to be noted here is that a good with
some degree of rationality must be real, i.e. it is not
merely a matter of preference; it has some status in the
43. Moore, PE, 7; Urban, IW, 139-140; Rashdall, TGE,
I, 135; Dewey, EN, 398; Sorley, MVIG, 91, 93, 108,
139, 141; Demos, POP, 74.
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actual world. If there is no objective good, no benefit
that man does not now possess could result from his action.
To act at all would be both futile and foolish. A ration-
al good is one that is objective. This idea will be ex-
plored rather fully in Chapter Four.
The second assumption is that good can be actualized.
Freedom is essential to the good as it is essential to ra-
44
tionality. For if there were good, and man could not re-
alize it, this would be to cause him pain and misery, and
thus would contradict the idea of good which motivates him.
And if men believe that their choices make a difference in
the world when they actually do not, then the system in
which such a thing is possible is irrational. This will be
treated more fully in Chapter Five.
The third assumption is that some goods are not yet
realized in practical affairs. This is to say that ideals
and duties are bound up with the notion of good. For it
would be meaningless and irrational for creatures with the
power of reason and the capacity for realizing values that
human beings have, to carry on life in a world where noth-
ing else good could ever be achieved. Human beings normal-
ly neither feel that there are no goods to be valued and re-
alized, nor that life would be bearable unless goods could
be realized. There are still persons who forego places of
prestige and opportunity with high salaries because they
44. Bowne, MET, 329.
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cannot feel that they deserve the amount paid. They have
an ideal of actualizing a proportionate amount of good for
the remuneration they receive. This general question, also
will be more fully dealt with in Chapter Five.
Fourth is the assumption of the enduring quality or
the permanence of goods. It must simply be seen that if
a supposed good does not last long enough to be tested and
evaluated, if it does not remain valid everywhere it occurs,
it loses its rational character, which is the chief quality
which could require it to be regarded as good. This assump-
tion, if true, makes possible the rational choice of alter-
natives v/ith. a view to the long run. Although human con-
ceptions of good may be only partly stabilized or made per-
manent, the objective world-order still retains a systemat-
ic mode of operation in which everything that is good makes
a lasting contribution. Chapter Four will deal with this
postulate at greater length.
The fifth assumption is that the concept of the good
which each person has is binding upon him, and also is to
be taken as indicative of the general nature of good every-
where in the universe. This is expressed in Brightma^s Law
of Autonomy (derived from Kant) , that "self-imposed ideals
45
are imperative." If the first proposition is not true,
then we are being deceived about good and no rational ideal
45 • Brightman, ML, 106; See Rashdall, TGE, I, 61.
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is possible. If the Law of Autonomy is untrue, then no
further progress in understanding the nature of the good
can be made, for a man f s own mental capacity is the first
and last means by which he can know anything. The good be-
comes an" ought -to -do" , a fact binding upon the man who com-
prehends it; and increasingly so in proportion to its de-
gree of coherence with the rest of his thinking. Chapters
Four and Five will both employ this assumption and give it
further explication.
The sixth postulate concerning the rational good is
concerned with its requirement that all persons should be
regarded as equal so far as the primary fact of selfhood
alone is considered. Good is realized in persons; only
persons recognize the ought—the obligation which the per-
ception of an ideal places upon them. Rationality permits
no unfairness among persons, and a rational good is impos-
sible if some persons have unearned and unmerited advantages.
Basic equality of persons, then, is a postulate of the ra-
tional good; if there is inequality it must be such as can
be rationally justified—an equality which in the final an-
alysis is really adjusted reward, deserved, and coherent in
the whole social scheme. In Chapter Five this postulate will
be considered still further.
The ought-to-be-liked, the good, will be the goal
when one values rationally, i.e. with a coherent, self-con-
sistent, and most widely inclusive end in view. The ought-
46. Cf. Wheelwright, CIE, 378.
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to-be-liked takes precedence over the liked because it makes
a universally comprehensible appeal; i.e. it has meaning for
all rational minds, whereas value-claims are individual and
often hotly contested opinions with doubtful validity when
carried to wider areas of experience.
iii. The claim of good upon rational beings . The rea-
sonable person is oriented by his own nature toward the
ought-to-be-liked. As soon as a man begins to discipline
his likes by referring them to reasons, he becomes more ob-
jective. His value-claims will either gain new strength
thereby, or die for want of sustenance because they cannot
assimilate the strong meat of rational objectivity with
which adult ideas are nourished. One may differ with Plato
concerning the mode of conceiving the objectivity of the
good, but that the way of knowledge leads to the good seems
47
undeniable. Plato expresses the idea thus:
The idea of good is the highest knowledge, . • .all oth-
er things become useful and advantageous only by their
use of this.
Do you think that the possession of the whole world
is of any value without the good? or of all wisdom,
without the beautiful and good?
It has already been intimated that purpose is an as-
pect of rationality. Purpose is basic in the nature of a
reasonable person, a rational being. Coherent thought it-
47. Plato, Rep . , Bk. vi, 505a.
48. See above, 15-17.
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self is fraught with intention, with a motivation toward
49
its object. "At any moment," says Royce, "your ideas,
50in so far as they are rational, embody a purpose." Pur-
pose is the term applied to the will to approve, choose, and
pursue an end persistently. A good purpose may be said to
rule the person who approves, chooses, and persistently
pursues ideal ends, those which ought to be pursued. "Rea-
son calls us to see our minds and our world as a whole; and
to approve as ideal only those ends which are rational in
51
the light of that vision."
Purposes come into conflict and contradict each oth-
er—a condition which indicates that the task of reason is
not yet fully performed, and that the good is incompletely
realized. A man who is at cross-purposes with himself can-
not assert that his mental state is good, nor is he able
with confidence to reason about what ought to be liked in
a more ultimate sense. He is irrational in as much as he
sees the good imperfectly. When one sees what ought to be
liked and finds his satisfaction in it, he has, for the
time being, realized his rational capacity to the full.
Changing conditions, and the arrival of new ideas may later
require him to look again, to select and pursue ends in the
49. Cf. Hobhouse, RG, 22.
50. Royce, WI, I, 441, 443.
51. Brightman, POI, 82.
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service of the good, but each challenge thus met brings
him a rung higher on the ladder of rationality.
The definition of good, as well as that of ration-
ality, requires reference to purpose, the kind of purpose
that is expressed in a rational will. "The coherent will
alone is concretely good. It is the source of the goodness
52
of objects or things." Until there is some sense of di-
rection, of goal or end, no one can say with conviction
that anything is good except the purpose or will which in-
tends to move in such a direction that good will be pro-
duced, whatever that direction may turn out to be.
iv. A working definition of the good . If purposes
are both rational in the sense defined above, and success-
ful, a good objective order is the probable outcome. What-
ever men find or whatever they experience is accepted by
them as good if they see that it fulfils a rational purpose,
i.e. a purpose which includes the greatest possible benefit
to all together. Rational purposes and anything that ful-
fils rational purposes may be said to be good
.
Anything
which has not been employed, is no longer employed, or can-
not be employed to fulfil a rational purpose may be neutral
or evil; the latter if it fulfils an irrational purpose.
v. Validation of the definition . This description
of the good, although somewhat general, is clear. To be ra-
52. Paton, GW, 180.
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tional as previously defined, includes being coherent, self-
consistent, and the constant attempt to include more facts.
Purpose refers to the persistent will to approve, choose,
and pursue any end, good or bad. Rational purpose indi-
cates the self-direction and self-restraint of the person
actively seeking the things he likes and ought to like, vol-
untarily submitting to the principles of coherence, self-
consistency, etc. The motivation, the will to make pur-
poses rational, must come from childhood training, from an
active conscience, or from a religious consciousness.
The definition places emphasis upon purposes, and
thus indicates two functions of a purpose—the motivating
of a person to choose ends and to select means. Since ra-
tional purposes themselves are basic agencies in the service
of the good, without which it could have neither meaning
nor realization, such purposes must be designated as in-
trinsic goods, or ends-in-themselves. The means which they
employ are instrumental goods; the latter will be rational
so far as they are harmonized with the end sought, examined
and selected with the view of increasing the rationality of
purposing agents everywhere. It is not intended to main-
tain that the only intrinsic goods are rational purposes,
—
any end, rationally chosen, may be said to be an intrinsic
good. But it will be instrumental in so far as it con-
tributes still further to the development of rational pur-
poses or wills. Rational purposes will include the inten-
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tion to like what is worth liking, and thus exclude values
based merely on impulsive or erratic desires. One of the
strange paradoxes of the human self is its ability to ac-
complish its aim to be rational by deciding against itself,
choosing a rational end in spite of its strong inclination
toward an irrational end.
Someone might object that purposes are often evil,
so that the definition would allow whatever serves evil
ends to be called good. An evil political machine, like
the Nazi party, could be called good because it fulfils a
purpose. The word rational is the sole safeguard against
this interpretation. Whatever is evil is so because it
conflicts with well-established, well-attested purposes.
Evil is by nature ungrounded, detached, illogical, partial,
spasmodic, and incoherent. Within a limited realm evil pur-
poses may be elaborately and intricately organized, but
their success must depend upon deception concerning their
true place in the whole order of existence.
The attempts to define the good and the rational have
shown how closely related the two concepts are. In experi-
ence they seem to be inseparable if one adheres closely to
the idea of good as that which ought to be liked. In that
case the rational is part of the good— it is one of the
items which ought to be liked. On the other hand, if there
is a genuine good, it will inevitably and invariably be
found to be rational in the sense in which rational has
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been defined. This problem is fundamental— it will occupy
the most of Chapter Three.
4. Summary of the chapter
In the present chapter a statement of the problem
and definitions of terms have been presented. The fact must
be recognized that in spite of the constant use of the term
good and the efforts of men to develop a rational society,
the present state of things is disappointing. Modern sci-
ence, which has been regarded as possibly the most rational
of human interests, and which has its day of profound in-
fluence, has assumed an attitude of indifference toward the
good. Therefore one is constrained to ask, first, in what
sense, if any, is the good rational? Second, are there
valid concepts of good which human reason can discover? Is
a rational good either necessary or possible? Finally, can
the supposedly valid concepts of good be realized in con-
crete experience?
Such questions can only be answered when it is known
what is meant by the rational good. The ambiguity of the
word rational is one of the stumblingb locks which must be
removed. For this dissertation the meaning of the word was
taken to be three things: First, the clarity and coherence
of the thought-process itself; second, a dialectic where-
by the end to which a constantly wider inclusion of data
logically points is taken as making certain justifiable de-
mands upon the reasoner; and third, the attempt to fulfil
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these demands by applying them to nature and to society.
Thus rationality may he thought of as a union of the ideal
53
and the practical.
The good, it was said, requires differentiation from
ideals and values. Whereas value refers to whatever is de-
sired, liked, loved, enjoyed, or prized, the good is taken
to refer only to what ought to be liked. Values are thus
dependent upon persons and are subjective; true values are
taken to be equivalent to the good and have also an objec-
tive aspect. As objective, the good makes a rational demand
on minds everywhere— its appeal is universal. Ideals are
goods which call upon rational beings to realize them; they
are ends which ought to be liked because of their nature,
and because of the nature of the rational persons who ap-
prove of them. Of course they are values, too, when some-
one likes them.
Good is of two orders or kinds- -the good end, good-
in- itself , and the good means, or instrumental good. The
good-in-itself is defined in this chapter as a rational will
or the intention of a rational mind. The first thing that
can be said to be good is the agency which intends to move
and does move in such a direction that good will be pro-
duced, increased, spread abroad. Instrumental good is the
designation for anything which fulfils rational purposes.
53. See above, 16-17.
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5. Sources
Among ancient philosophers, Plato and his successors
up to the closing of the Academy furnish considerable rele-
vant material. Germs of much modern thinking are present
in the philosophy of the Sophists, the Cyrenaics, the Cyn-
ics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, In the modern period
the material becomes so abundant as to be almost unwieldly.
From the seventeenth century until the present in Germany,
France, and England able men have contributed extensively
to the better understanding of rationality and goodness.
Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, the
British moralists, the Deists, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, the
German idealists—but time and space fail even the naming
of the contributors. No attempt can be made to review all
these sources, but wherever fitting and needful, they will
be used for illustration and reference.
Recent books which relate closely to the problem of
this dissertation are: The Rational Good by L.T. Hobhouse,
The Good Will by H.J". Paton, and The Intelligible World by
W.M. Urban. A glance at footnotes will reveal that much
help has been derived from Bowne, Blanshard, Bosanquet,
Brightman, Dewey, James, Leighton, Pringle-Pattison, Rader,
Rashdall, and many others.
6. Statement on method and the plan of future chapters.
The method to be followed in the dissertation is to
explore first the writings of certain philosophers who en-
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tertain doubts about the rationality of the world, and who
are somewhat arbitrary in their selection of ideals which
they regard as valid. These writings and viewpoints will
be subjected to criticism. With the help of the results
obtained by criticism, with the method indicated, the prob-
lem of the implicative system in which the rational good
plays its part will be explored. Throughout, the aim will
be to realize the ideal of rationality already portrayed,
and if this effort is successful, the final chapter will
indicate what relation the rational good may be expected to
bear to social progress, and will constitute an attempted
application of the principles evolved to the social en-
vironment. The plan as a whole follows: Chapter One, as
noted, states the problem and offers definitions. Chapter
Two will deal with objections to the notion of a rational
good. In Chapter Three certain logical and epistemo logi-
cal ramifications of the rational good will be explored;
the problem of Chapter Four will be the relation of the ra-
tional good to the real; and as stated above, Chapter Five
will be concerned with the possibility that a rational good
may bear fruit in social progress.
With this prelude, then, the course is set, and the
task is ready to begin. The first question to ask is, what
case do those have who challenge the rational good? Can it
be demonstrated to be an ideal alike impossible to conceive
coherently and to realize? These questions require an an-
swer which the following chapter will attempt to supply.

CHAPTER II
OPPOSITION TO THE RATIONAL GOOD
1. Review of the definition of the rational good
In the preceding chapter the rational good has been
defined as having a dual aspect: the first and fundamental
one is a will that moves coherently, consistently, and in-
telligently to produce and increase harmony; and the sec-
ond aspect consists of the means which this will employs
to produce harmony. The present chapter will set forth a
number of views which oppose one or both of the elements
of rationality as thus defined. These views will then be
evaluated.
2. The incompleteness of the progress of mind
All philosophers worthy of the name have recognized
one fact—namely that finite intelligence has proceeded
but a small distance toward complete understanding of the
world. Whether this results from the intrinsic irration-
ality (brute factuality) of nature, or from the limitations
of finite reason, or from both together, is a point at is-
sue. Comparatively few thinkers are persuaded that the
world is meaningless, but it seems only fair to say that 1
The actual knowledge that we have arrived at in no
way justifies us in assuming the absolute rationality
of the universe. Strictly speaking, not a single event
1. HSffding, POR, 36-37.
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has ever "been entirely explained. Our causal series
display many gaps, and they come to an end altogether
long before we have reached any cause which we can
suppose to be first.
Therefore reason is often at rope's end, and many sys-
tem-builders charge the objective world, both physical and
nonphysical, with the responsibility. Reason could discov-
er its secret if it had a secret, and solve its problems if
a solution were possible. Many world processes apparently
neutralize each other and are therefore self-defeating. The
world is in part irrational and there is no guarantee that
2
a rational good is possible.
3. Classifications of various metaphysical
views which fall into irrationality
Various conceptions of the world's supposed irration-
ality have been formulated. To say, on metaphysical grounds
that the objective world partakes of unreason may mean
(1) that it is mechanical in its operation, atomistic
in its composition, and infiltrated with unaccount
able (or brute) facts. This view is called mech-
anism, atomism, naturalism, or the scientific view
The names of Democritus, Hobbes, Hume, and Darwin
may be associated with the idea of mechanism or
atomism. Empiricism and realism in general are
aspects of philosophy which take account of brute
fact.
2. See Cohen, RN, 136, for an assertion that there is
irrationality in the universe.
t
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(2) that it is governed by an arbitrary will or mind
which is indifferent to human valuations and
ideals. This view may be called authoritarianism
and is exemplified in Calvinism and in Mohammed-
anism.
(3) that the so-called goods which the world affords
are subjective and illusory while seeming to be
real; values are palliatives to keep human vic-
tims disposed to endure further suffering. There
is no true good. This is called pessimism, and
Schopenhauer is the most famous proponent of it.
{U) that there are real or objective goods, but that
these are contrary to usual human valuations; the
usual valuations are irrational. This is approx-
imately what Nietzsche affirms in what he calls
transvaluation in the subtitle of The Will to
Power.
(5) that the real goods are inaccessible to the dis-
cursive reason, and hence incapable of definition
and conceptual treatment. Plotinus is an out-
standing representative of this view, which is
called mysticism.
(6) that the world contains an irrational element (not
merely brute fact) which is intrinsically antag-
onistic to law and order, and which continuously
resists the efforts of reason to overcome it. The
t
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religions of the world recognize such an element
as a rule; (Ahriman, Satan, karma) . But it is al-
so recognized by certain empirical philosophers,
of whom Plato is an eminent representative. The
view itself, for want of a better term, may be
called realism or factualism.
First view : mechanism and atomism * Naturalism and
the natural sciences contain views which approximate that
expressed in the first group above. For the scientist the
world is a maze of facts to be discovered and described in
3
as orderly a fashion as possible.
It is loosely knit. Its primary material are minute
particles, and the main principle which science recog-
nizes in their behavior is mere chance. ... So much
progress in our appreciation of the world could not be
achieved in a few years. Galileo, for instance, was en-
tirely unaware that nature is ruled by chance and thus
escapes all understanding. It was practically our gen-
eration which made this final discovery.
Science employs one main explanatory principle—the
mechanioal principle of cause and effect. It must find the
antecedents and the consequents of each single fact, and it
makes no attempt to explain why any fact should be just
what it is, beyond asserting that some event or chain of
events immediately preceded it. One effect of this adher-
ence to the scientific method is to rule out the possibil-
ity of adequate explanation of certain kinds of facts, par-
ticularly in the fields of ethics and psychology, or in oth-
3. KShler, PVWF, 13. K&hler is rot in full sympathy
with the view expressed. Cf. ibid., 35-37, 410-
411, 413.
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ers where human preferences and volitions must enter in.
Cause and effect relationships simply do not account, in
any satisfactory sense, for the occurrence of our ideas or
our preferences. For this reason philosophers and even sci-
entists themselves have condemned the inadequacies of the
scientific method. In the realm of fact, says Blanshard,
genius is no better than lunacy; better and worse are con-
trasts which no science which deals exclusively in facts
4
can. indulge in. The critic of science and of scientists
5
may say:
You give us correct but misleading statements about
man so long as your statements refer to mere facts and
not to the very essence of the human world, to value
and to insight in values. Lastly, science is a destruc-
tive agent in that it tends to demolish not only this
or that particular valuation of man, but even his be-
lief in value as such, as a principle that transcends
mere facts.
The self-limitation of science to facts of a mechan-
ical and atomistic nature blinds it to other facts just as
significant—facts which point to a different kind of ra-
tionality and to an objective order of goodness. Socrates
saw this danger of missing part of the truth in his day;
and Bowne represented the opinion of many when he wrote:
^
4. Blanshard, NT, I, 4-63.
5. KBhler, PVWF, 32. Kflhler is not precisely stating
his own view. Cf. ibid., 35-36, 410, 411.
6. Plato, Phaedo
,
97b-99d.
7. Bowne, MET, 296; cf. THE, 290.
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But as to science, we must remember the relativity
and incompleteness of actual science. If it will hold
for a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases,
it will do all we can ask of it.
The natural sciences cannot really challenge a ra-
tional good, for they are by their choice of methods ex-
cluded from the realm of knowledge where the rational good
may be found. Its rationality lacks a full-blooded vital-
ity— its method is rational only with respect to the lim-
ited purpose which called it into being. The great con-
tributions of the established descriptive and experimental
sciences should not be ignored or disparaged, but these
contributions must not blind men to its shortcomings and
inadequacy to deal with man*s ethical and spiritual prob-
lems, which are, after all, the fundamental ones.
ii. The second view : authoritarianism . The second
classification of beliefs about the objective world which
purport to offer a challenge to the rational good is that
which asserts the domination of the world by an arbitrary
will which is indifferent to humanity and its standards of
valuation. These beliefs include primitive animistic con-
ceptions, theological views of God as an inexorable poten-
tate, and the notions of fatalists or other persons who
have a continuous quarrel with the universe. In animism,
worshippers are filled with a superstitious fear of evil
spirits or gods whose capricious demands have no logical
ground or explanation—they are wholly irrational, and are
met as well as can be by the practice of irrational magic
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and sacrifice. Mohammedanism represents God as a supreme
potentate who demands complete submission of his servants
(to whom he is merciful). Even though Allah is cruel to
his enemies, however ungodlike that may seem to most mod-
ern Christians, he is probably not more cruel than the God
of Calvinistic theology has been represented by some of its
o
adherents, for the latter God has been said to vent his
wrath upon infants, and his mercy toward men or his con-
demnation of them is unpredictable.
As for the notions of fatalists or disgruntled per-
sons—not all, of course, regard the world as under the dom-
ination of will. Many see it as contingent. However, James
Thomson* s "The City of Dreadful Night" describes a divine
being who delights in visiting woes upon mankind and is con-
sequently not bound by human standards of rationality and
goodness.
Such views carry little conviction with the majority
of thinking people. They appeal more to emotional persons,
or to those who have experienced frustration. The main arg-
ument against them is that they do not adequately account
for the whole experience of mankind. Science itself has
overcome any argument for animism; and common sense pro-
hibits worship of a God who is arbitrary, unfair, or unpre-
8. See the Koran
,
Chap. Ill, 32, 45; Chap. VI, 89;
Chap. X, 157; Chap. XXII, 250-251; Chap. XL, 352;
Chap. XLII, 359.
9. See M. Wigglesworth, MThe Day of Doom."
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dictable. Human beings often show more of divine nature.
And men who think of God as a tyrant who loves to torment
them simply accuse the divine of originating evils which
actually have other causes; if they would be rational, many
of these causes might be pointed out to them. They ignore
the good that comes to them and magnify the evil—an irra-
tional procedure. Rationality calls for an ever-widening
inclusion of facts in a man*s account of things—hence these
beliefs constitute no fundamental challenge to the rational
good.
iii. The third view : pessimism and f ictionalism . The
third mode of conceiving of an irrational world is that of
the pessimists. There are moments when most human beings
feel strongly inclined to be Schwarzseher . Values seem il-
lusory and the apparent goods which come to mankind, when
viewed more comprehensively, are seen to be evils, for they
make possible to mankind the great evil of survival. To live
is to desire, to desire is to be frustrated and to suffer;
suffering is evil, therefore life is an evil. This theme
recurs in Schopenhauer's writings, and reaches a climax in
such passages as the following:^"
But the present is always passing through his hands
into the past; the future is quite uncertain and always
short. Thus his existence, even when we consider only
its formal side, is a constant hurrying of the present
into the dead past, a constant dying. But if we look
at it from the physical side; it is clear that, as our
10. Schopenhauer, YJWI, I, 401-402.
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walking is merely a constantly prevented falling, the
life of our body is only a constantly prevented dying,
an ever-postponed death.
,In the same minor key sound forth such expressions
as that the life of man and brute alike "swings like a pen-
dulum backwards and forwards between pain and ennui"; this
is true because the essential nature of life is to will and
to strive; it is a nature "which may be very well compared
to an unquenchable thirst."^ This is the worst of all pos-
sible worlds, for if it were any worse, it could not en-
12
dure; all life would cease.
Blind irrational will, the deepest reality in the
universe, is the agency back of all activity. This will is
inscrutable—it is ungoverned by reason in its original
13
status. It is postulated because of the fact that
in everything in nature there is something of which no
ground can ever be assigned, of which no explanation is
possible, and no ulterior cause is to be sought.
Some temporary alleviation of this otherwise com-
pletely hopeless situation may be found by some persons in
14
artistic contemplation.
Most extreme of the pessimists whose writings are
15
available is Prince Troubetzkoy, who asserts dolefully that
11. Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 401-402.
12. Cf . Wright, HMP, 364.
13. Schopenhauer, WWI, I, 153, 230, 354.
14. Schopenhauer, SEL, 120, 127-128; WWI, I,
15. Troubetzkoy, art. (1917), 179-181.
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. • . Life in its entirety, always repeats the same
vicious circle, spinning on its axis like any stupid
top.
Every life struggles to rise above the earth like the
butterfly, only to fall back, without hope of respite,
and be blended with the dust.
What we now experience is no longer the mere ab-
sence of rational meaning, no longer the disappointment
of failing to reach the goal; it is something far more
excruciating. ... We see the meaning of life, for
which we were in search, transformed into an object of
mockery.
A type of thought which takes goods to be illusory
after the manner of pessimists but from a different motive
is f ictionalism, of which Vaihinger 1 s philosophy of the "as
if" is illustrative. This philosophy owes much to Kant*s
phenomenalism. According to Vaihinger, "all ideals, log-
ically considered, are fictions."^" The presence of fic-
tions is proved by the contradictions, the antinomies that
are generated. Fictions are useful inventions,—they "are
mere temporary halting-places for thought and have no bear-
17
ing on reality." In a manner similar to that of prag-
matism, fictionalism looks to action and to practical con-
sequences as the end of thought; and the fact that an idea
is false does not preclude the possibility of its being
18 TO
useful. Good and values are unreal, for
16. Vaihinger, PAI, 46-47.
17. Ibid., 66, 100.
18. Ibid., pref., viii.
19. Ibid., 124.
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the only thing that is real and will remain real is the
observable unchangeability of phenomena, their relations,
etc. Everything else is a mere illusion with which the
psyche plays about.
Suoh a nihilistic treatment of goods and values con-
tradicts both common sense and sound reason, for over and
over again the power of ideas, ideals, truth, and love, as
against "the observable unchangeability of phenomena" has
been demonstrated. Today, as ever, "the pen is mightier
than the sword."
If it were able to describe the whole of life as well
as it characterizes men's blacker moods, pessimism would
constitute a challenge of considerable significance to the
rational good. But if a man will have it that good is real-
ly bad, that value is an illusion, that the world is only
20
intelligible when it is irrational, then he is arbitrary
and subjective, and his account of things, while it may be
21
intriguing, cannot be authoritative. Most men choose to
be rational rather than irrational.
iv. The fourth view : transva luat ion . The fourth con-
ception of the irrational character of the world, as pre-
sented above, was that there are real, objective goods but
that these conflict with ordinary and usual human valuations
by reason of their superiority. The usual valuations are
not only irrational—they are weak. The fundamental fact
in the world, says Nietzsche, who advocates this view, is
20. Urban, IW, 187.
21. Rashdall, TGE, II, 236.
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the "will to power," This will simply exists as a primary
22
force in the world. In the affirmation of it lies the
possibility of realizing the true goods; but only strong
men are courageous enough to follow out the implications
of ruthlessness and individualism which it demands. The
will to power is the metaphysical ultimate, and all things
else are instrumental. When the will to power can be ade-
quately realized in an individual, he is a superman or over-
23
man.
The usual valuations, those of the Sklaven, bring
on decadence in a society—they produce mediocrity or some-
thing worse. They deny instead of affirming the will to
24
power. Traditional Christianity, for example, fosters a
"poor people's God," and honors the weak, simpering virtues
25
of pity, benevolence, and love. Democracy, the political
code of the herd, is rejected; and in its place is substi-
tuted the ideal of men who are strong enough to be "free
26
spirits." The inferior race is justified in existing at
all, only because it serves as a pedestal for the superior
27
men. The latter constitute the aristocratic, ideal class
22. Nietzsche, WTP, II, sees. 533, 552; see also
sees. 3, 4, and 6; BGE, sec. 36.
23. Nietzsche, TSZ, Prologue, sec. 3; cf. Perry, PRP,
171-172.
2U. Nietzsche, BGE, 57.
25. Nietzsche, GOM, Pref. sees. 5, 6; ANT, sees. 17,18.
26. Nietzsche, DOD, sees. 199, 201; Wright, HMP, 391.
27. Cf. Barrett, ETH, 243.
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of masters; they exercise their strength and create their
own morality, --their own way of life, which is one of self-
assertion, splendid courage, self-crucifying exertion (for
one must not pamper himself). Nietzsche found his ideal in
classical Greece— in her splendid art, her intellectual aris-
tocracy, her delight in strong physiques and athletic skill.
Nietzsche was convinced that Christianity was chiefly respon-
sible for the loss of these values, and that they must be
regained, if at all, by the denial of traditional morality.
28
He describes the reversal thus:
Perhaps the most solemn conceptions that have caused
the most fighting and suffering, the conceptions God*
and 'sin 1 will one day seem to us of no more importance
than a child's plaything or a child's pain seems to an
old man.
On Nietzsche's view truth can no longer be regarded
as a rational ideal, if the true goods are to be gained.
29This is evident when he writes that 7
the falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection
to it. . . . The question is how far an opinion is life-
furthering, life-preserving. . . . And we are fundamen-
tally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to
which the synthetic judgments a priori belong) are the
most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of
logical fictions. . . man could not live.
If one is to take Nietzsche seriously, it is evident
that he discards the usually accepted principles of ration-
ality, for he asserts the absence of any end or goal in the
30
universe, and declares that although destruction (presum-
28. Nietzsche, BGE, 75.
29. Ibid., 8.
30. Nietzsche, WTP, 425; BGE, 20.
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ably of everything that thwarts the will to power) is il-
logical, "the Nihilist does not believe in the necessity
31
of being logical."
The only way one may take Nietzsche seriously is to
look for what he was trying to do. His inconsistencies
are difficult if not impossible to reduce to rationality
—
he seems to intend to be provocative and exciting rather
32
than logical. But underlying his demand for a trans-
valuation of values, back of the condemnation of the old
insipid order of human mediocrity, he seems to have some-
thing of the same idea in mind as Socrates had in the fol-
33
lowing speech:
I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the
greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish
also the greatest good things. Then all would be well.
But now they can do neither of the two.
Thus it may be that Nietzsche* s radical and paradox-
ical language conceals the true underlying rationality of
his chief purpose—to rid the social order of hypocrisy,
weakness, resentment, envy, mediocrity, and meanness of
spirit. There is nothing in the conception of the ration-
al good which conflicts with this aim, and in so much
Nietzsche offers no real challenge to the rational good.
However, Nietzsche is irrational in his method, even
31. Nietzsche, WTP, 425.
32. Of. Wheelwright, CIE, 128.
33. Plato, Crito , 44d.
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though his "beneficent purpose be acknowledged. His view is
partial; his ideas of men and things are too absolute in
some respects, for he would have a man either master or
slave, and good either the expression of the will to power
34
or nothing. In other words, Nietzsche's ideal is too re-
stricted, too one-sided, too prejudiced. Merely to dismiss
the goods or values to which he is opposed does not blot
them out of existence, nor refute their claims, nor prove
them irrational.
35
One other point as raised by Barrett may be noted.
Nietzsche's view does not reveal fully what shall be the
function of the superman, beyond the fact that he will ex-
ult in his power and in his anticipation of the eternal re-
currence. But an idle, aimless perfection is an irrational
culmination of any effort. The likely occupation of super-
men would be war, which unfortunately means the destruction
of all values, to a considerable extent even those of the
victor.
Various features of Nietzsche's philosophy lack suf-
ficient ground to be acceptable. For example, the world as
driven wholly by blind will is an hypothesis untrue to the
totality of facts, some of which point to a rational tele-
ology. The assumption that the masses must serve as step-
34. Cf. Wheelwright, CIE, 128.
35. Barrett, ETH, 244.
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ping-stones for the few masters is contrary to the ration-
al principle that men benefit themselves as they benefit
others—a theory at least as old as Socrates, Nietzsche
contradicts the rational good, for the most part, but it
may be said that his contribution, if he has been rightly
interpreted, is greater than his challenge. Rationality
is largely determined by purpose, by the intended end.
v * Tne fifth view: mysticism . The fifth mode of
conceiving of the world's irrational character is one which
declares that the real goods of the world are inaccessible
to the discursive reason, and must be comprehended by other
means. Conceptual treatment of them, attempts to define
them, are futile; real goods and rational valuations are
incommensurable
.
This viewpoint may be broken up into two problems,
the metaphysical and the epistemo logical, of which the lat-
ter, which is concerned with the ways other than reason by
which one may know reality, will be treated in a later por-
tion of this chapter. The metaphysical problem will deal
briefly with the goods themselves, with what is regarded
as real.
Mysticism is the type of philosophy which approxi-
mates this point of view most nearly. In this discussion
it will neither be feasible nor necessary to separate re-
ligious from philosophical mysticism. The question to be
36. Plato, Apol., 2$c-e; cf. Rep
. , 335.
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considered is, how does the mystic think of the real, and
in what way is his thinking opposed to the idea of a ra-
.
tional good?
According to Josiah Royce, the mystic supposes the
37
real to be indefinable. Nothing can be said about the
real without contradiction, since the necessary judgment
represents a finite viewpoint about an absolutely all-in-
elusive unity which contains even the knower himself. Any
statement is limited to an abstract and partial meaning and
is therefore false— it cannot tell the whole truth. Any
partial reality is scorned by the mystic; he desires only
the genuine, the one reality. Bennett describes the mystics.
39
They^
turn their backs on everything that we include under the
terms culture and civilization. They leave behind the
whole elaborate system of goods which men have discov-
ered and laboured to establish. For action they sub-
stitute contemplation; for society, solitude; for rea-
son ecstasy.
Since the ultimate reality cannot be described with-
out falsifying the reality, many mystics have given up the
attempt. But not all; and some of the keen reasoners in
the history of thought have been mystics.^ If one rea-
sons, he must ascribe some predicate, character, or quality
37. Royce, WI, I, 80-83, 186, 188, 191-192. Quoted
in Bennett, SOM, 29.
38. Hocking, TP, 380, 381, 384.
39. Bennett, SOM, 15.
40. Hocking, TP, 390.
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to whatever he names as real. Thus it is, that in mysti-
cism, God or the Real has also been called the Good. The
reason for this has been, as Hocking shows, that some mys-
U
tics waver.
We may refrain from calling the Real 'good/ for fear
of limiting it to our conceptions of goodness, and yet
believe that good* comes nearer the truth than 'evil.'
And while hesitating to assert that the Real is 'mental 1
or •personal 1—for the mentality we know requires a non-
mental environment to live and grow in, and the person-
ality we know needs a society of other persons around
it to play its very partial role in—the mystic still
implies, when he identifies the Real outside us with
the ultimate self within us, that »mind* or • spirit'
would come nearer the truth than 'matter' or any other
non-mental thing. Thus, while mystics have commonly
been in trouble with an orthodox tradition which in-
sists on the literal personality of God, they have com-
monly referred to their Real as 'God.' And Spinoza,
who maintained a stricter neutrality than most, used
the expression 'Natura sive Deus, *—Nature or God.
For the mystic, then, God is the essence of all good,
for which or for whom all lesser goods or human values are
gladly renounced. Such a 'world-flight' contradicts the
elements of the rational good which call for its realiza-
tion in nature and society and for the inclusion of all
sorts of facts within it. This renunciation of the world
seems insufficiently concerned with social progress; and it
refuses to face realistically the actual facts of human ex-
perience. It is less ready to bear the ills that plague
mankind than it is tc "fly to others that we know not of
The extreme otherworldl iness of mysticism is not the way
of the rational good.
41. Hocking, TP, 392; he quotes Plotinus, Enneads,
VI, 9, vi.
42. Bennett, SOM, 29; quotes Plotinus, Enneads. VI
vii, 34.
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vi. The sixth view : realism or factualism . The six-
th way of conceiving of the irrationality of the world was
expressed thus: It was said that existence is weighted
with an irrational element which by its very nature con-
flicts with reason, law, and order. Contemporary writers
who hold this view are numerous. Among them are William
James, E.G. Spaulding, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Otto, and
M.R. Cohen. The latter writes
Existence in the actual world is more than rational
connectedness and ... it cannot be entirely grasped
by mere reasoning.
There is thus something which will always be for us
beyond rational form or system, and in that sense ap-
propriately called irrational.
Spaulding designates this irrational element as
"chance" and the "Valueless" and thinks of it as a nonra-
tional aspect of nature.^ Otto calls it the "numinous"--
an obscure depth "which is not accessible to our power of
conceiving, and which is therefore called the non-rational.
Russell compares the action of nature to a state of anar-
46
chy. James feels that if the world is one orderly, pur-
posive, rational system, then the fight we are in "is no
better than a game of private theatricals from which one
47
may withdraw at will."*"
43. Cohen, RN, 136.
44. Spaulding, WOC, 276; art. (1912), 241; Cf. Bright
man, IPII, 19.
45. Otto, TH, 75; quoted in Baillie, IOR, 251.
46. Russell, ABCR, 196.
47. James, WTB, 61; Pringle-Pattison, IOG-, 394, quotes
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As a matter of fact, this conception of irration-
ality in nature is one of the most ancient of all views, ap«
pearing in numerous religions, and in philosophies at least
from Plato*s time. Before Plato, Anaxagoras felt that he
had to account for the order and harmony. that existed—ap-
parently he felt that disorder and disharmony needed no ex-
plaining. And Empedocles explained the irrational motions
and events by a principle of hate or strife.^
Plato was keenly aware of the evil, chaos, and con-
tradiction in the world. Wild motions surge in the cosmos,
49
and wild emotions in the soul. Neither soul nor cosmos
is in the complete control of reason—for besides reason,
which is the efficient cause, there is a rival cause which
50
is responsible for "accidental and irregular effects."
51
This rival of reason is named "Errant Cause.** It is ir-
rational—a kind of unpredictability which to a consider-
able extent baffles both the finite and divine minds, al-
though God copes with it successfully when he exerts him-
52
self. It is necessity—the state of things which existes
53
"in the absence of God," when the composite elements of
48. See "Fragments" in Nahm,SEGP, 130-131, 150-151.
49. Plato, Rep . , 439c, d,e.
50. Plato, Tim . , 46e.
51. Ibid., 48a.
52 Ibid., 68d, e; 53b; 30a.
53. Ibid., 53a, b.
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the world possess only aimless motion.
What Plato means exactly by his figures to express
the irrationality of the world is a controverted point
55
among interpreters. At various places he intimates that
some achievements are impossible because of the refractory
nature of the materials from which the world must be formed.
56 57
Whether it is mechanical causation, chance, the conflict
of divine purposes by which one purpose necessarily excludes
58
some other, or the nature of things sensed as brute facts
59
or immediate ideas is impossible to determine with any
great degree of certainty from Plato's description. But the
fact remains that necessity arises out of the aimlessness
and incoherence of things, in the absence of God, hence in
60
the absence of order and logical grounding.
The conflict of necessity with reason is one that oc-
61
curs in nature, as Plato conceives of it. It does not oc-
cur in the mind of the Artificer, for he is not obligated
54. Plato, Tim., 52e, 53a.
55. Ibid., 30a, 32b, d; 37d; 53b.
56. Plato, Tim . , Bury's footnote, Engl, page 109.
57. Cornford, PC, 164
.
58. Hitter, EPP, 376-378.
59. Taylor, CPT, 300; Demos, POP, 12.
60. Plato, Tim
. ,
53a, b.
61. Ibid., 56c.
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to have anything to do with it as he would be if it were a
part of his own consciousness. God could rest serene in
his contemplation of ideas; he entered voluntarily into the
62
task of reducing unreason to reason. The process was hin-
dered by the factor of necessity, but the result is a highly
desirable one, ^3 especially in view of the fact that the
former chaotic condition is transformed into a self-acting,
64
self-sufficing universe in which other valuable results
can be wrought out by lesser gods and presumably by men.
The "ever-existing Place" "Wherein" all process oc-
curs is the "Receptacle," otherwise called "Mother," "Nurse,"
65
and "a Kind, invisible and unshaped." The receptacle con-
tained all the "suchlikes" (material possibilities of becom-
ing) befoBe the generation of the universe, when they were
66 n
"always circling round" and there was no reason or meas-
67
ure in anything. Every variety of appearance is manifest-
ed in the receptacle; its motions are irregular, and its con-
tents are shaken like grain being separated from the chaff.
It is upon the contents of the receptacle that God begins
the task of introducing order and reason by "first marking
62. Plato, Tim
. ,
29e, 30a.
63. Ibid., 33a, b; 34a, 53b.
64. Ibid., 33d, 34a.
65. Ibid., 4Be-53c
66. Ibid., 49e.
67. Ibid., 53a.
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them [i.e. the suchlikes of earth, air, fire, and waterlout
68
into shapes by means of forms and numbers." The receptacle
is a permanent factor of reality, along with the pattern
(model, form) and God (the Artificer). In it is found ne-
cessity, the errant cause, v/hich makes the receptacle a hin-
drance, yet a necessary hindrance (if a world is to exist)
to God's plan.
To speculate here upon the ultimate or real nature
of the receptacle, what Plato intended to symbolize, or
what it may mean for modern interpreters, is beside the
point. There are numerous capable interpreters whose con-
69
elusions differ. The point is that a rational account of
the world, from Plato's point of view, cannot assume that
the world is completely orderly, coherent, intelligible,
rational in itself—reason must operate upon it, and make
it as perfect as possible. Reason is a teleological prin-
ciple which must persuade indeterminate "suchlikes" (poten-
tialities) to take on regular motions and harmonious rela-
tionships rather than to remain irrational. The irrational
element in the world is thus not absolute, not wholly in-
corrigible; evils can be transmuted, and a rational good is
possible— it is even in large measure already achieved.
This view, thus expressed, is not a refutation of
the possibility of a rational good, but is rather an il-
68. Plato, Tim.
,
53b.
69. Cf. Cornford, Demos, Taylor, Ritter, Archer-Hind,
Lutoslawski, and others.
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lustration of the problem which it confronts, and of the
way in which it may be articulated. Most of the so-called
challenges to the rational good are challenges to other at-
tempts to harmonize the contradictions in our experience of
nature. Any normal human effort (thought or action) aims
both to be rational and to achieve the good. Others may
see his system as nonsense, but to the man who forms it,
it appears as light and truth. "The philosopher seeks a
world that is intelligible even when, as in the case of
70
Schopenhauer, to be intelligible it must be irrational."
To aim at unintelligibility is self-defeating.
U* Epistemological views which make
concessions to the irrational
The foregoing discussion in this chapter has dealt
with objective aspects of irrationality, and has considered
how experienced metaphysical facts have been interpreted in
important philosophies. The following section will be con-
cerned with epistemological or subjective irrationality
—
with views that reject or repress reason and thus challenge
71
the rational good. As Rader asserts:
Anti-intellectualism has been part of the mental
climate of the age. Among the creeds which have con-
tributed to the revolt against reason may be mentioned
Henri Bergson*s theory of the superiority of instinct
and intuition, Oswald Spengler's preference for the
more romantic and activist phases of culture, Giovanni
70. Urban, IW, 187.
71. Rader, NC, 22.
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Papini's exaggerated interpretation of the pragmatism
of Wm. James, Vilfredo Pareto's emphasis upon senti-
ment and illusion as the "basis of social action, and
such voluntaristic creeds as Gabriele d'Annunzio f s
theatrical romanticism, Charles Maurra's passionate
nationalism, Maurice Barre's "philosophy of energeti-
cism," Giovanni Gentile's "philosophy of the pure act,"
and Houston Chamberlain* s theory of militarism and ra-
cial imperialism.
In this section, so far as the attempt is capable of
being realized, various elements of the revolt against rea-
son will be considered under the following headings: (1) Ir-
rational sources of belief; (2) the repudiation of belief,
scepticism; (3) epistemological dualism; [U) the will to be-
lieve, voluntarism; (5) belief on the basis of immediate
perception or insight, mysticism, intuitionism.
Irrational sources of belief . Well-expressed in
72
the language of James is the fact that
Reason is only one out of a thousand possibilities in
the thinking of each of us. Who can count all the silly
fancies, the grotesque suppositions, the utterly irrele-
vant reflections he makes in the course of a day? Who
can swear that his prejudices and irrational beliefs con
stitute a less bulky part of his mental furniture than
clarified opinions?
The mode of genesis of the worthy and the worthless seems
the same.
The "mode of genesis" referred to is the life of feel-
ing, desire, emotion, and sensation. A ma^s first disposi-
7tion to call a thing good arises from a feeling of pleasure.
Infants, as James says in a well-known passage, experience
72. James, PP, I, 552.
73. Hobhouse, RG, 72.
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naught but "a blooming, buzzing confusion." Impulses run
riot in the child f s consciousness; bodily organization and
structure rather than mental activity is responsible for
whatever harmony and order the child's ideas possess. As
he develops, the life of feeling comes gradually under con-
trol; but it is doubtful that even the most stoical ever
completely subdues his imagination and emotions.
How true this is may be gathered from observation of
men, from introspection, or from literature. Most men heed
their desires and impulses to near exclusion of the claims
of reason. "Wild" emotion and "calm" reason—thus do many
writers describe man's inner life. Plato* s allegory of the
charioteer illustrates the point. The ill-bred, untamed
animal represents the life of sense; the thoroughbred rep-
resents the spirited element in man. Both are active, en-
ergetic, and in need of control; hence the part of the
charioteer, who symbolizes reason. Reason does not originate
its materials and task, but is faced with the problem of
75
organization and control.
In the realm of practical conduct, morals and ethics,
the undisciplined following of impulses is generally recog-
nized to be self-defeating. The man who seeks pleasure or
happiness without regard for other goods, experience re-
veals, will come to a sad disillusionment. A man who seeks
74. James, PP, I, 488.
75. Plato, Phaedr . , 246a ff.
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power exclusively must seek some kind of power: political,
economic, military, physical, or intellectual. In general,
to seek one of these alone will mean that, in the long run,
deterioration will set in as a result of the lack of one or
more of the others. Hence the need of a principle of guid-
ance in one's life to keep it balanced, desire by discipline,
means by ends.
Is the life-force perhaps more fundamental than rea-
son as a directive agency? So-called modernism in philoso-
phy sponsors the viewpoint says Urban.
Life is perpetually at war with thought, and the forms
of reflective thought are made only to be broken, all
goals are set only to be surpassed. The only absolute
truth is that there is no such truth.
James supports the notion of the ultimate power of
life over reason in his description of the faith-ladder,
which he says all people use in their thinking. "It is
life exceeding logic, it is the practical reason for which
the theoretic reason finds arguments after the conclusion
77
is once there." This thought has also been expressed by
Borden Parker Bowne, who is reported to have reiterated
frequently in his lectures to students that "life is deeper
than logic." And a man from the medical ranks indicates
what is probably a common sentiment among professional men,
that "intelligence is almost useless to those who possess
76. Urban, IW, 29.
7?. James, APU, 328-329.
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nothing else."^ Even more radically than any of the men
yet mentioned, Nazi theorists teach the primacy of life and
79
instinct over reason. In the minds of different men the
same creed means something different, but they all mean that
reason is being challenged as an end-in-itself that should
completely rule men's lives. This creed is a kind of re-
verberation from the world-shaking creed of Kant—that the
practical reason is the basis of our belief in fundamental
things, and not the theoretical reason.
Again, in art, subjective emotional states often re-
sult in monstrosities when they are embodied in some medium.
One type of art which portrays emotions is that called "ex-
pressionism"—a type often powerful. Emotion in it is the
very "steam of art." Its emphasis rests upon the making of
the art work an expression of the total life of the artist,
but this tends to become chiefly the expression of feeling.
The steam needs "to be kept in a boiler." In art, as in
ethics and in life, the challenge to reason, if it leads
to successful resistance to reason, also leads in the long
80
run to chaos.
Thus in different ways the life of emotion and feel-
ing is asserted, and the principle of reason is relegated
to the background,— in extreme cases practically into the
78. Carrel, MTU, 137.
79. See Kolnai, WAW, 193, 194ff . Also 202 ff
.
80. Kelps from notes taken in Professor Brightman*s
course in Aesthetics.
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discard. This situation must be recognized and acknowledged
by all, and seems to be a canker in the very heart of any
rational good. There is no question but that it is a chal-
lenge which must be overcome by reason if the idea of a ra-
tional good is to be maintained.
However, the challenge is probably less serious than
its external appearance would indicate. There has been no
claim that rationality springs full-grown from its sources,
as Minerva sprang from the forehead of Jove; but rationality
must be earned, and it develops as an organic growth. Rea-
son must wrestle (and grow by the exercise) with impulses,
desires, and emotions, and build a rational structure out
81
of them. As Hobhouse insists:
The stupidest human being outside an idiot asylum is not
guided by pure impulse alone. . . . Irrational as the
average life may seem. . .it is orderly when compared
with the chaos of spluttering impulses which would re-
main if the element of reason were once for all ab-
stracted.
A sane view, acceptable to many with widely variant
metaphysical positions, a view which neither denies reason
8
nor assumes its omnipotence, is that of Balfour. He writes:
If we have to submit, as I think we must, to an in-
complete rationalization of belief, this ought not to
be because in a fit of intellectual despair we are driv-
en to treat reason as an illusion; nor yet because we
have deliberately resolved to transfer our allegiance
to irrational or non-rational inclination; but because
reason itself assures us that such a course is, at the
81. Hobhouse, RG, 19.
82. Balfour, FOB, 67.

62
lowest, the least irrational one open to us. If we have
to find our way over difficult seas and under murky skies
without compass or chronometer, we need not on that ac-
count allow the ship to drive at random. Rather ought
we to weigh with the more anxious care every indication,
be it positive or negative, and from whatever quarter
it may come, which can help us to guess at our position.
In spite of the lowly manner of the origin of ideas,
the powerful influence of practical and vital interests, a
rational good is still possible. Rationality is a goal that
must be won.
ii. The repudiation of reason
,
scepticism . The sec-
ond kind of epistemological challenge to the rational good
appears in the repudiation of belief, both in reason and in
objective goods. Some of the words used to describe the en-
emies of reason and of certain rational values are interest-
ing. For the most part, they are not commonly used; this is
probably because few people really deserve to be described
by them. Some of these words are: misanthropist, misogam-
ist, misogynist, misologist, and misoneist. The common terms
which are akin to the term misologist are sceptic, agnostic,
and anti-intellectualist. The first two of these indicate
doubt more than hatred of reason; all three deprecate the
power of reason to grasp reality.
Men normally find it much easier to accept than to
doubt their reasoned conclusions. There are no completely
sceptical persons, for such extreme distrust of reason leads
to self-annihilation. Most of the early sceptics were lit-
tle more than clever rhetoricians, able to invent reasons
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for repudiating the knowledge attained "by reason (or by
some other means) • Hume confessed that his scepticism
83
seemed impracticable when he was in certain moods. And
in his book Scepticism and Animal Faith Santayana has de-
clared the impossibility of maintaining the skeptical at-
84
titude. Thus the challenge is partially met by the inabil-
ity of skepticism to sustain itself.
However, it is a hardy growth, and crops up regular-
ly from generation to generation. It appears in unexpected
places, in response to diverse motives, not infrequently,
as in the cases of Hume, Kant, Santayana, and Bradley, being a
by-product of attempts at rational explanation. The view
of Santayana will serve to illustrate the trend toward skep-
tical withdrawal from certain crusades of reason.
Santayana proposes that essences resembling Platonic
forms are the immediate data of experience. They are change-
85
less, inert, subsistent, known by contemplation. Essences
become embodied in the material world (which all conscious
creatures accept on animal faith) by accident or chance. "A
world of accidents, arbitrary and treacherous, first lends
8(
to the eternal a temporal existence and a place in the flux."
83. Hume, EHU, Bk. I, Part IV, Sec. VII; quoted in
Wright, HMP, 208.
84. Santayana, SAF, 40, 67, 108.
85. Santayana, ROM, 84; quoted in Blanshard, NT, I,
434.
86. Loc. cit., both references.

Whatever is behind essences to cause among them the order
and arrangement that we know, is hidden from our knowledge,
87for Santayana says:
The mind cannot pursue the roots of things into the
darkness; it cannot discover why they exist; it must be
satisfied with noting their passing aspect, which is
but an essence; and it must follow the chase, carried
by its own galloping substance, to see what aspect they
may wear next.
A man is compelled to act in order to sustain life;
this action of both men and animals is done on faith. But
knowledge is beyond the power of reason; the only thing any-
88
one can be sure of is the realm of essence. The best that
one can do with the material world is, as far as possible,
to escape it.
Santayana 's viewpoint is an interesting variation of
the Platonic and Kantian schemes of the Eternal and the Be-
coming, or the noumenal and phenomenal realms. But, says
8QBlanshard in criticism, 7
stripped of the glamour with which a splendid prose has
invested it, 'the life of reason' is a life of servitude
to the irrational. Rationality becomes animal luck.
One suspects that the underlying motive is similar
to that which moved the Epicureans—the desire for equanim-
ity of spirit which no restless, necessarily futile search
for the ultimate causes of things will permit. If no dis-
87. Santayana, ROM, 10 3- KM.; Blanshard, NT, I, 435.
88. Edman, POS, 479.
89. Blanshard, NT, I, 438.
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covery is possible, it is irrational to seek.
Such a viewpoint "poisons the wells" against venture-
someness, inventiveness, and a broadening conception of the
good life. It promotes ennui and defeatism by emphasizing
the uncertainties of human experience more than the cer-
tainties, so far as practical, ethical, everyday pursuits
are concerned; for there exists "no necessity in the rela-
tion between cause and effect, and no assurance that law is
90
constant." Again, "no moment, no event, and no world can
insure the existence or the character of anything beyond it.
If these statements express fact, then a rational good is
out of the question. Indeed one cannot be rational; reason
loses all foundation of requiredness or necessity at the be-
ginning.
In some quarters, the doubting tendency has become
cynical and sophisticated. When man and his values are ne-
gated by the educated, the skeptical attitude must penetrate
92the thinking of the masses after a time. When that occurs
no principle will seem worth defending. What after all
are principles? The only principle that still holds is:
I want to be left alone. . . . Without any conviction
whatsoever nobody can be expected to have much courage.
The cynical attitude expresses itself in a "willing-
ness to combine the incompatible" and in the "denial of all
90. Santayana, ROM, 111; in Blanshard, NT, I, 435.
91. Santayana, ROM, 114; ROE, 80-81; Blanshard, NT,
I, 435.
92. XShler, PVWF, 33- KOhler quotes an unnamed man.
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finality." It is seen in such criticism of the rational
94
function as the following:
A dog is content to turn round three times before
lying down; but a man would have to invent an explan-
ation of it. These explanations are often fantastic
and rationalistic in the highest degree. There is not
a single human social institution which has not orig-
inated in hit or miss fashion, but, nevertheless, every
one of these institutions is justified by some ration-
alizing argument as the best possible, and, what is
worse, the community demands the acceptance of these
arguments as a precondition of happy social life.
This account does injustice to the aims of reason
which are not, when it is at its best, to "invent" explan-
ations nor to justify the status quo as the "best possible,"
nor to compel acceptance of irrational arguments. For rea-
son does not invent, but discovers logical connections and
relations; it does not justify what it does not see is real-
ly best under the circumstances; and the only compulsion it
would use is logical compulsion. This is the only true ob-
jective reason. Anyone may strike an arbitrary attitude,
may accuse and berate reason, but he thereby closes to him-
self the doors of any possible truth, even that of defending
his own cause.
iii. Ep istemological dualism. The third division of
actual or supppsed challenges to rationality from the sub-
jective standpoint is dualism—the separation of thought and
thing, knower and known, idea and object. This question
93. Urban, IW, 28.
94. Bridgman, art. (1933), 21.
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follows in natural logical succession from the last one
discussed, for "perhaps the chief criticism passed on the
95dualist ic theory is that it leads to skepticism." In the
same way that the mind-body problem appears baffling, so
the antithetical poles of thought and thing present a per-
plexing paradox. Eow do they come into significant relation
with each other?
Dualism has been challenged in recent years as being
an irrational position because it appears to make knowledge
impossible. A great gulf is fixed by it between the knower
and the known, or the would-be-known. If the theory is cor-
rect, it would seem impossible for anyone to know the exter-
nal world at all.
The complexity of the problem rests in the fact that
there are numerous schemes of explanation on the assumptions
of either monism or dualism, and in the further fact that
terms (such as object, subject, idea, intuition, etc.) are
used somewhat indiscriminately by adherents of both posi-
tions. One of the fundamental principles of rationality--
a clear understanding and exact use of terms— is violated
by the latter procedure.
A high degree of dialectical skill is necessary to
establish anything about the idea-object relation beyond
immediate experience. If one attempts to employ a catalyst,
95. Knudson, PP, 100.
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such as a datum or essence, to bring the two poles together,
the problem turns out to be doubled in difficulty, for now
the knower must not only grasp the essence, but the essence
must in some mysterious way partake of the object. In some
way it must be explained "how the character of objects can
belong at once to the self and to the world. Absolute
idealism and new realism have attempted to preclude the
skeptical outcome of dualism by affirming the unity of idea
and object in knowing.
The difficulty which the latter positions have with
the problem of error is notorious. If one knows reality
directly, it is difficult to see how he can ever labor un-
der an illusion; and if error can be explained as only in-
adequate finite comprehension, how can any distinction be
made between truth and error, since finite comprehension is
never fully adequate? If it is said that the adequacy of
human comprehension may be tested by the coherence of the
new idea with the body of coherent ideas already possessed,
one v/ould feel impelled to ask what value can come from co-
herence when the whole system of knowledge is infected with
error? There is nothing remarkable about the fact that
false ideas may cohere—most evil plans can be intelligibly
and plausibly worked out.
Hence on the face of it, the theorist must cope with
96. Blanshard, NT, I, 44-4.
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this situation: He must choose between wrestling with the
problem with error or with the possible skeptical outcome
of dualism.
Is the dualist necessarily shut up in a solipsistic
retreat? Must he admit ignorance of the outer world? Al-
most no dualist would admit the necessity. The task is to
produce a rational account of how mind can cross the chasm
separating it from things. If this can be done, it is all
any theory can do; and to charge a theory of knowledge with
being dualistic is not on that account to charge it with be-
ing irrational.
Such an intelligible account of knowing was set forth
by Borden P. Bowne, who felt that human minds must assume
a realistic, common-sense attitude toward the objective
97
world. Thus he writes:
The world itself, though more than a thought, is essen-
tially the expression of a thought, and hence lies open
to intelligence. If we assume that the world expresses
thought, and that our thought has something universal
in it, the ground of the parallelism between our thought
and the system becomes apparent, and there is no longer
any speculative reason why finite minds should not
grasp the cosmic fact. Things, as products of the cre-
ative thought, are commensurable with our intelligence
and are essentially knowable. Both human minds and
cosmic things must be traced to a common source in the
creative thought and will. Only thus can the antithesis
of thought and thing be transcended and mediated.
An ultimate metaphysical monism which takes the world
to be of the nature of mind is the most satisfactory answer
to the problem of epistemological dualism. On this view the
97. Bowne, TTK, 3U
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physical world can be explained as independent of finite
minds but as knowable, their knowledge of it being explained
by the fact that all reality below the ultimate Mind has
certain qualities and principles in common. The knowledge
that a finite mind has of the world is valid, but it is no
direct awareness, no copy of the objective order. It is
rather a parallel to it in nature and character. The guar-
antee of correspondence between ideas and objects rests in
the ultimate ground of both orders of reality.
No more than any other theory or explanation can this
be proved to be rational beyond doubt. To many rational
minds it makes little appeal. But it does allow a conception
that is in harmony with normal human intuitions; and it per-
mits one to hold to an objective and rational good. It al-
so leaves open the possibility of contingency and hence of
evil in the cosmos.
iv. The will to believe : voluntarism . The fourth type
of suspected irrational isms in knowing is that which has been
labeled "the will to believe." This is, of course, the ti-
tle of a book of essays by James, and of its leading essay.
James 's view of the function of mind is considered in this
section, although numerous other philosophers also stress
the importance of the will in knowing. lames finds value
to be an ultimate category, rather than the pure being of
traditional rationalistic philosophies. Whatever we believe
gets its hold upon us, in the last analysis, because of its
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value, its attraction for us. All human activity, even sci-
ence itself, arises in response to demands which are expres-
sions of values to he realized in action. The result of
any activity or belief is the test of its value; i.e. good
results justify the action taken. The fruits are the just-
ification of the tree. Hence if "by belief in "higher values"
such as God, freedom, and immortality one gains added strength
and confidence in life, he needs no rational justification
98
of these beliefs.
The meaning which James intended has somehow been
misinterpreted; he was not playing a child's game of wish-
ing, but was advocating the making of choices upon which
one would risk all his effort and his life if need be. This
course of procedure especially lends a degree of certainty
and assurance to one's action when ordinary rational pro-
cesses have contributed their utmost and have failed to
yield a satisfactory answer. The world is full of con-
tingency, and is largely undetermined; effort and action,
in the situations where reason is unable to advance, make
a difference in the outcome of history, and may offer the
best possible solution.
Rightly interpreted and given a limited area of oper-
ation in individual lives, the will to believe is a ration-
al will. A rational good includes the will to bring it in-
98. These ideas are chiefly from the essay. See also
Perry, PRP, 191; Hocking, TP, 156 ff; Barrett,
PHI, 352; Townsend, PIUS, 144.
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to being, out of the realm of the ideal into actuality.
One must be guided by consequences (but not solely by con-
sequences) in order to be rational. The satisfaction of de-
sires is legitimate as long as these are criticized and
disciplined. James seems to say (although probably not in-
tending to do so) that a course of action which yields "cash
value" has in that result its justification. Not his logic
but his sterling ethical character prevented James from ad-
vocating reprehensible means to gain his ends. In addition
to this lack of rigorous logical reasoning, the irrational-
ity of the will to believe lies in the psychological ef-
fect it has upon belief. Some minds will take it as a way
of escape from the grueling work of achieving logical con-
sistency, while upon minds in general, the decision that
"it shall be held for true" is disastrous to one's assurance
99
of certainty. Hocking describes the effect:
The suspicion that our will has tipped the balance
of evidence brands for us the chosen hypothesis as sub -
j ective ; but a belief is the reference of the mind to
an object assumed real, independent, objective. The sus-
picion of subjectivity therefore destroys belief.
The challenge of the will to believe to the rational
good consists in the natural uncritical readiness of common
sense to adopt it as final, coupled with the ease of misin-
terpreting it. A merely subjective good cannot be a ra-
tional good—the rational good is more than the actualizing
99. Hocking, TP, 163.
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of values. The good that is determined by objective rela-
tionships may not coincide with the good that is the result
of action. The will to believe cannot be excused from pas-
sing under rational criticism,
v. Intuitionism and mysticism
.
Mysticism employs
the method of intuition or immediacy in knowing. It is on
the basis of the way of knowing which it employs that it is
treated again in this chapter. No type of philosophy is
100
more anti-intellectual than mysticism. The mystic
regards conceptual knowledge as ever unsatisfying or
meaningless, and Immediate experience as the only trust
worthy guide and the only solid satisfaction.
The mystics almost alone among people who are found
101
as sharers in every kind of world-culture normally are
little concerned about the contradictions in experience,
102
between theory and practice. Bennett says:
Intellectual doubts trouble them very little: they
are not concerned with philosophical problems. Phil-
osophy, indeed, is one of the hindrances which they try
to remove. This attitude is conspicuous among the
Christian mystics, but it is not confined to them.
In place of conceptual thinking the mystics tend to
substitute the way of illumination; they believe that "it
is possible through visions, revelations, or in some other
100. Pratt, RC, 366.
101. Bennett, PSM, 20; Royce, WI, I, 178.
102. Wright, HMP, 623; cf. Royce, WI, I, 83, 86, 144
177.
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superrational manner, to know God or ultimate reality."
Explanation of the awareness of the presence of God is ex-
ceedingly difficult, or even impossible; it rests upon a
feeling of certainty, and all logical propositions are in-
adequate to express it. For this reason it is common prac-
tice for mystics to couch their meanings in allegories, par-
ables, similes, and metaphors when they try to express them-
selves. Mystics are greatly handicapped in expression;
they are unable to communicate intelligibly with anyone who
has not shared experience like theirs. Even though the most
intense feeling and clearest certainty may endure but a
short time, minutes or a very few hours at most, the ex-
perience is a basis of assurance even through periods when
ecstasy is absent.
The general method of knowing of the mystics bears
a close kinship to that of the romanticists and intuition-
ists in literature and philosophy, the chief difference be-
ing its subject-matter and the use made of its results. Ro-
manticists lay emphasis on heeding the commands of the
heart, and on cultivating moods and atmospheres, thus re-
vealing an interest in special or particular types of feel-
ing. This feeling is not that of particular sensations but
rather that of sensible states or "tones'1 ; it leads to im-
pulsive rather than to reflective action. Carlyle, for ex-
103. Wright, HMP, 623; cf. Royce, WI, I, 83, 86, H4,
177.
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ample, rejected analytic psychology and Utilitarianism be-
104
cause they required too much reasoning.
Among the philosophical intuit ionists, Bergson fol-
lows out most completely the nature and implications of his
method. For him intuition is a far more complete and per-
fect way of knowing than intellectual effort. The former
sees whole, sees the real which is invisible and intangible.
Time, for example, is apprehended by intuition and complete-
ly missed by intellect, which is by nature equipped to get
only parts and details, and misses the whole. It is analy-
tic, and cannot explain the great concepts in a way that
will correspond to actual experience. The classic exam-
ple of this failure of intellect to grasp the basic truth
is found in the analysis of motion in Zeno's paradoxes
where reason becomes muddled up with the idea of infinity.
Ultimate reality, l' elan vital , eludes the grasp of
intellect but yields to intuition. Intuition makes no at-
tempt to compare or relate but to comprehend the entire
unit with which it is confronted. It is not nearly so use-
ful or practical as intellect, but it brings persons much
105
nearer to the actual pulse beat of reality.
It is not in their insistence that truth may be
reached by other ways than by discursive reason that in-
104. Hflffding, HMP, II, 379.
105. Bergson, CE, 46, 176 ff; See Hocking, TP, 188-
194; Urban, IW, 126.
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tuitionism, mysticism, or romanticism may "be called irra-
tional, but rather in their one-sided abstractionism and op-
position to rational and intellectual procedures. From this
criticism Bergson may in the main be excused. He grants the
practical value of the rational and critical powers of the
mind, and would in fact supplement intuition with reason.
As will be pointed out in the following chapter, he finds
the two functions to have a common ground and origin. Also
the milder mystics, those who gain lasting good from their
experience, remedy the one-sided and exclusive emphasis,
making the rational processes complementary to the life of
feeling. In the widest view of the matter, it is not ir-
rational to depend for some help in knowing upon the sub-
conscious mind, which may be, after all, the secret of much
of the illumination of the intuitionist, mystic, or romanti-
cist. Irrationality begins when a biased and exclusive con-
ception of the way to acquire knowledge gets the whole right
of way.
5. Summary of the chapter
The outcome of the present chapter is about as fol-
lows: the supposedly irrational attitudes or aims of seve-
ral philosophical types have been examined. Some aspects
of them are challenges to a rational good, yet each of them
has a contribution to make toward a more rational outlook
on life.
The challenges consist chiefly in emphases upon a
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single point of view which excludes reason; the contri-
butions appear in the fact that each new fact or belief
adds to a whole that is more rational and more true than
any single part. For example, among the objective aspects
of irrationality, extreme pessimism is a negation of the
rational good— it is an immoderate and unreasonable phil-
osophy. Yet there is a less extreme variety which does not
overlook the evils, but at the same time is not blind to
the goods. Some prefer to call the latter realism or an
even more eulogistic term.
In any case, too much stress cannot be placed upon
the fact that the viewpoints of science, the belief in an
objective purpose, a realistic pessimism, a recognition of
the vast realms of possibility for human experience, and
the conflict between reason and the recalcitrant factors
in nature must all be considered in getting a rational ac-
count of the universe. According to the definition of ra-
tionality of the last chapter, in a rational system none of
the points of view or ways of knowing may be arbitrarily
omitted. Only if they have no good ground, or if they con-
tradict the most inclusive experience that is self-consist-
ent, would their omission be justified
Thus only the complete repudiation of belief among
the supposedly irrational points of view would necessarily
be omitted, for it is only the chronic kind of skepticism,
the settled way of doubt, that is hopelessly irrational.
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Skepticism as a method ( dubito ut intelligam ) , a policy of
caution and conservatism, is a healthy symptom of a well-
balanced personality; and it is not only admissible, but is
required in a rational order or system.
In investigating these various challenges the def-
inition of rationality given above has been reinforced and
corroborated. For there it was insisted that rationality
involves a dialectic process of exact definition of ideas,
wide inclusion of facts, and an ideal aim. In the present
chapter the attempt has been made to show what various views
are, and what they contribute to a whole view, and in what
way, if any, they do violence to a rational good. The ideal
goal is a combination of all the possible benefits of dif-
ferent approaches to reality and knowledge in one compre-
hensive, practical, and universal philosophy—one which
shall be as nearly as possible the essence of truth and ra-
tionality.
The present chapter has set forth various attempts
to dismember the rational from the good, or to discount the
one or the other. The following chapter will attempt to
show how the rational and the good are related, and to show
whether they have any fundamental connections which each a
concept necessary to the other. To this task the discus-
sion now turns.

CHAPTER III
THE RATIONAL AND THE GOOD
1. The suspicion of conflict between
logic and reality
In the present chapter the central problem for dis-
cussion is the relation of rationality and goodness from
a logical and an epistemological standpoint. Is there any
inevitable necessity which links coherent thought and sys-
tem to value or good as defined above, on the one hand, and
which necessarily connects irrationality with evil on the
other? There is uncertainty on this point in contemporary
thought. Much mediaeval scholasticism is an illustration
that a flawless logic which leads to unprofitable and mere-
ly speculative conclusions is possible. In the last chap-
ter various questions which dealt with antagonism to ortho-
dox conceptions of rationality and goodness were reviewed.
Many feel with James that logic and the given reality are
incommensurable. "Reality, life, experience, concreteness,
immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, over-
1
flows and surrounds it."
2
The conflict is widely felt. Of it Otto writes:
The fact of the matter is that the contemporary man
is divided against himself. He is unwilling to forego
the practical results based upon the achievements of
1. James, APU, 212.
2. Otto, TI, 172.
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men and of science, but he is fearful lest the develop-
ment and application of scientific method shall deprive
human endeavor of meaning and worth. The question is
whether this state of mind is necessarily final. Are
science and human values by their very nature incom-
patible, like God and Mammon, leaving us no choice but
to serve one or the other?
To put the problem otherwise, it is reducible to the
question whether goodness and rationality must be divorced
in actual experience. Is there a hopeless conflict between
the theoretical and the practical life?
2. The conviction of connection between
rationality and goodness
Traditional logic is being critically examined and
in many quarters rudely handled in these days. Yet, although
3logicians dispute about logic, in the dispute
is always involved the question of
'
bong fide logic, 1
and the question of good faith always involves the ques-
tion of sincerity and of values which again can be ack-
nowledged but never proved. In other words, it is be-
coming increasingly evident that the ultimate problem
of logic is a problem of values.
This inability to prove values means an inability to fur-
nish universally acceptable evidence. In the final analysis
the only proof that anything is a value is that someone likes
it. However, some evidence can be offered which many ration-
al minds will accept.
The field of logic is the field of rational meanings,
and meaning is a notion in which value and good are neces-
sarily involved. The nature of meaning is derived from val-
3. Urban, IW, 85.
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ue or from the objective good to which it points.^" It is
by logic that a man must bring himself to be rational (in
at least a part of its meaning) , for logic includes the
work of definition, and that of properly connecting and de-
riving meanings. The interconnection of meanings points
to the interconnection of goods and their grounds. In the
notion of meaning, rationality and good have a fundamental
connection.
i. Plato . This conviction has ancient roots; it is
the historic tradition of idealism. Plato has expressed it
clearly and unmistakably. For Plato^
the Good is the principle of intelligibility; it sup-
plies the criteria and norms by which all rational be-
liefs are tested.
• . .The idea of the Good is the source of all knowledge;
it generates all meanings, and validates all true beliefs.
The Good cannot be known except as one pursues it
through dialectic—and even then the final knowledge of it
is from direct insight. What is mean# is that"there is a
progression from reason to insight."^ No adequate concept
7
of it can be formed by finite reason. Taylor says:
Neither Plato nor anyone else could tell another man
what the good is, because it can only be apprehended
by the most incommunicable and intimate personal in-
sight.
4. See Urban, IW, 23, 61.
5. Demos, PP, 74; Plato, Rep . , 532b, 534b.
6. Demos, loc. cit.
7. Taylor, PLA, 289.
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Nevertheless, rational reflection can point to the
good, and can call attention to its manifestations in the
flux of experience. It is mainly through this ability, in
fact, that the rational mind by means of dialectic traces
the good, and directs intuition to the good as the ultimate
object.
ii. Urban . Urban is convinced that as serious oc-
cupations knowing and thinking are in their very nature
gbound up with valuation. Truth would be unlovable and dis
couragingly abstract were it not connected with the good.
Modernist philosophies, those which disparage logic and in-
tellectual values, have at their root the denial of the in-
terconnection of meaning and value.
iii. Kant . Kant has shown that by virtue of their
nature as rational beings men universally experience a con-
viction of duty or sense of obligation. This obligation-
consciousness is the demand of the moral law which pure rea
Q
son prescribes. It commands that men recognize their obli
gation to be rational. "Handle so, dass die Maxime deines
Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen G-e
10
setzgebung gelten konne." Any being with both reason and
8. Urban, IW, 23, 115.
9. Kant, KPV, Bk. I, Chap. I, Sec. 7, 36.
10. Ibid., 35« nAct so that the maxim of thy will can
always at the same time hold good as a principle
of universal legislation." (Tr. Abbott, in Rand,
MCP, 461).
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11
will is "bound by the moral law, and such a being is re-
quired to show his reverence for the law by seeking the re-
12
alization of the summum bonum in the world.
The summum bonum for Kant is thought of in two ways:
(1) The supreme good (virtue) which is the unconditioned
condition of happiness; and (2) a whole which combines vir-
13
tue and happiness. Virtue is personal— it is the state of
a will which is determined by the moral law, a will which
strives to make its own attempts to realize happiness the
universal maxim for the realization of happiness in other
persons. The happiness of the rest of mankind is thus not
sought because of personal inclination, but because of the
demand of reason. If one loves his own good, he must be
willing that this disposition should be universalized so
that he wills also the good of others.^ The determining
principle is not the desire for happiness, but the moral
ISlaw, the sense of ought. y
How virtue and happiness can unite to realize the
summum bonum is the problem which calls especially for the
postulate of God. When men respect the moral law, they nat-
11. Kant, KPV, Bk. I, Chap. I, Sec. 7, 36-37.
12. Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. II, Sec. 4, H6.
13. Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. II, Sees. 1, 2, 136-137 ff.
H. Ibid., Bk. I, Chap. I, Sec. 8, theorem iv, 39,
15. Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. I, 131.
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16
urally seek for the realization of the highest good. The
law is unconditional; to be rational one must fulfil its
insistent demand. But at the same time that reason calls
for observance of the moral law it also requires that the
outcome be a harmony of virtue and happiness. Kant argues
17
that
ist also das hBchste (Jut nach praktischen Regeln un-
mBglich, so muss auch das moralische Gesetz, welches
gebietet, dasselbe zu beftfrdern, phantasisch und auf
leere eingebildete Zwecke gestellt, mithin an sich
falsch sein.
This difficulty calls for the postulate of an in-
telligent cause of all nature, which is distinct from na-
ture, that shall guarantee the ultimate harmony of virtue
and happiness, the possibility of the realization of the
summuTn bonum . Man*s experience is that virtue and happi-
ness are often unequal and progress in morality is slow.
But if there is a being who controls the whole order, whose
values are not inconsistent with human values, then the
struggle is not senseless, but fundamentally meaningful.
18
The existence of God is required for intelligibility.
Nun war es Pf licht fur uns, das hBchste Gut zu be-
16. Kant, KPV, Bk. II, Chap. II, Sec. 4, 146.
17. Ibid. Sec. I, 137. "If then the supreme good is
not possible by practical rules, then the moral
law also which commands us to promote it is di-
rected to vain imaginary ends, and must conse-
quently be false. "(Tr. Abbott, in Rand, MCP,475).
18. Ibid., Sec. 5, 150-151. "Now it was seen to be
a duty for us to promote the summum bonum* (con-
tinued in footnote section of following page).
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fordern, mithin nicht allein Befugniss, sondern auch
mit der Pflicht als Bedtirfniss verbundene Nothwendig-
keit, die MBglichkeit dieses hSchsten Guts vorauszu-
setzen; welches, da es nur unter der Bedingung des Da-
seins Gottes stattfindet, die Voraussetzung desselben
mit der Pflicht unzertrennlich verbindet, d.i. es ist
moralisch nothwendig, das Dasein Gottes anzunehmen.
Thus although reason and will are autonomous, when
they obey the laws of their own nature they come inevitably
to the good, and to its realization. Rationality can find
its ultimate satisfaction only in the idea of the good, and
the will can be moral only as it strives for the realization
of the good, only as it universalizes the maxims of its
moral law. The suranium bonum is inseparably joined to the
fundamental rationality of man and made intelligible by the
postulate of the existence of God.
It seems that only a short period of reflection
should be needed to establish the connection of good and the
rational. The means of ordering life is choice, and choice
is possible only as we are presented with goods and their
19
alternatives. Hence "good keeps life from being chaotic."
Goodness and rationality coincide.
3. Intuition, reason, and the good
But now the problem of the relation of rationality r
consequently it is not merely allowable, but it
is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite,
that we should presuppose the possibility of this
summum bonum ; and as this is possible only on con-
dition of the existence of God, it inseparably con-
nects the supposition of this with duty; that is,
it is morally necessary to assume the existence of
God."(Tr. Abbott, in Rand, MCP, 479).
19. Dickinson, MOG, 7.
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and good may be approached from another direction. Men are
motivated by what they like, by their sense of what is good;
and this motivation operates vigorously to stimulate the
20
activities of thinking and knowing. Liking and desiring
occur in mental life earlier than reflection, and the direc-
tion of practical reflection and effort, as well as the ac-
tual arousing of these, begins in the feeling for values.
From the time when the baby cries for the moon and reaches
out for it until as an old man he longs for release from a
weary existence, the sense of value stimulates him to ex-
ert his powers.
In mere value-experience, however, reason does not
necessarily play a large part, just because it is usual that
feelings occur without being aroused by reflection. Liking
and desiring may not correspond with a rational insight in-
to values; in their most primitive stages values depend more
upon instinct. There may be no rational understanding of
the good, no comprehension of an ought-to-be-liked, no un-
ity or system among likes and desires. To many persons a
good which arises out of the coherent wholeness of things
is incomprehensible, and an unknown quantity; they cannot
be persuaded to let go of their preferences, their preju-
dices, and their fixations.
Thus the daily living of individual persons may be
out of all touch with a rational good. Values are present
20. Urban, Rf, 115, 127; Hobhouse, RG, 3.
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in great numbers in daily life, but the good and the ration-
21
al must be striven for. Value -experiences are not ration-
al in the sense that they fit into a coherent whole from
their inception. As a rule they are comprehended by a kind
of immediate awareness without reflection, although reason
is not prevented from influencing what is valued. As Rader
states: "Values. . .are based upon preference—a nonration-
al factor—but preferences themselves change in response to
22
knowledge and insight." However, when taken at their
source, values are not affected by conscious purpose. They
are not created by the mind but experienced by it, intuited.
As a matter of fact, a man's values may run counter to his
purposes, as in the case of the child who intends to dis-
like his food, but is delighted in spite of himself; and
the adult who strives to like a food because it is good for
him, but finds the flavor detestable.
It is the immediate values and the goods which rea-
son has explored enough to make familiar that are intuited.
If there is an objective good which ought to be liked, its
ultimate character cannot be recognized by such immediate
perception as is described above; at least not, as Plato
insists, until reason has done its part to make this pos-
23
sible. A good (true value) may be liked before its objec-
21. See definitions above, 17-18.
22. Rader, NC, 53-54.
23. See Plato, Rep
. ,
532a, b.
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tive nature is understood (i.e. it may be a value before
it is recognized to be a good) ; but the understanding of this
nature is a function of reason. The point is that none can
say upon the immediate perception of a value that it ought
to be liked. One can only assert his own preference. In-
tuitive grasp has no reasons of its own, but only bare ex-
perience. The chance that, out of the myriads of likes and
dislikes that men experience, any one of these has the sta-
tus of an ought- to-be-liked is small enough to make action
on the basis of intuition alone a great risk. This is the
conclusion intimated in the treatment of the mystical mode
of apprehension in the previous chapter.
On the other hand, reason alone cannot satisfactorily
settle the problems of value. It can relate a person 1 s
values to each other, and note in what direction lies the
good to which the systematized body of values points. Rea-
son can determine which values are spurious, and which are
instrumental for the good. The function of reason is essen-
tially relating, integrating, making coherent, systematizing,
and it performs this task with materials which it does not
make but finds in the flow of experience. Pure reason be-
comes involved in mazes of abstraction and gets lost just
as certainly as does intuition. The goal of concrete
thinking is a system made orderly out of the chaos of im-
mediate experience.
Probably most modern thinkers would hold that reason
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and intuition are not two separate ways of knowing, but
rather two distinguishable functions of individual minds.
Bergson says in referring to the relation of intelligence
24 25
and instinct, which is the primal form of intuition, that
when given their place. . .in the evolution of life, they
appear, as it were, two divergent and complementary ac-
tivities.
The two activities, which began by mutual interpenetra-
tion, had to part company in order to grow; but some-
thing of the one has remained attached to the other.
In the introduction to Creative Evolution he speaks of the
"certain powers that are complementary to the understanding,"
thus at least making possible the inference that the under-
26
standing is fundamental. In any case, either way of know-
ing is partially dependent upon the other, when the life of
man as a whole is considered; and either way is inadequate
for certain important aspects of the field of knowledge. In
the realm of value this is seen by many philosophers. Dewey,
for example, pictures their complementary, yet oppositional
27
functions by the following discussion:
Whether it be a question of the good and bad in con-
viction and opinion, or in matters of conduct, or in ap-
preciated scenes of nature and art, there occurs in ev-
ery instance a conflict between the Immediate value-ob-
ject and the ulterior value-object: the given good, and
that reached and justified by reflection; the now appar-
24. Bergson, CE, xii-xiii, 176, 178.
25. Bergson, TSMR, 107-108; CE, H3, 168, 175, 182.
26. Bergson, CE, xii-xiii.
27. Dewey, EN, 402.
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and the eventual.
While it is true that a great many thinkers have per-
sisted in elevating one or the other of these functions to
a place of pre-eminence while more or less neglecting the
other, it is possible that Leighton is not wholly just in
his critical estimate of Bergson and James. After asserting
that they "insist on the validity of immediate perceptual
experience as being the primary datum for philosophy," he
28
says they
argue that in the conceptualizing process the mind is
carried, not deaper into, but farther away from, real-
ity. Percepts are characterized as concrete and dy-
namic, continuous with the original and ever varying
flow of living reality; whereas concepts are static,
abstract, pale shadows or skeletons which misrepresent
the rich flux of experience, which is the real stuff
of things.
This description, as seen from the excerpts and ref-
erences from Bergson given above, does not adequately des-
cribe his view, which is an attempt to explain and justify
both ways of knowing. If perhaps Bergson seems to give an
undue emphasis to instinct and intuition, this may be jus-
tified by the vast neglect of this side of knowing at the
hands of most traditional philosophy. Bergson would not
use the Kantian language, but in large measure he would en-
dorse the dual recognition of mental functions in Kant's
famous statement: "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, An-
28. Leighton, MC, 44.
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29
schauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind." For Bergson teach-
es nothing more unmistakably than that intuition is not self-
30
sufficient.
It is from intelligence that has come the push that has
made it [intuition) rise to the point it has reaohed. With-
out intelligence, it would have remained in the form of
instinot, riveted to the special object of its practical
interest, and turned outward by it into movements of lo-
comotion.
31As for James, his emphasis upon "pure experience"
and his criticisms of intellectualism go to such extremes
as to make him vulnerable to charges of prejudice and in-
consistency. He writes that the only way to reality is to
put off intellectualism and fall back on "raw unverbalized
life as more of a revealer."-^ Rightly understood, how-
ever, James may be seen as fighting for the rights of the
intuitive capacity of man, and was led into extremes of
speaking because the intellectualism he was fighting was
extreme and irksome to his intense spirit. On the whole,
he does not discard concepts and discursive reasoning as
false or useless, although he struggled mightily to keep
them from dominating the philosophical scene.
The opposite emphasis from that of James and Berg-
son occurs in the system of McTaggart. On the rationalis-
29. Kant, KRV, 95.
30. Bergson, CE, 178.
31. James, ERE, 193; See Barrett, PHI, 139.
32. James, APU, 272-273; see also 256-257; quoted in
Barrett, PHI, 188-189.
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tic or intellectualistic extreme, he is sure that the dialec-
tic which employs concepts can arrive at full knowledge of
the real, and he minimizes the necessity for the need of da-
33ta from experience. But not all philosophers who wish to
do homage to reason go to such extremes. Royce, for example,
recognizes the unity of the mental functions in a more bal-
anced form. There is neither pure conception nor pure per-
ception. Both are cognitive processes, hut real knowledge,
which is the aim of thought, appears only in interpretation,
34the combination of the two.
The defense of intuition is called for by the fact
that so many regard it as irrational. Plato set the fashion
by expressing distaste for the perceptual intuitions of sense-
experience. This distaste has been a particular reaction of
many to intuitions of the values. Intuitions, it is said,
contradict each other, and therefore are false. Intuitions
are often manifestly in error, and therefore cannot be trus-
ted anywhere they occur in experience.
While these charges contain a degree of truth, it is
based upon a partial view of intuition. Reason also often
arrives at erroneous and contradictory ideas. The best
thinking that a man can do may be false. When this is the
case, it can be remedied in two ways: by reference to what-
ever intuitions are relevant, and by further criticism from
33. McTaggart, SHD, 46; See Mackintosh, POK, 339.
34. Royce, POC, II, 117-123; Mackintosh, loc. cit.
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reason itself on the basis of wider inclusion, greater co-
herence, self-consistency, etc.
But if reason and intuition are distinguishable func-
tions, they are also complementary functions, and truth,
true values, the good, are not comprehended adequately with-
out both. The average man does not greatly trouble himself
to distinguish between those things which he likes and those
which he ought to like— i.e. to think beyond the immediately
practical need—and so the true values are neglected by the
masses of people. The theorist, the dialectician, and the
reflective person deduce the existence of a subsistent and
invisible order of good and of reality from their value-
experiences. Thus the chemist or the physicist has arrived
at a complex account of atoms, although no one has ever im-
mediately experienced an atom; and at least some philoso-
phers arrive at the notion of the rational good, which to
the multitude of people who are involved in the maze and
whirl of normal value-experience, seems as unreal as the
quantity for which the mathematician^ "X" stands.
Value-experience is seen to contain contradictions
when it is viewed critically by reason. It is common ex-
perience for the value of one person to be a disvalue for
another, or for what is a value in one hour to be one*s
chief antipathy in another. Any value under the exploring
process of reason may appear as evil. A familiar example
of this occurs with the apostle Paul, who at one time re-
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garded the persecution of Christians as a worthy calling,
35
but who finally came to the support of their cause.
The endeavor of this discussion has been to show
that a correlative relationship exists between reason and
intuition, between intuition and values, and between rea-
son and the good. The relationship between value and good
was treated in Chapter One. Both reason and intuition show
a peculiar instability alone; and the same appears to be
the case with abstract good and immediate values. No one
can be said to have reached a complete rational good until
he likes what he ought to like, until his values and his
goods coincide, or until his intuitions and his reasoning
come together in harmony.
Values are neutral (neither rational nor irrational)
until they are defined by reference to a coherent body of
36
knowledge or fact.
Our values can only be understood and must always be in-
terpreted and criticized in the light of our world view.
No one has the right, rationally speaking, to say "This
is of value," unless he has related it to everything he
knows.
Relating an item "to everything he knows" would be an
impossible task if one took it to mean each specific item of
knowledge; but it is experientially possible to relate a new
value to the coherent whole of one's knowledge, and to re-
35* Acts , Chap. 26.
36. Brightman, ITP, 147.
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late it to as many specific items as he has time for. One
must be governed by the practical factors of the amount of
time he has, the degree of importance of the value, and
his own purpose to do the best he can under the circumstan-
ces .
Intuitions are not necessarily irrational because of
their spontaneity, but they must be made rational. It is
probably true that intuition has nowhere the right to make
final and dogmatic pronouncements, but neither has reason
apart from intuition. Value-experience is part of the whole
experience of a person, and sets the task of living thought
—
the task of making an orderly, coherent and inclusive system
of experience; in short the task of realizing the rational
good.
4. Results of the comparison of intuition
and reason for the good
It appears, then, on the basis of the analysis of the
functions of intuition and reason, that the rational and the
good have a vital, internal, interdependent relationship.
Values are presented in a chaotic immediacy which is be-
wildering, but which in the systematizing processes of rea-
son begins to take on more significant meaning, and to point
to an enduring good. All those values for which reason can
find grounds take on the likeness of the rational good, and
the body of such values indicates what the most rational of
goods must be. "Whatever is reasonably held good," says
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Hobhouse, "must not tend to clash with anything else that
37
is reasonably held good." The removal of such clashes
is the road both to complete rationality and complete good-
ness—to the rational good.
One warning should be reiterated. Logical coherence
and orderly system do not in themselves guarantee a rational
good unless they characterize the widest possible range of
events or facts. In a limited sense, rational evils are
possible; for example, an organized underworld racket, or
the Nazi political and military machine. The selection of
an inclusive end is as important to rationality as a smooth-
ly working system. The rational good results from the com-
bination of rational ends with rational means. As Hegel
puts it: "Sie allein ist das Vernunftige und der Rhythmus
38des organischen Ganzen."
The rational good is no single fact, event, or other
item of experience, but is an ideal end indicated by the un-
ity of a system of values, progressively discovered and re-
39
alized by rational minds. One who would be rational finds
himself aiming at an end which is good, of which, the farther
he moves toward it, he sees more and more clearly that it
37. Hobhouse, RG, 78.
38. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes
,
Vorrede, 53;
in Hegel, SW, II. "This alone is what is ration-
al, th° rhythm of the organic whole." (Hegel, SEL,
51, edi Loewenberg, various trs.). The antecedent
of "sie" is "die logische Nothwendigkeit."
39. See Kant, KPR, Bk.II, Chap. II, Sec. U\ tr. in
Rand, MCP, 477.

97
ought to be desired. In the same way one who strives for
an enduring good sees eventually, at least, that it can
be what it is only by virtue of its being founded in a ra-
tional order of things. Both the rationality and the good-
ness of which men usually speak are relative terms. "Why
callest thou me good?" asked Jesus of the rich young man.
40
"None is good save one, even God." Goodness and rational-
ity are both interdenendent ideals and practical ends. The
41
task of human beings, says James,
seems at first sight to resolve itself into that of get-
ting a conception which will yield the largest balance
of rationality, rather than one which will yield per-
fect rationality of every description.
The "perfect rationality" is an ideal to strive for; Kant
has clearly stated this. Meanwhile "the rational as such
is not an established system, but a process governed by a
42
principle." It is the process by which the ideal good
is ever more perfectly apprehended. Even though this ideal
of complete realization is ever just beyond man's grasp, its
recognition "gives a direction to our efforts and prevents
43
our conduct from sinking back into its animal origin."
Finally it should be noted that the necessity which
links rationality and goodness is not the mechanical neces-
40. Mark, Chap. 10:18.
41. James, APU, 113.
42. Hobhouse, RG, 75.
43. Cohen, RN, 448.
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sity which connects physical aspects of the world in a caus-
al chain. Mechanism breaks down in the attempt to account
44for persons and values. "At the bottom of all human ac-
tivities are Values*, the conviction that some things
' ought to be* and others not."^ This is the requiredness
or necessity of value. "The ultimate inseparability of val-
ue and reality is now almost axiomatic; the attempt to di-
vorce them can issue only in unintelligibility."^ But there
is no mechanical necessity by which a reasoning mind, using
correct deductive principles, must arrive at the good. None
of this kind of inevitability or rigor exists here. The ne-
cessity in the relation between the rational and the good
contains an "ought" rather than a "must".
Human rationality is incompletely won, and the good
is dimly seen and partially achieved. All that can be af-
firmed is a reasonable surety that whenever and wherever
reason strives to be comprehensive and coherent, the ought-
to-be-liked will appear. There is something independent,
something recalcitrant and inscrutable about the universe;
after man's most strenuous efforts to circumvent an evil, it
may still ride roughshod over him. But perhaps far more of-
ten it may be persuaded to give a modicum of co-operation.
That faith is the basis upon which humanity as a whole rests
44. Blanshard, NT, II, 44-1.
45. Ktthler, PVWF, 35.
46. Urban, IW, Preface, 3.
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its hopes for the future. The denial of rational good is
the denial of that which most men implicitly "believe.
5. Summary of the chapter
In this chapter the attempt has been made to show
that rationality and goodness are intimately connected.
Logic is itself a value, and whosoever begins a crusade to
displace any one kind of logic does so on the basis that
another is better. Plato was convinced that the aim of any
true science is the good; he thought that good must be the
principle of intelligibility.
In an analysis of the functions of intuition and rea-
son, it was indicated that intuition grasps values, but is
unable to rise to the ought-to-be-liked, at least not un-
til reason has led the way to it. The true good is of
necessity rational— it is what the whole mind perceives to
be required if one wants to be rational and live a life of
coherent wholeness.
In the following chapter, the search for possible re-
lationships between the rational good and the real will be
pursued. Is everything that is real also rational and good?
In what objective realm does the ultimate good lie? Are
goods and ideals mere phantoms without objective, enduring
status? These problems occupy thought in the pages ahead.
47. Cf . 81, 87 ff. above.

CHAPTER IV
THE RATIONAL GOOD AND THE REAL
In the preceding chapter rationality and the ought-
to-be-liked were presented as kindred ideals. Valuations
may occur irrespective of the real worth of the thing val-
ued and may be irrational; but a real and objective good is
necessarily rational.
1. Reality defined
Reality is anything which has objective validity,
which becomes intelligible as it is thought about. The real
tends to be determined by these marks: (1) That it does not
give rise to self-contradictory judgments; (2) that it has
2the nature of "common to all" rather than of "special to me*;
and (3) that it has an element of permanency and self-iden-
tity. Various levels of reality may be thought of— some
regard the more universal as the more real while others take
4
the more definite and concrete as more ultimately real.
However, there is universality in every individual and in-
dividuality in every universal that can be named or recog-
nized. Reality consists of every referent, the idea of
1. Holt, art. (1912), 366; Bowne, MET, 9, 10 (Note that
references to MET on this page are to the 1882 ed.);
Stace, NOW, 5.
2. Bowne, MET, 8.
3. Garnett, RV, 109-110.
4. Cf. Stace, NOW, 3-4; Bowne, MET, 30-33, 41.
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which can become a coherent part of a rational experience.
In so far as the good is bound up with what is en-
during and coherent, it has all the objective reality that
is needed. This connection of the good and the real cannot
be finally proved in the sense of being made acceptable to
5 6
all minds. Yet Urban asserts:
The inseparability of the highest value from the most
truly real has been at once the venture of faith and the
•axiom of intelligibility 1 of the greatest thinkers. . •
.From Plato to Hegel the deliberate and reiterated iden-
tification of being and value has been the hidden spring
of traditional thought.
It seems that human life cannot achieve its highest
goods without the conviction that reality on the whole is
benevolent, self-consistent, and enduring. Leighton presents
this thought:
^
If the spiritual values of human existence at its high-
est term of development and achievement do not endure,
amidst all the changes and chances of this mortal universe,
there seems to be no stable or coherent meaning in exis-
tence. Then the universe is irrational— indeed it is no
universe at all.
2. Modernist and traditional views
of the problem
So-called "modernist" philosophers are distinguished
from others in part by their willingness to divorce values
and goods from reality. They evidently think that criteria,
standards, purposes, and evaluations make no difference to
5. Cf. Hoffding, POR, 93, HI.
6. Urban, IW, 14. In quotations value often means the
same as good means for this dissertation.
7. Leighton, MC, 463; cf. Alexander, STD, II, 413.
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8
the existence of a world of fact and experience. Nature
is believed to be ruled by inexorable law, with no stan-
dard or ideal affecting it except incidentally and secon-
darily. Professor Montague's definition of the real in The
New Realism implies this belief, for it omits all reference
to mental or spiritual reality. "The real universe," he
says, "consists of the space-time system of existents, to-
9gether with all that is presupposed by that system."
Plato's conception of the Good as the highest real-
ity is so well-known, so original, and so important that it
must be noted here. Far from relegating good to a secondary
place or even farther down the scale of reality, Plato de-
10
clared that
the good may be said to be not only the author of know-
ledge in all things known, but of their being and es-
sence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds
essence in dignity and power.
The Good, then, is more real than essences (Ideas),
which are the usually considered basis of his idealism. The
Good is the cause of all kinds of being. It informs or in-
fuses the world as a whole with purpose, and gives it a goal
(perfection) at which to aim."^ The main point is that the
world has a purpose; it is no mere blind striving, no col-
lection of brute facts, nor senseless process.
8. See Dewey, EN, 405ff.; cf. above, 82.
9. Montague, art. (1912), 255; quoted Garnett, RV, 109.
10. Plato, Rep
. , 509; cf. Royce, WI, I, 190.
11. Demos, PP, 66; see Plato, Tim . , 33b.
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Demos describes what Plato means:
103
In nature the Good is striven for but never to be at-
tained. But, since it may be striven for, the Good is
immanent in nature. The Good is the summit of all be-
ing, the idea which is beyond all other ideas; it is
also the defining principle of all being.
It the Good is not only the defining principle of eth-
ics; it is the basic notion in ontology, in theory of
knowledge, in the arts, and in theology. It is the
most fundamental of the metaphysical factors; all the
other metaphysical factors are subordinate to the Good.
Plato f s Good is both a pre-existing form and an ab-
solute end, an abstract, impersonal, unchanging perfection,
the same for all races and generations. All phenomenal ex-
istence comes short of it, but is moved or affected by it.
The Good is the ultimate in the scale of reality and the
highest in the order of rationality and truth, even while
the finite mind, tangled as it is in physical existence,
cannot adequately grasp it.
The conviction that rational goods and reality co-
incide is not so much a result of proof as it is of faith.
It is a working hypothesis. Evidence which favors the judg-
ment that they coincide can be presented, and to do this is
what is proposed for this chapter. In order to get under
way, the distinction between instrumental values and goods
and intrinsic should again be set forth.
3. Intrinsic and instrumental goods
In the scale of values and goods it is often possible
12. First half of quotation is from Demos, PP, 71;
the second half from same source, 76.
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to make a cleavage between the items which are valued for
their own sake and which are good in their own right, and
other items which are valued for their utility or instru-
mental character. For example, there are some intrinsic
goods (such as truth, beauty, purity, personality, good
will) which ought to be liked for what they are: the culmi-
nation, the highest expression, the most effective concept,
or the most poignant insight in a whole system of ideas.
Then there are other goods which ought to be liked because
they make such a culmination, expression, concept, or in-
sight possible. Probably no intrinsic good is merely in-
trinsic, and no instrumental good is that and nothing else,
for there is a mutual interdependence between goods which
does not permit them to stand alone, except that they may
be isolated in thought. But in so far as a good is intrin-
sic, it stands higher in the scale of reality. Values of
either kind are more or less indifferent to objective truth;
they may be highly prized regardless of the marks of real-
ity which they do or do not possess. But the recognition
of true enduring values (goods) represents the highest un-
derstanding which finite minds can have—the concept of
what ought to be liked for its own sake.
4. Values and goods on the practical plane
are instrumental
On the practical, common-sense plane, the tendency
of human beings is to accept instrumental and intrinsic val-
i
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ues alike as real goods. All kinds of pleasure are desired,
and the natural bent of uncritical reason is to say that
what is liked ought to be liked, that the status quo is the
most desirable state of affairs. In this case common sense
would say that pleasure ought to be sought everywhere and
at all times. Familiarity, habitual, constant contact with,
and affection for objects of daily use may blind anyone to
their really extrinsic nature. They tend to become synony-
mous with the real. Professor Hocking describes the forma-
13
tion of the bias thus:
Our occupations always define for us some aspect of re-
ality; whatever we are daily occupied with and can deal
with successfully, making it respond to our wills,—that
we regard as real. To the banker, the flimsy figures on
his account sheets represent realities; to the artist,
his colors and the things of beauty he can produce with
them: and these may or may not seem to the banker as un-
real as the abstractions of financial credit to the ar-
tist. But there is one universal occupation, the occu-
pation with physical things, place and motion, food and
shelter, physical labor which fortunately no one escapes.
It is thus that men come to regard certain values as
final and to link them with the real, while the ought-to-
be-liked, as a more spiritual and intangible fact, appears
to be an unreal abstraction. Long contact with the physi-
cal environment blurs but the vision of the good, while an
untempered conception of reality as material becomes welded
to the values (the merely liked) in the furnace of daily ex-
perience.
13. Hocking, TP, 47.
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Like most common- sense ideas, this way of talcing
value-experience leads to contradictions. With its atten-
tion fastened upon the immediate interest, common sense
fails to apprehend the more remote inconsistencies which
appear to maturer experience, to reflection. To pursue the
object which is immediately liked is often to pursue a phan-
tom, while paradoxically, what one really wanted eludes him.
Uncritical common sense experiences this disappointment
again and again. Values taken with no reference to the ra-
tional ought-to-bp-liked lead to conflict and chaos in the
life of the person who so takes them. An organizing prin-
ciple to keep values in proper relation and perspective is
a requirement of the good life.
5, Values and goods on the theoretical plane
Some inkling of the confusion on the theoretical
plane concerning the relation of values and goods to the
real can be gleaned by noting the opinions of a number of
modern thinkers.^ The disagreements among them might well
cause a novitiate to throw up his hands in despair and re-
nounce the rational good as nothing more than a wish or a
15
dream. At best goods are ideals which can be realized
under favorable conditions. At worst, an ideal represents
14. Cf. Ayer, LTL, 17, 172; Alexander, STD, II, 243-
245; Dewey, EN, 28, 405, 415-416; Leighton, MC,
340, 406, 408, 411; Sorley, MVIG, 91, 93, 140,
HI, 233; Perry, GTV, 115; Russell, WIB, 22;
Spaulding, W0C, v; Urban, IW, 61, 65.
15. Cf. Gerard, art, (Jan. 1942), 98.
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an impossible height of perfection which human beings can-
not fully realize, or realize at all in the world as it
now exists. Such an ideal is not real because it is not
objective, public and enduring; and it is doubtful, even in
spite of the fact that some people cling to such ideals,
that they can rightly be called goods (what ought to be
liked) . The position for this dissertation is that some
ideals are genuine objective goods which have a valid claim
upon all persons because of their rational and persistent
16
character, and their possibility of adequate realization,
6, Arguments for the objective reality of good
i. Urban. What is the nature of the arguments that
are used to establish the objectivity and the reality of goods
(or values, as some writers understand the term)? Urban
writes that the "natural metaphysic of the human mind," the
result of the basic constitution of human beings in an en-
vironment like the present world, is to see the good and
17
the real as one, as an ultimate monism.
We find reality intolerable without raising it to the
sphere of value, but we find it equally difficult to
think value without its implying some kind of reality,
and without giving it some form of being.
ii. KBhler . Kflhler speaks of something similar. The
conviction that values are in large measure objective is
well-nigh universal. "If the contrary is true should not
16. See Chapter One, 16.
17. Urban, IW, 130.
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practically all mankind be able to see it? H he asks. It
would seem that the present zest and initiative of human be-
ings in the quest of goods and values would disappear if the
conviction of their objective reference or status were to
be dissipated.
iii. Alexander . Alexander bases the objectivity of
good upon its enduring quality, and in the coherence of the
objects to which it attaches. An excerpt of his metaphysi-
19
cal view may be used for description:
For goodness, whether we are considering the human val-
ues or the subhuman values, is the character of the per-
manent as opposed to the impermanent contrasted evil.
The universe works in experience so as to secure the
survival of good, or rather that which survives in the
long run in the contest establishes its value thereby
and is good. To repeat a saying already quoted, "mo-
rality is the nature of things."
iv. Pringle-Pattison
.
Pringle-Pattison argues that
20
values must be objective because of the meaning or nature
21
of ideals for men in general.
Ideals would be impossible to a self-contained finite
entity. To frame an ideal and pursue it means the pres-
ence of the infinite in the finite experience; or, from
the other side, it is the mark of the finite being who
is to partake in an infinite life. All claims, there-
fore, made on man's behalf, must be based on the objec-
tivity of the values revealed in his experience, and
brokenly realized there. Man does not make values any
more than he makes reality.
18. Kohler, PVWF, 77.
19. Alexander, STD, II, 413; cf. 243.
20. Many authors use "values" in the sense that "good"
is used here.
21. Pringle-Pattison, I0G, 238-239.
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v. Other arguments . There are other grounds for be-
lief in the objectivity of goods based upon the belief that
there is an objective reason or mind which is expressed in
forms, structure, law, universals, uniformity, and system.
No one will seriously deny the presence of these factors in
to world to some extent, but that they indicate the operation
of an infinite mindt is of course not universally aooepted.
22
Metaphysicians may well ask with Taylor:
Is the 'world* as a whole the embodiment of a defi-
nite rational plan or structure, or is its very ground-
plan something which, like the successive sensible
events 1
,
is always unfinished and 'provisional 1 ? Is
the plan on which the world is constructed, so to say,
subject to indefinite revision?
The facts point in both directions. Yet it does not
seem that the world-plan is, in its broad outlines, subject
to revision. Many details appear bound by an almost negli-
gible necessity, in comparison with the validity of the laws
and broad principles which seem so definitely established.
23
A scientist writes:
The induction that nature is reasonable has been so for-
tified by the crescendo of objective evidence that it
has become a law of experience, and scientists have the
same faith in the ubiquity of uniformity as have all
men in the regular rising of the sun.
Since the essential nature of reason is to be pur-
24
posive, to speak of nature as "reasonable" would seem to
22. Taylor, CPT, 71.
23. Gerard, art, (Jan. 1942), 96.
24. See above, Chapter One, 24ff.
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indicate that signs of purpose can be discerned therein; that
the connections in the world are the work of a mind. That
the good is rational and vice-versa was the chief proposi-
tion of Chapter Three; if this be granted, then a reason-
able or intelligible world is a good world.
If the world were simply a cumulation or succession
of disconnected facts or events without value, it would be
difficult to see how any predictions could be made which
would occur as predicted, unless occasionally a lucky guess
might coincide with some part of the flux of events. There
must be some kind of co-operation and co-ordination between
reality and realizers in order for knowledge to be possible.
Pringle-Pattison writes and quotes from Balfour a lucid ex-
25
pression of this requirement:
If the general system of scientific beliefs is to be
accepted as rational—which is the contention of Natur-
alism and also the assumption of commonsense— it must
be because 'we bring to the study of the world the pre-
supposition that it is the work of a rational Being,
who made intelligible, and at the same time made us,
in however feeble a fashion, able to understand it. 1
The conviction that good is objective is a corollary
of the belief in a benevolent world-purpose, because pur-
pose is meaningless unless there is an objective end to be
gained which is conceived of as good. Arguments for pur-
pose are practically innumerable. A few samples should
bring to light much of the evidence that is offered by the
25. Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 61; he quotes Balfour,
FOB, 282; cf. 296, 301.
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exponents of the idea.
vi. Plato . One of Plato f s arguments was based on a
reduction to absurdity. It is ridiculous to argue that the
world was not purposed and planned. How could earth, air,
fire, and water, without any dynamic and intelligent princi-
ple of organization, cause all the various intelligible
forms of experience now present in the world? 20 He makes
use of the teleological and cosmological arguments, basing
the case upon the analogy of a finite mind and its products
to a mind which has molded existing things after an eternal
27
model.
vii. Lotze . Lotze was convinced that forms do not
arrive by accident. The efficient and formal causes of
things must be bound up in one unit with their final cause,
+ 28for
we cannot regard Nature as a kaleidoscope that, shaken
by chance, produces forms that look as if they had a
meaning; if there is to be any meaning in this meaning,
we must seriously assume and hold fast the conviction
that the same power whence proceed the efficient capa-
bilities of things, also directly includes the mould-
ing imagination which assigns to these capabilities
their points of application and their significant lines.
Mechanism cannot be the sole explanatory principle, he argues,
because nature favors the rational, and tends to expel what
26. See Plato, Phaedo
, 97-99.
27. See Plato, Tim., 29ff.
28. Lotze, MIC, 411.
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is irrational. Numerous benefits and requirements of life
on the earth are produced "by nature through its inner har-
29
mony of parts. He asks:
How could mechanical Nature—which must be contented
with all that satisfies its universal laws—be the
source of this superfluous perfection?
viii. Bowne . Borden P. Bowne argued that determinism
and necessity or the alternative chance would involve men
in speculative disaster; for that reason these explanatory
30
methods must be curbed or discarded. If man*s thinking
is necessitated it is meaningless. It is not meaningless,
therefore it is not necessitated. But if it is not neces-
sitated then novelty and freedom exist in the world. Wher-
ever novelty and freedom exist in the absence of lawless ir-
rationality, there must be some kind of benevolent purposive
control. Thus the idea of a governing agency which operates
throughout the whole world is arrived at, and all reality
is united by a common bond.
ix. Leighton . Two arguments used by Leighton are in-
teresting. In one he suggests that purposiveness is a mark
of incompleteness, of imperfection, and end not yet reached.
Complete mechanical operation is perfect; thus engineers
speak of the perfection of a motor, a locomotive, or oth-
er machine. But nature is always apparently falling short
29. Lotze, MIC, 429.
30. Bowne, TTK, 365. The argument is slightly em-
bellished.
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of perfection, although seeming to aim at a mark. This ac-
tivity without perfection implies the incomplete reign of
mechanism, and the presence of a purpose which aims at the
a 31good.
His other argument follows the line of thought that
man's progress has in it more of good than men themselves
have contributed to it. There is a perceptible direction
of human development which is neither the result of con-
scious human planning nor of chance. He supports this by
32
the following idea from Bosanquet:
It is not finite consciousness that has planned the
great phases of civilization, which are achieved by
the linking of finite minds on the essential basis of
the geological structure of the globe. Each separate
mind reaches but a little way, and relatively to the
whole of a movement must count as unconscious. You may
say that there is intelligence in every step of the
connection; but you cannot claim as a design of finite
intelligence what never presented itself in that char-
acter to any single mind.
z. Gilson . To those scientists who charge that the
belief in a benevolent purpose (or any purpose) in nature
is merely a projection of our own ideas into it, Gilson
33
replies:
We do not need to project our own ideas into the econ-
omy of nature; they belong there in their own right.
Our own ideas are in the economy of nature because we
ourselves are in it.
Through man, who is part and parcel of nature, purposive-
31. Leighton, MC, 208. Slightly embellished.
32. Bosanquet, PIV, 154-155; in Leighton, MC, 211.
33. Gilson, GP, 133-134.
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ness most certainly is part and parcel of nature. In
what sense then is it arbitrary, knowing from within
that where there is organization there is always a pur-
pose, to conclude that there is a purpose wherever there
is organization?
xi. Results of the arguments . These then are some
of the arguments that have been advanced to justify the be-
lief in benevolent purpose in the objective world. They are
some of the simpler, less complicated arguments. In the fi-
nal analysis, one must have a comprehension of the nature of
the world as throughout mental in order to see that it could
not be what it is and still lack purposiveness. Those with
the scientific bias may be willing to live "in a world of
mere appearances, where that which appears is the appearance
of nothing," and they may regard the question "why is
there something rather than nothing?" as meaningless; but
they take their stand on "notions of blind force, chance,
emergence, sudden variation" for the reason that "they much
prefer a complete absence of intelligibility to the pres-
35
ence of a nonscientif ic intelligibility." They are un-
willing to accept as plausible any kind of purposive eval-
uation or explanation, or to acknowledge that cosmic facts,
events, and structure are what they are because their par-
ticular mode of being is better than some other. This seems
arbitrary and irrational— it is the adherence to the strict
34. Gilson, GP, 132,
35. Ibid., 130.
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application of a method to the point of fanaticism,
7. The meaning and place of evil
If benevolent purpose is an objective fact in the
world then there is a good which is an objective reality.
For purpose which has no direction is nothing but a blind
urge or will, and can be neither benevolent nor rational.
This necessary union of benevolence and purpose is usually
brought together or consummated in the concept of God, and
will be considered presently in this chapter. But first
let these questions be considered: what shall be done with
the facts of particularity, novelty, mechanical operation,
interruptions of process, and destructions of values in the
world, all of which facts at times wear the outward appear-
ance, at least, of evil? Do they point to the presence of
evil purposes? Are they objectively real evils? Do they
36
refute the idea of a rational good?
In general the explanations move in two directions.
One explanation makes the evil or irrational aspects of the
world merely apparent or phenomenal. The other pictures ir-
rationality and evil as an established aspect of the real,
fully as objective and enduring as the good. The issues
tend to become somewhat beclouded; the Hegelians acknowledge
evil, but not "real" evil, while the realists insist upon
36. These questions are answered specifically below,
page 119.
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remaining optimists in a world where evil remains as a per-
37
manent, untransmuted fact.
Evil depends for some of its unpleasant effect upon
its relation to time. It is obvious that in a world where
situations change, the evil of "now" may well be the good
of a later period. But as long as the evil does appear now,
it is difficult for the finite mind to see it as part of the
eternal purpose of a benevolent mind. Nevertheless, even
finite minds may attain to some notion of the way in which
evil might be taken as an instrumental good. Reason re-
38
quires irrational materials in order to be kept busy.
Without some opposition, some antithetical other, it could
have no task. Without evils there could be no idea of good,
because there would be no criteria by which to recognize it.
If there were no evils, rational minds could will no change,
for there could be nothing to change from or to. Time would
disappear if there were no change, for time is essentially
of the nature of change. Benevolent purpose could have no
further place in an economy of complete good, for all pos-
sible good ends would already have been realized. Thus a
world in which there is resistance to reason without the re-
sult that reason is completely frustrated, is both good and
rational. That is the kind of world that actually exists*
37. See Bradley, AP, 411; Spaulding, WAI, 255; Hock-
ing, TP, 354, where he quotes Spaulding; also
Hocking, TP, 372-375.
38. Santayana, LOR, 196.
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Mankind seems almost incurably committed to optimism be-
cause of it. The belief is practically universal that more
and more of the problems that men face will be mastered.
Many of those who would renounce any belief in a benevolent,
rational world-purpose would be the first to insist upon this
possibility of making the human lot a better, happier one.
Such a combination of hopelessness with optimism seems in-
consistent.
Evil is an overpowering fact only as one forgets the
whole in which it appears. It is a bitter fact of the mo-
mentary present, but is impermanent
—
H, twill not always be
so." When it is carefully considered in a wider context
than immediate experience (and it must be admitted that to
view it thus when personal tragedies come is extremely dif-
ficult), evil becomes transmuted and presents a different
appearance.
Evil appears because the human ideal of perfection
is contrasted with existing circumstances which are admit-
tedly not perfect. The power to grasp ideals lures human
aspirations on from the particularity of facts to the gene-
rality of goods and values. Ideals direct the attention
away from the irrationality of much of nature to the com-
plete intelligibility which they possess. Chance and un-
predictability give way to the hope of certainty in the mind
which forms concepts of the ideal; the apparent purposeless-
ness of the world becomes the reality of a precise realiza-
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tion of a benevolent purpose; and the immediate persuasion
that evil is a reality to the perception that in the supposed
evil there is the possibility of advance to still greater
goods. The infinite in the finite, the eternal in the tem-
poral, the front stage and the background of life— it is the
perception of the contrast between these that gives rise to
the idea of evil. It is an idea which plagues mankind, yet
if men can but get the total view, evil helps to make actual
the infinite possible goods of individual personalities.
In the whole situation of good and evil the most amaz-
ing fact is the ability of men to endure and rally under ad-
verse circumstances. The first and most important battle of
the whole struggle occurs within the unity of each individ-
ual personality; the battle to understand, to adjust, and
finally to alter the offending facts. It is by this that
personality develops out of its beginning as a "blooming,
buzzing confusion" (to borrow James* phrase) into a coherent
whole. And as will be shown later, the creating and molding
of rational and unified personalities appears to be the ulti-
mate end of the world that now is—"the last of life, for
which the first was made."
8. Summary of the preceding section
In order to summarize this section, the questions pro-
39. Browning, Rabbi Ben Ezra ,
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posed above may be answered briefly. The facts of the
world which are called evil may be explained as really in-
strumental goods (so long as they do not arise from finite
wills), or facts capable of being used for self-development
by rational minds. They do not necessarily point to evil
world-purposes but to good purposes, since struggle against
opposition is the only way higher good and greater perfection
can come out of the less perfect. These evils may be said
to be real in the sense that they arise from a comparison
of the ought-to-be-liked (which is real) with the state of
things as they are; but they are not real in the sense of
being permanent. There is no rational mind to will their
continued existence. Finally, they do not refute the idea
of a rational, objective good, but rather strengthen it,
since they are employed by a rational mind and minds to re-
alize the good, to set the course in the direction of the
ought-to-be-liked.
9. The mode of the objective
existence of good
Although a reasonable presumption of the objectivity
and enduring character of good has been established, the man-
ner or mode of its being has not yet been determined. In
Chapter One it was asserted ^ that rational purposes and
40. See page 115*
41. See page 23.
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anything that fulfils rational purposes may be said to be
good. Since rational purposes do not accidentally occur,
but in experience are found only in the minds of persons,
it follows that personality or a person is the locus of
42
the greatest potentiality for good. HBffding says:
In our experience personal beings appear in existence
as centres of value, by which I mean as the living
central points in which value can be felt and acknow-
ledged. It is personality which in the world of our
experience invests all other things with value. . . .
The inhibition of a centre of value must necessarily
involve a decrease of value.
i. Good is not a hypostatized abstraction . Thus the
rational purposes, the good will, are not something apart
from personal beings. The trend of philosophy is happily
away from the hypostatizing of abstractions. Goods are not
held to be objective in the sense of their being independent
existences apart from other reality; they have their char-
acter precisely because they are bound up with the most per-
manent and self-identical essence known- -personality. Val-
ues or goods have no "sort of ineffable and mysterious re-
ality."43
ii. Good exists concretely in personality
.
Bright-
man iterates the necessity for a view of good (or true val-
ue) as concrete. 44 "Value is an abstraction, a mere essence,
42. HBffding, POR, 279.
43. Leighton, ISO, 340.
44. Brightman, IPKI, 36.
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apart from its existence in personality; and no metaphysic
of value is complete without a metaphysic of personality."
45Elsewhere he writes in similar vein:
Personalism holds . . . that a value which does not
exist is, as nonexistent, no value at all, and that the
value of a value consists in some type of actual or pos-
sible embodiment in personal life, finite or infinite.
Without existence, no value. Without personality, no
existence.
It was said above that in the final analysis, one
must understand the world as being throughout mental in or-
der to see that purposiveness is part of its essential na-
ture. It is thought in the world structure that keeps its
ordered, furnishes the efficient causes, resists the irra-
tional, unintelligent drift toward disintegration and chaos.
It is the kind of thought that is found in personality.
Personality is far from being one of the last products of
nature—rather the reverse seems more nearly true. It seems
unintelligible to say that nature had no cause or beginning,
far more so than to say that God had none. For if God be
conceived to be a person, the analogy of human personality
possessing self-activity and self-maintenance powers gives
at least some clue to the nature of a self-identical, self-
sustaining first cause. It has been said that nature is
running down, that the available heat is being diffused,
that in some billions of years the conditions will no long-
45. Brightman, POI, 190.
46. See page 114.
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er be present to sustain life. If nature is running down,
the question pressing upon the minds of many is, who has
wound it up? What nature seems unable to do for itself
calls for the idea of an adequate cause.
But aside from this, to say that nature is uncaused
is unintelligible for these reasons: The assertion is un-
satisfactory because it discards the ordinary mode of ex-
planation; that is, it abandons the scientific mode of ex-
planation by reference to causal antecedents. Being a neg-
ative proposition, it fails to tield any fruitful hypoth-
eses. Further, to speak of structure, law, order, and sys-
tem as evolving on either a small scale or large without
some kind of active agent seems to lack meaning. If there
is neither an immanent purpose or nisus in nature nor an
external agency dealing with it from its inception, the
fact of its being a universe seems unaccountable.
Neither truth nor error, good nor value exists with-
out minds which purpose and appraise. "The only thing that
is of absolute value is the individual person* s experience,
since this is the only realizer, enjoyer, and bearer of val-
47
ues. n This is a "down to the earth" fact which must com-
mend itself to minds which require something definite to
which they may cling..
Let it be supposed that the statement opening the
47. Leighton, ISO, 340.
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preceding paragraph is false. It would still remain true
that all values and goods and the factors of individual
growth and development are significant only by their ref-
erence to mind or minds. Character develops by the contin-
uous reasoned incorporation of the better and the best in-
4
to one's personal life, Leighton expresses it excellently:
We human selves discover values and in their realiz-
ation become persons and thereby become richer and more
harmonious finite embodiments of the meaningful and
worthful life of the universe. . . • For the deepest
quality in man, that which makes him a person or spir-
it in becoming, is the capacity to transcend his natur-
al or biological selfhood and to take on more universal
and richer spiritual quality, Man is essentially a God-
seeker, one who can become divine. This destiny of spir
itual progress through self-transcendence is the deep-
est word of the greatest human thinkers. . . .So too
the doctrine of the union of the individual soul with
the universal soul; Plato* s doctrine of the good; Aris-
totle^ contemplative life; the Stoic life in harmony
with the logos; the mystics contemplative and ecstatic
union with the one. Through these and other one-sided
or partial expressions of the same principle there
shines one fundamental truth—the absolute principle of
value, the objective ground of all value is personality,
spiritual selfhood in widest commonalty spread.
This point of view is held by philosophers who dif-
fer widely on other fundamental points. For example, Mc-
Taggart argues that "only the spiritual can have value,"
but as an atheist he says that the universe, which in oth-
er explanations would be the experience of God, has no val-
ue, although its parts (selves) do have. In fact, selves
are the locus of all value—they are intrinsic goods, and
48. Leighton, MC, 4.10; see also 406-407.
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other goods are called utilities.
W.R. Sorley expresses his opinions in a way which seems
adequately to summarize the main ideas of this section. He
believes that value resides in persons "by virtue of the fact
that they are individuals, and as such unique. "Given exis-
tence, value is always possible; it attaches itself to unique-
ness only because it is the individual that exists, and the
individual is always unique." He quotes T.H. Green to the
effect that personal worth is our ultimate standard in the
category of good, a standard in relation to which all other
51
values are relative. His belief that the good is rational,
52
real, and in persons appears in these words:
As free and rational, persons are also purposeful,
seekers of ends. The law which the person recognizes
as valid for his life is that which tends to be the end
in which personality is conceived as reaching its true
good. This is an ideal, and its attainment must be
looked for in the gradual process by which character is
built up and conduct brought into rational order. The
moral agent is thus compelled to regard his true per-
sonality as consisting not in the actual features of
the passing moment but in an is to be— in something
to which he should attain and"^o which he can at least
approximate,
10, The good and God
On the finite plane reason and good (and value) are
included within the microcosmic unity of personal life. Are
49. McTaggart, NOE, II, 398, 399, 404.
50. Sorley, MVIG, 115.
51. Ibid., 122-123.
52. Ibid., 190.
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they also ultimately identical with the macrocosm? Since
the world conforms more or less readily to the persuasion
of intelligent plans of action, since it favors rational
ends and is apparently under the influence and direction
of ends, it must be a unity of experience for some kind of
mind capable of grasping it as a whole. This seems to be
necessary, for without rational direction, it is difficult
to see how such a rational character and continuity of di-
rection could be true of the universe so steadily as is the
case. All the mechanical systems which mankind knows defi-
nitely require constant thought and attention to keep them
at peak operating capacity and perfection. Therefore the
world requires the constant and immediate oversight of an
infinite mind.
This is a tremendous venture of analogical reasoning,
one whose bases and implications will occupy the remainder
of the present chapter. The question of the ultimate ob-
jectivity of the rational good depends upon the disposition
of the problem of an infinite mind.
Proofs for the existence of God need not be pro-
duced here. For the most of mankind, such proof affects
the belief but little; men depend more upon faith and prag-
matic consequences than upon intellectual demonstration.
The stock arguments, the ontological, cosmological, teleo-
logical, and moral arguments, are faifcly familiar and can
be found in numerous textbooks of philosophy and theology.
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The gist of all arguments is that there must be a rational
ground of the worlds existence, its interaction of parts,
and its purposive operation. The denial of any explanatory
principle, such as cause, agency, or purpose, or other cat-
egories and empirical facts, detracts both from simple in-
telligibility and from mental satisfaction. If human minds
at the present advanced stage of the world's progress can-
not produce phenomena like those of nature, or even repro-
duce them adequately when given a pattern to work from, how
could nature have been produced by a finite mind or minds
at an earlier stage of history? And as the world now ex-
ists, how could its mechanical parts interact so precisely,
carry on as if under direction, and maintain themselves with-
out breakdown or apparent deterioration, unless there were a
53
single unitary agent in control of them? Further, accor-
ding to the scientific doctrine of evolution, the survival
of a belief strongly suggests its truth and validity, and
certainly theism has outlived many perilous periods in the
history of thought and religion.
11. God's nature and relation to the world
Four main conceptions of the nature of God have been
developed to account for the intelligible character of the
world. The first to be discussed here is pantheism. In this
view, as is well-known, God is regarded as wholly immanent
53. Bowne, THE, 51-63. This is the gist of his argu-
ment.
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in the world. Extreme pantheism is a conception in which
every particular fact is identified with God. God is dis-
solved, as it were, in an ocean of particularity, in which
he is indistinguishable from any particular—no predicate
can adequately describe him. If everything is a manifesta-
tion of God, then everything partakes of his nature. Every
thing is good, and evil has no reality whatever.
Pantheism is such an all-inclusive conception, so
entirely without an alter that to most persons it lacks
meaning. The views of some of the most important philoso-
54phers have had a more or less pantheistic flavor, but are
far more moderate than some others which can be positively
identified as pantheisms. '
The method of obtaining the unity which an intelligi
ble metaphysical theory demands, of identifying everything
with God has produced some masterpieces of ingenuity and
dialectical intricacy. Many of them bear a winning plausi-
bility. Yet somehow one sees and feels that absolutes, be-
cause they are not thinking and willing beings, but merely
universal concepts which must contain everything that is,
fall short of accounting for and unifying the diversity,
novelty, evil, and other irrationalities of the physical
54. For example, Hegel, Bradley, Royce.
55* Philosophic Hinduism, Stoicism, Neo-Platonism,
Spinozism.
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and moral universe. No matter what concepts are brought
forth to explain the multiplicity of particular empirical
facts, the explanation must be an inadequate one if God or
the Absolute is not granted active intelligence and will.
"Metaphysics," said Bowne, "shows that active intelligence
alone fills out the true notion of being, unity, identity,
and causality."^ Unless God is an active mind, he cannot
be a significant factor in the world*s processes, and the
apparent purpose in the world remains an ungrounded phenom-
enon.
Deism is the second view of God^ relation to the
world which is offered to reduce the facts to some kind of
intelligibility. It is at the farthest extreme from pan-
theism. The term "deism" is usually used to refer to the
religious rationalists and the advocates of natural as op-
posed to revealed religion in the eighteenth century, par-
ticularly in England, where, as shallow as it was, it had
more depth than in some other countries, e.g., France. One
characteristic doctrine of deism in all countries was the
57
notion that God is far removed from the world-order. The
world is mechanical; although God probably created it, he
is both external to it and remote from it (i.e. wholly tran-
scendent in relation to it). God may be personal on this
56. Bowne, THE, 140.
57. Rogers, SHP, 391.
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view, but he is wholly unconcerned about his creation. In
spite of its vogue in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
deism was too superficial to win the support of able men.
A religion which operates only by an uninspired reason,
and a deity who serves only as creator have too little ap-
peal either to become or to remain vital influences. The
manifestation of purpose in the world is unintelligible if
the world is mechanical. Growth, development, and progress
cannot have meaning if only the reign of law is to make them
possible. The modification of one law by another (e.g. the
expansion and increased buoyancy of water as it arrives at
the freezing point), seems difficult to conceive on the me-
chanical plane.
The view of Aristotle is in some ways intermediary
between the deistic and pantheistic views, but has some fea-
tures also which distinguish it from both of them. Terms
which might fittingly be applied to his conception of God
are the "logical absolute" or the "ultimate abstract uni-
versal." For him God is pure form, wholly inactive and in-
corporeal, the highest object of pure thought and contem-
plation. How God can move the world becomes a problem;
Aristotle argues that the desire of finite existence for
the ideal which God is, is the impelling power in all mo-
tion, in all growth and development. God is only a final,
58. Joyce, PNT, 2, 56I.
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and not an efficient cause. He is the entelechy, the re-
alization for which the whole world strives. But Aristotle*
view of him is abstract, a projection from the finite hier-
59
archy of form and matter on the ascending scale.
The truth of this view is that forms or universals
do bear the load of intelligibility for the world. The
case rests upon this basis: H If there are genuine univer-
sals, the universe is rational; as someone has said it is
•put together mindwise.* This much is fact: men think
by means of universals, and the world accommodates itself
to this method. The question upon which most disagreement
develops is: what kind of universals? Aristotle's abstract
universal is not in general favor at the present time.
The falsity of this view lies in its snpposal that
God has any significant connection with the world, consid-
ering the fact that he is pure form, a mind without activ-
ity. Form and matter separated from each other are empty
abstractions—even Aristotle saw how little could be said
about them. It was Plato f s separation of them which he
criticized and which he intended to overcome by his own
view, although as has been seen, he did not wholly succeed.
Form and matter are never experienced singly, hence for
Aristotle to call God pure form is to make God an unknow-
59. Aristotle, Met . , IX, 6, 994a, 1049a, b; cf.
Rogers, SHP"7~l02-107.
60. Brightman, ITP, 133.
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able entity. The criticism which Leighton directs against
those who try to avoid the concrete metaphysics of person-
ality by having recourse to a 'transcendental ought 1 seems
to have relevancy when applied to the view of Aristotle.
^
To set up such a notion is an intellectually vicious ab-
stractionism, of the same order as that which would
ground all the reality, worth of personal life, in a
'consciousness in general' (Bewusstsein uberhaupt).
Aristotle maintains with the deists the objectivity
of God, but God is so far from any effective relationship
with the rest of reality that his function is not fully in-
telligible.
The fourth view of God formulated to explain the in-
telligible and benevolent aspects of the world is personal-
istic and theistic. This conception of the nature of God
is offered as a true synthesis of the views which make God
an empty generality on the one hand and a meaningless uni-
versal inclusion of all facts on the other. In this view
God is regarded as both immanent and transcendent, as a mover,
purposer, and sustainer of the universe. Rashdall describes
62
the motive and spirit of this position:
I will simply state that to my own mind the only form
in which belief in the rationality of the universe is
intelligible is the form which ascribes the events of
its history to a self-conscious rational Will direc-
ting itself towards an end which presents itself to Him
as absolutely good. However inadequate our conceptions
61. Leighton, MC, 408.
62. Rashdall, TGE, II, 214.
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of 'Will 1
,
'Mind*, 'Purpose*, Reason 1
,
Personality 1
,
may be to express the nature of such a Being, they are
the best we have. Thought does not become more ade-
quate by becoming vaguer.
There are several formulations of the personalistic
position; in all, as the name implies, the highest reality
is the fact of personality, individual, unique, active, and
intelligent. In the system propounded by Bowne, God is con-
ceived as a person under whose direction the world moves at
63 , 64
all times, Bowne writes:
Both laws and things exist or change solely because of
the demands of the divine plan. If this calls for fix-
edness, they are fixed; if it calls for change, they
change. They have in themselves no ground of exis-
tence so as to be a limit for God; because they are
nothing but the divine purpose flowing forth into re-
alization. . . .We hold that the world is no self-
centred reality, independent of God, but is simply the
form in which the divine purpose realizes itself.
Bowne consciously strives to avoid the extremes of
65
both the deistic and the pantheistic views. In his opin-
ion the only possible way to accomplish this is on the plane
of personality. The features of the world which force one
to the conclusion that God is a person are these: (1) the
world of interacting things requires an underlying ground
of interaction which is effective at all points. (2) It is
63* God as personal was advocated by Plato; has been
the Christian tradition held by the church fath-
ers, many of the scholastic thinkers, Leibnitz,
Berkeley, Kant, Lotze, Eucken, Green, Sorley,
Green, Howison, Balfour, Ward, Pringle-Pattison,
Rashdall, and the Personalists, Knudson, Bright-
man, Flewelling, as well as many others. See
Knudson, PP, 32-33.
64. Bowne, THE, 227-228.
65. Ibid., 227.
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an intelligible system which requires an intelligent orig-
67 minator--the opposite view is contrary to reason. But many
have held that the world-ground is intelligent and rational
in1
69
68
but not personal." This is contradiction; active telli-
gence is what is meant by personality or personhood.
The universe of experience has no meaning or possibili-
ty apart from conscious intelligence as its abiding
source or seat. . . • Living, personal intelligence
is the only possible first.
This is but one of the numerous metaphysical paths
which lead to the same conclusion. "Identity, unity, caus-
ality, substantiality are possible only under the personal
70
form." Everything impersonal is dependent and phenomenal
and of the nature of instrumental good.
With the idea that the co-ordinated action of the
universe can take place mechanically, with only the moving
power of impersonal causal antecedents to bring events about
it is difficult to have patience. On the impersonal plane,
theorizers are given to assuming tacitly what they never ad-
mit explicitly. Thus the following, quoted by Pringle-Patti
son from A.E. Taylor: M, The succession of stages is welded
into a unity by the singleness of the plan or law which they
V A «71embody."
66. Bowne, THE, 51-53. 71. Taylor, EOM, 162-
' 163; Pnngle-Pat-
67. Ibid., 69-70, 151. tison, IOG, 360.
68. Ibid., 155.
69. Ibid., 169; see also 168.
70. Ibid., 204.
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Now a plan or law can weld nothing. Of course one
must make allowances for the modes of expression which, al-
though inadequate to express the thought, are yet made neces-
sary by the shortcomings of language. However, this mode of
expression is typical of a considerable number of philosoph-
ers who import dynamism into their systems of thought sur-
reptitiously, without recognizing frankly and fairly that
something more than order, system, intelligibility, a group
of categories, and a physical world are needed to account
for the unity that are actually experienced. The only orig-
inal dynamism that men experience lies within their own per-
sonalities,—they initiate events, begin activities. Any
other self-starting activity cannot be intelligible to them,
except on this basis.
Most learned men, particularly those with scientific
training, look for mechanical causes, and are wont to over-
look the fact that mechanical operation has no sufficient
ultimate explanation within its own realm. They are content
to rest in the immediate chain of causes and effects, and to
ignore the ultimate cause.
No one need complain of this procedure so long as
those who use it do not go beyond their prerogatives to
deny that there are ultimate explanations and goods, or to
affirm that there is no other explanation possible than me-
chanical explanation. But when philosophers, either through
timidity or carelessness, fall into the same error, and re-
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main within the one limited realm of explanation, while
still importing the necessary motive power and motion for
the scheme of things, then an outcry must be raised. When
science is able to prove that anything of a strictly mechan-
ical nature is self-preserving in the same sense that liv-
ing organisms are, then philosophy may cease to look for
ultimate sources of power, because a nature that is self-
sustaining could then be conceived as having no beginning.
Until, then, the most logical and reasonable possibility
for ultimate reference is a personality of the same order
as human personality, a prototype of human personality. This
is the natural and most satisfactory ultimate explanation
for human thinking.
12. The outcome of the view of God as
personal for the rational good
It was said above that personality is the bearer of
value, the realizer of value, and is itself the highest of
72
values or goods. In short, it is the only intrinsic good;
that is, whatever intrinsic goods may be distinguished re-
side in personality. Therefore the Supreme Person is the
summum bonum, the highest good of all. In him reality and
all worth become identical; the proposition of the "Great
Tradition" coheres with personalistic principles.
God's supremacy and perfection do not mean that he
72. See above, 122.
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has no occupation, no task, no activity. Self-activity is
a conspicuous fact in all personality, and there is no rea-
son to suppose that the personality of God is any exception.
The mirror-like intelligence of Aristotle^ God cannot be
the God who is in active relationship with the universe, a
God who both knows and wills the good.
But if God is a rational mind under whose direction
the world moves, does he will its unpleasant, painful, and
discordant features? Is he the author of irrationality?
God wills no intrinsic evil—one may be sure of that a pri-
ori , because he would no longer be God, but only a supreme
tyrant. That is, if the Being who controls the universe
wills contradictions of an intrinsic nature, then he is not
God and the world is as senseless as the most extreme pes-
simist thinks it to be. The facts do not support this opin-
ion. The direction of God's will is set unalterably toward
the good which ought to be liked, but the coming of this
good may be long deferred as mortals count time, although
it will be deferred in the interests of the whole ration-
al end. Extrinsic evils may be aids to this final good.
The events and conditions that cause pain may well be caused
or introduced by God. The patriarch Job thought so, and de-
73
clared, "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." "No
chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but griev-
73. Job , Chap. 13:15. Cf. American Revision.
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ous. Even so, a world or a character which contains the
maximum possible good seems to require the chastening which
is called evil.
On the basis of reason it would be difficult to say-
that the world is good, even allowing that the evils are on-
ly apparent. Reason is perplexed by the question, why the
appearance of evil? Considering the whole realm of the
world as it is, its possibilities and the apparent divine
purpose in it, one may say that it is the best God can make.
From the finite viewpoint it is knotty and thorny, yet or-
derly and benevolent, and could be either better or worse
than it is. It does serve a purpose (which may be the di-
vine purpose) ; by making man toil and sweat it develops char
acter and spiritual stamina, yields the satisfaction of prog
ress, and prepares one so that he can enjoy a still more per
feet world. If one's philosophy does not admit a realm of
ends, this argument will be meaningless. Without ends, how-
ever, all arguments are finally meaningless. This unques-
tionably true of the individual argument itself--if it does
not aim at truth, or at exercising the vocal cords, or at
some other end, no matter how trivial, it is senseless. But
in another sense even if the reasoning concerns particulars
or immediate causes, if there is not something more ulti-
mate to which it leads, these particulars or causes must of
74. Hebrews
,
Chap. 12:11.
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necessity bear a limited and partially misleading meaning.
Cut off from ends, they can only be described, not inter-
preted, and to the average man must seem barren and bleak
in the long run. Ultimately every human thought is vanity
if life is not moving toward an end that is full of mean-
ing because full of the good.
What man calls imperfection, then, is for God but a
tentative arrangement with a better end in view. This is
proved only by the fact that such imperfection can be shown
to serve the interests of reason and the good will. To
some it may seem unnecessarily naive, but the analogy of
God to a parent who takes the long run viewpoint in pro-
viding for the welfare of his children seems a plausible
notion. Discipline is an evil thing to a child, that is,
from the observation point of a partial mind. However, if
the characteristics of personality be the same in kind in
man and in God, then God will not propose that man should
have freedom from all trials. Rather, God will allow and
ordain everything which will enable man to become an em-
bodiment of the good, a rational will.
The fully rational good is not yet a reality in fi-
nite existence, but is a plan to be realized, an ideal. Men
have good reason to hope and to exert themselves in its be-
75
half. As Bowne expresses it:
75. Bowne, THE, 212.
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The seeming evils and imperfections of the world being
founded in purpose and freedom, and not in an intracta-
ble necessity, we are permitted to hope for their remov-
al or transformation in the completion of the divine
plan.
The outlines of the plan are clear to those who can read the
signs—not that it is a rational certainty, but it is at
least a rational probability that "a community of moral per-
sons, obeying moral law and enjoying moral blessedness, is
the only end that could excuse creation or make it worth
76
while." The conditions for this goal are present in the
world, and men still have hope. The perfectly rational good
is an ideal to urge man on to his fullest possible, and best
possible self-realization; to his highest good, which is a
personally achieved good. No good that could be given to a
man would have such high value for him as that which he had
a part in creating. Goods are only withheld, desires frus-
trated, and evils permitted, in the anticipation of greater
ultimate gains. These gains in personality growth are the
concrete realization of the rational good, the creation and
enhancement of a rational will.
13. Summary of the chapter
This chapter began with the definition of reality
and proceeded to show that the outstanding characteristic
of the real is its capacity to keep its identity without
contradiction while it is the object of coherent thought.
76. Bowne, THE, 231.
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The good can measure up to this requirement for the real,
especially if it is taken to be a good will concretely ex-
emplified in personality. Without the latten neither good
nor value can be real. The natural human tendency to rest
in what is liked without reference to the more enduring
ought-to-be-liked was noted, along with the tendency to re-
fer all values to an objective order. Evidence was presen-
ted to show that goods are objectively real—they are the
key to the whole meaning of the universe. Purposiveness
with a benevolent tinge marks the whole character of the
world. From this purposiveness, by analogical reasoning,
the existence of a Supreme Mind or Person is inferred. Evil,
so-called, appears as undesirable because it represents the
status of phenomenal existence against the background of
perfection; perfection is a goal to be striven for--having
by that plan a greater value--rather than to be conferred
on a man without effort or desire on his part.
The pantheistic, deistic, and Aristotelian conceptions
of God T s relation to the world were shown to be inadequate
to account for the experienced facts. A much more coherent
and satisfactory account was shown to be the view of God as
a personal, intelligent, and efficient mediator of the other-
wise loosely- jointed world. The deepest truth about the di-
vine being is its active participation in the realization of
man's good; the fundamental truth about finite beings is what
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they are capable of becoming.
In the following chapter, the implications of these
conclusions for social progress will be investigated. How
shall they be applied? What is social progress? What forms
of social, political, and other kinds of organization contrib
ute most to the development of individual personality and
good will? Is individual development, after all, the thing
most desirable, or is the desirable end a well-organized and
unified state or society? These are the next questions
awaiting attention.

CHAPTER V
THE RATIONAL GOOD AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
In the previous chapter, the conclusion was reached
that the rational good is an ideal which becomes an objec-
tive reality in personality. In finite personality, it was
said, the important fact is its capacity for becoming in one
process more rational and ethically better. These ends are
identical when the definition of rational adopted in Chapter
One is accepted.^" The background of the previous chapter
2
for the present chapter is essential, because
The source of the principle of the perfection of so-
cial man is to be found in the life and purposes of the
cosmos. • . . The pattern and standard of moral worth
is not to be found in man's nature alone, but in his en-
vironment, not merely of human society, but of the wid-
er cosmos.
1. Definitions and viewpoints
In this final chapter the aim will be to discover
how the ideal of the rational good may be realized in so-
ciety as a whole, and what it will mean for society. Some
of the questions to be considered are: (1) What is meant by
"social"? (2) What is meant byMprogress"? (3) What prin-
ciples are involved in an adequate conception of social
progress? (4) What do men who have thought carefully on
the subject of social progress feel and say about it?
1. See above, pages 16-17.
2. Reid, art. (1926), 38-52; quoted in Leighton, ISO,
3U.
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(5) Should progress be attempted through individual train-
ing and culture, or through manipulation of the masses? (6)
What fulfilled pre-conditions will make social advance pos-
sible?
"Social" is a term applied to the relationship of
human beings in a common environment. If a man is out of
contact and communication with other men, whatever relation-
ships may obtain between him and them, they are not social.
To say that a man is a social being means that he is capa-
ble of exchanging thoughts and ideas with other persons,
and of participating in their emotions, aspirations, and
life in general; but he actually has a social life only
when such exchange and participation is taking place.
"Progress" is taken to mean change in the direction
of an ideal end. Usually this does not mean wholly consis-
tent, unhindered, or uninterrupted change for good; it
means rather change for good on the whole. This is a wide-
ly inclusive definition which requires modification for
more specific and significant meaning.
Social progress, then, may be taken to mean the in-
creased and increasing interchange of ideas and participa-
tion in mutual interests between the geographically, poli-
tically, economically, and culturally separated groups of
men that now populate the earth. Social progress will call
for increasing knowledge and control of the facts in human
environment which can bring about this increase of contact
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and communication, and it will include the unwavering pur-
pose to exercise control in behalf of the common good. So-
cial progress refers to the relations of men to each other
as they realize the good which their true nature as persons
demands. Many variegated activities of men have social im-
plications. The economic, political, scientific, and cul-
tural pursuits of men may all contribute to their social
progress.
It would be well to consider here in what light prog-
ress has been regarded before considering how the whole idea
may be improved. The concept of progress is comparatively
modern. Up to comparatively recent times (and the attitude
is still strong in some quarters) those in places of leader-
ship and authority were willing to "let well enough alone"
as far as the social order was concerned. It has been con-
sidered "natural" for those in power to resist the coming
of any kind of "new order" and to condemn the reforming
spirit. The advice to mankind has been to endure patiently
the ills it suffers rather than to fly to others it knows
not of. Illustrations of the attitude may be found in the
social systems of India and China, the "divine right" ap-
peal of former monarchs, the totalitarian organization and
spirit of some of the churches, and in certain capitalistic
economic doctrines.
On the other hand, some restless, revolutionary souls
have been convinced that radical means, the use of either
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violent ideas or violent force, will bring about an order
in which many of the present evils will be absent. Driven
by the desire for economic security and the desire for ade-
quate recognition of their essential dignity and humanity,
they have resorted, where necessary, to the use of violence
in order to achieve these ends.
2. Principles of social progress
The notion of social progress that is here considered
to be satisfactory is one which has as its end the rational
good of the preceding chapters, and one which is perhaps a
mean between the concepts presented in the last two para-
graphs. This notion involves the recognition of at least
three principles. These are: (l)That progress is possible
only on the plan of widest inclusion of facts, of contin-
uous harmonization as new elements appear in the social
milieu; (2) That progress is possible for society as a whole
only as the rational good is realized in individual persons;
and (3) That progress for society requires the intelligent
guidance of individual persons—not merely to control each
one by prohibitions, but to foster the growth of positive
character.
Notice the principle that rational social progress
demands wide inclusiveness.. Many conceptions of the earth-
ly life and of the final destiny of man are hopelessly one-
sided. Some enthusiasts for general education, for example,
advocate universal schooling to solve the world's ills. Some
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economists apparently think that financial security of all
persons will fulfil all the conditions for man's happiness.
Some religionists seem to have the idea that the present
world and life in it are valueless; they would have men
neglect it as far as possible in order to seek for other-
worldly goods. Scientists sometimes speak, in their zeal,
as though the discoveries and inventions of science open
to mankind the doors to all -possible good.
The fact is that no rational creature can be satis-
fied with a one-sided restriction of his interests for a
life time. However much a man may restrict his own ac-
tivities, or be restricted by those who have authority over
him, to the pursuit of any isolated set of values, power,
pleasure, money, religious values, social values, the lim-
itation will react upon him. If he does not actually lose
the few things he prizes so excessively or to which he is
restricted, his own mind, in so far as he is rational, will
rebel at the monotony, the actual poverty, and the little-
ness of personality which such a course engenders. Ration-
ality and goodness demand wholeness; to have good things one
must be wholehearted, must devote his whole life, effort,
and talent to secure them. A man must devote his whole
attention in order to understand the myriad items which
clamor to be seen and heard; and he must see the world whole
3m order to grasp its meaning, progress, then, may be de-
3. Cf, Hobhouse, RG, 121, H5.
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fined anew as increase in the ability of minds to see the
whole of anything; and social progress is the rational and
benevolent will of men to include in their planning an in-
creasing recognition of the interests of those who are sep-
arated from them by whatever boundaries
—
geographical, ra-
cial, political, cultural, or other*
The second of the principles which are conceived to
be essential to a genuine social progress is that progress
is effected only through individual persons. This is not
to deny that there are mass movements of persons; there is
a mob spirit, a group consciousness, a sense of mystical
s
rapprochement , and an emotionalism which is evoked in many
individuals at a time through contacts with other people.
In the final analysis, however, any change in the group is
an alteration of the persons who compose it. The locus of
progress, as well as the real, is in the person.^"
This thesis may easily be illustrated by a brief
glance at the history of any science, art, or cultural pur-
suit which may be said to have progressed. The development
that has occurred has been no abstract process, but a defi-
nite passing on of ideas from person to person, with a few
especially fortunate or brilliant persons adding innovations
and receiving most of the attention. Thus in the science of
chemistry—after the beginning in alchemy a grand array of
4. Cf. Leighton, MC, 548; Hegel, POH, 38.
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great names appears, men whose minds were the vehicles of
progress for the science. Thus Boyle, Charles, Dalton,
Priestley, Faraday, Davy, Lister, Mayer, Joule, Helmholtz,
Mendele'ef , and many others have made contributions and passed
the science on more complete than they found it. In a sim-
ilar manner social progress owes much to men like Buddha, '
Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, Locke, Mill, Kant, and
Hegel, all of them men whose ideas have added to a fund of
knowledge handed down from person to person, giving each
person touched by it in each new generation a priceless
heritage of truth, insight, and ideals.
The third principle, that individual persons need in-
telligent control and guidance, has here to do more with
political affairs and government than with the control which
each man exercises upon himself through his reason. That
no individual conscience is enlightened enough to be ab-
5
solute was the view of Hegel. A man must be guided by the
systematic whole of things in order that both it and he may
6
achieve the best possible. Since a good man may have poor
judgment (and men of good will often suffer from this fault),
the persuasions of power, emotion, authority, and reason
must be used to protect the interests of the whole from the
5. Hegel, POH, 340; quoted in Leys, ESP, 300.
6. Cf. Hobhouse, RG, 204.
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faulty partial judgments of individuals. The more ration-
al persons recognize their shortcomings and submit to the
corrective judgment of the whole social and political or-
der to which they belong, even while trying to change that
order into a more rational one as they see its faults, the
more rapidly will social progress result. A man must submit
to the good and rebel against the evil in his social order.
Only so can he remain rational in the best sense of the
word, and contribute the most to his fellow men.
3. Views of the prospects of social progress
i. Kant . Many of the views of thinkers on the pros-
pects of social progress are none too optimistic. Kant, for
example, said that "the distance separating the good which
we ought to effect in ourselves from the evil whence we ad-
7
vance is infinite," and no one can "hope that man's good
will lead mankind to decide to work with unanimity towards
r ~i, 8this goalja kingdom of virtuej . Kant does feel, however,
that if a man possesses a good will "there remains a hope
9
of a return to the good from which he has strayed." What
is highly improbable, almost inconceivable for society, is
within the limits of likelihood for the man of good will.
7. Kant, RWLRA, 60.
8. Ibid., 86.
9. Ibid., 39.
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ii. Otto and Santayana . Otto and Santayana also im-
part a somewhat melancholy feeling about the prospects of
cosiety. The former remarks that few people who are op-
timistic about personal improvement have the same optimism
about social progress. Santayana speaks drearily of "this
immense distance from a rational social order"^ and de-
clares that "a truly rational morality, or social regimen,
has never existed in the world and is hardly to be looked
for." 12
iii. Dewey . Still there are writers and thinkers
who more hopefully call attention to man's endless per-
fectibility, his possibility of continuous advance. Even
as these lines are written, a commercial advertisement in
a prominent news magazine is almost wholly devoted to a
statement from John Dewey on the question, "what kind of
a world are we fighting to create?" Mr. Dewey speaks of the
painful and slow arrival of the desired ends, but is con-
vinced that "they will come surely, inevitably, if we keep
our vision clear, and direct our energies into productive
1*5
channels." '
iv. Plato
.
The formulation of Utopian schemes has
10. Otto, TI, 237-238.
11. Santayana, LOR, 237.
12. Ibid., 239.
13. Dewey, art. (1942), 3. See also Pringle-Pattison,
I0G, 245.
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been the occupation of numerous great minds who were willing
to admit that their schemes were impractical. For example,
Plato did not discard his ideals even though he did recog-
nize that they could not become an existent reality in a
state.^ Leys says that "the construction of an ideal is
necessary in order that a man may avoid a tempestuous and
15
whimsical shifting of policy from moment to moment." The
propensity of the human mind (irrational because out of har-
mony with the cosmic order, and logically, the confusion of
contraries with contradictories) to want everything black
or white, yea or nay, in Canopus or out, does not bring
mind to the truth in seeking for social welfare any more
16
quickly than in other pursuits. Leys warns of extremism:
Because men are not perfectly rational, we cannot there-
fore infer that they are completely immoral and irration-
al. The fact that we are not angels does not prove that
we are beasts.
4. Views of the good to be gained
and criticisms
Social progress was said above to be a mutual, increaS'
ing participation of men in common interests to create, to
conserve, and to enjoy the things they want and need. As
Rader points out, "human beings in great measure agree in
H. Leys, ESP, 161; see Plato, Rep . , V72, 473a-d.
15. Leys, ESP, 161.
16. Ibid., 281.

152
what they do want." ^7 This gives a basis for a definite be-
ginning. Yet men want a variety of things, some of which
conflict, and there is difficulty in deciding which wants
shall be given preference—all the more when many persons
are to be considered.
Plato has well-expressed the popular idea concern-
18ing the most important value in these words:
The rest of the world are of opinion that to him who
has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure,
life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent
about them is as good as dead.
Long ago, however, and through the years since, men who were
able to evaluate fairly the worth of a life of pleasure, de-
cided that as an end-in-itself which should supplant other
values or goods, it was wanting. Plato himself refused to
consider pleasure as more than incidental. Instead, he
showed that a rational balance of wisdom, courage and moder-
ation was far more to be preferred. These goods were condu-
cive to the best individual life as well as contributory to
the most desirable social structure. Pleasure as an end-in-
itself chokes out the incentive to realize other goods and
values. It is only one aspect of the good, and not the good
itself.
In the minds of ethic ists and social philosophers the
concept of the good life has ordinarily been one in which
17. Rader, NC, 74.
18. Plato, Phaedo, 65a.
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reason and good will must function; yet many of the view-
points developed are partial and incomplete. For example,
Bertrand Russell says that "the good life is one inspired
19
by love and guided by knowledge." "The good life must be
lived in a good society, and is not fully possible other-
wise," he insists. ^ But the world for him is devoid of
purpose and meaning, is indifferent to raan*s ideals, and in
the end it will nullify his achievements, for there is no
21
personal immortality. Russell regards the customary mo-
22
rality as mostly irrational, and dissents from most of it.
His conception of the good life is weakened by the notion
of cosmic indifference to it; in practice men require the
support of strongly intrenched metaphysical beliefs in or-
der to keep a motive for love and a reason for accepting
the guidance of knowledge instead of emotion or desire. One
may want the whole truth as a sort of general end, but unless
it bears a relation to his other values established by his
metaphysical thinking, it cannot serve effectively through
all the moral strains and stresses to which every man is
subjected. If any knowledge is worth having, it must be
because it can conceivably make life fuller and richer in
some respect. Even truth is interrelated with other val-
19. Russell, WIB, 28.
20. Ibid., 69.
21. Ibid., 21.
22. Ibid., 58-62.
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ues, and is not wholly intrinsic. If one knows that the
world favors a rational way of life and antagonizes an ir-
rational way, then the world cannot be indifferent to either
way. On the contrary, if one is sure that the world does
not support a rational way of life, no plan that he makes
can he better than any other. Such a world could only con-
vince a man of the futility of belief in anything. That
Russell does not wholeheartedly accept the notion of the
futility of life is evidenced by his emphasis on "courage
23
and rational reflection" as the way to overcome fear.
Another view which is often in danger of being in-
terpreted in a too narrow and partial manner is that called
variously self-realization, perfectionism, or humanism.
It numbers among its proponents such men as Plato and Aris-
25
totle, and numerous modern idealists. The basis of it is
the fact that conscious minds are active, that they have po-
tentialities for change in the direction of either good or
evil, and that in their development they progress faster
by contacts with other minds. Whatever the self may be in
its essential nature, one of its powers is self-transcen-
dence, through which means it grows and develops.
There are dangers in this viewpoint, among which is
the one which concerns the particular self that is to be re-
23. Russell, WIB, 21.
24. Wheelwright, CIE, 189ff., 196ff.
25. Bradley, ES, 228-229; Green, PTE, 305, 308.
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alized. The /problem takes on with the individual person
the same difficulties with which social ethics is occu-
pied: which partial self and which individual person shall
be favored? It is possible to distinguish the past, present,
and future selves, the rational and emotional selves, the
whole self, and others.
One might say immediately that the rational self
should be given the right-of-way; yet unless he understood
rational to mean widely- inclusive, as well as coherent, self-
consistent, and purposive, there would be many goods which
he would miss. Hobhouse propounds a view of self-realiza-
26
tion which seems adequate. He says:
No person's good is definitely fixed till the whole is
considered. . . .Self-development, as such, does not,
in short, remain part of the social ideal. Rather all
personal development is good as long as it is capable
of harmony, the wider the sphere of development the
greater the good attained.
The view of Bradley also has much to commend it. He says
that the good moral life is found in the realization of the
27
self as good-will. Good-will is the primary principle of
social harmony.
The good, then, is not a single simple fact— it is
the harmony of values and goods in an individual personality
or in a society, as well as a rational expansion and growth
in which the individual and his social order develop together
26. Hobhouse, RG, 147.
27. Bradley, ES, 228-229.
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and mutually benefit. A good society is one in which prog-
ress is being made—in which all values and goods that can
be made coherent at all in relation to the whole are being
realized. It is a society whose members (the majority of
them) strive to live peacefully, wisely, creatively; to
grow in wisdom and to distribute their benefits as widely
as possible. This is in part what is meant by being civi-
lized. Civilization which is more than a name calls for a
widening circle of relationships with things and people, and
may be thought by some on this account to make civilized
men meddlesome in the affairs of other people.
On this last thought Otto presents an interesting
notion of what the benevolence of civilized races towards
uncivilized races involves. V/hen one speaks of goods be-
yond the basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing, of com-
modities and goods instrumental to the more complete enjoy-
ment of life and the development of selfhood, he must wonder
whether foisting these upon people who have no desire for
them is presumptuous and unjust. Is it justifiable in the
interests of social progress to try to make the Chinese a
nation of automobile owners or users of kerosene lamps in
order to sell them oil and other western products? Should
western culture be imposed upon them whether they like it
or not? In regard to distributing these products to so-
called uncivilized nations, Otto asks: 2 **
28. Otto, TI, 39-40.
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Is it not a fact that we are supposed to be endeavoring
to make them the needs of more and more, and that in so
far as we succeed we call it progress?
Here again reason must be the chief critic. The whole
situation, which includes the end, must be examined along
with the means. Progress does require the creation of a
demand for new goods, the awakening of new wants and needs.
However, a great difference is apparent between the selfish,
capitalistic procedure of creating a demand for tobacco or
opium, with profit as the end in view, and the effort to
awaken the interest of people in ways to better their earth-
ly lot and find happier means of existence. The former pro-
cedure may be carried out in complete negligence of all per-
sonal values involved, whereas the latter is designed to
operate reciprocally for the creation of personal benefits.
In any case, members of primitive societies or of any so-
ciety left in isolation usually are and remain indifferent
-to the happiness of other persons, except perhaps, a few
close relatives. A rational society will seek to cultivate
and promote friendly relationships of all kinds with mutu-
al interests as the end aimed at.
5. The problem of social control
From the beginning of man's social life the funda-
mental problem which he has had to face is that of control,
and until it is solved no rational progress can be possible.
The aims of government, the scope of control, the means by
which the control of government is executed, the principles
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upon which it is based—these largely decide the fate of a
social group. The rationality of a society is reflected in
its government. Abject submission and practical slavery is
progress-defeating, and the government which demands it is
irrational. On the other hand excess freedom and lawless-
ness are self-defeating, chaotic, and equally as irrational.
Social progress comes by viewing the government and the gov-
erned as a whole; and with the end of furthering the inter-
ests of the good and the real, good government will relax
requirements or exercise more rigid control as these inter-
ests may be best served. Any form of government might be
modified to work toward these ends, but a whole view calls
for the kind of government which will protect itself against
all kinds of deterioration—moral spiritual, economic, or
any other.
Types of governments which have the greatest vogue
at the present time, and between which the issues are most
clear, are totalitarianism and democracy. These may be ex-
amined with the view of discovering the merits of emphasis
upon the good of the individual or of the state. If the
benefits to the individual are stressed, will those which
should accrue to the state take care of themselves? If the
state is powerful, prosperous, and caref- lly organized, will
the individual person in it automatically find his needs sup-
plied?

159
i. Contrast of totalitarianism and democracy . In
almost every point of importance totalitarian and demo-
cratic forms of government are antithetical. Contrast on
the following points may indicate this fact: (1) The to-
talitarian emphasis upon the value of the whole state is
opposed by the democratic emphasis upon the worth of the
individual—organicism versus atomism. (2) Totalitarian-
ism operates upon the theory of complete control and regi-
mentation within the state by only one political party,
while democracy permits the free expression of opinion by
those of widely varying political views. (3) The totali-
tarian states glorify traditions to a greater extent than
does democracy, and they stress the unity of the past, pres
29
ent, and future to a much higher degree. (4) Totalitar-
ianism calls for less use of reason and for more deference
to intuitions, feelings, " instincts of the blood." It pre-
30
fers to develop men of action rather than men who think.
(5) Modern totalitarianism has a record of encouraging wars
the use of violence and force, with the. idea that men grow
31
heroic in the battle and clash of enemies. Democracy
holds the ideal of peace with the use of a minimum of force
(6) Totalitarianism reduces values to facts, and in morals
29. Cf . Rocco, in Wagner, SR, 651-652.
30. See Spengler, DOTW, II, 17; quoted in Rader, NC,
51.
31. Rader, NC, 152.

160
and ethics adheres to a pure relativism. Good, better, val-
uable are terms of arbitrary meaning which ordinary individ-
uals are unqualified and unpriviledged to judge. Objectiv-
ity is a false ideal; truth must give way before the advance
of the state. The leader must make decisions, and he does
not err. The philosophers of totalitarianism deny the uni-
versality of law and all goods, and follow bias, racial dis-
32tinction, national cultism, and class distinction.
ii. National socialism . The system of national so-
cialism in Germany affords one of the best examples of the
operation of a totalitarian regime. Two characterizations
of it, written by independent observers, one early in the
history of the movement and one recently, judge the char-
33
acter of the state very similarly.
The universities of Germany, once the strongholds of
research and intellectual freedom, have been swept by a
new theory of knowledge which justifies all the outrages
of the Nazi student organizations and automatically
eliminates all that has hitherto been known as either
thought or science. According to this theory there are
no objective criteria of truth. Truth is arrived at by
feeling, specifically, by the feeling of uncontaminated
Germans. Reason is to be "strictly in the service" of
these Germanic intuitions.
The second of these articles describes the same con-
dition of irrational procedure and the effect upon the ob-
34
server.
32. Rader, NC, 337.
33. Lewinsohn, art. (1933), 277.
34. Agar, art .( 1942) , 565 ; quoting Hamilton Fish Arm-
strong with approval, but without reference data.
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There is a strange German world of mystification where,
if we are able to enter at all, we find ourselves grop-
ing and bemused. . . . Since things have no clear in-
tellectual basis they can have no issue except reckless
and violent action or dreams of action that result from
frustration and end in perversion and self-abasement.
In the description of such an order rests its con-
demnation for men who are rational in the sense defined
35
above. This is not to say that the German National So-
cialist State is wholly irrational. It is vastly unreason-
able, but it has a certain set of values for which it em-
ploys very effective means to realize, and in this effort
has maintained a remarkable inner order and harmony. Mere-
ly to call the Nazi doctrines nonsense as has been so often
done, does not dispose of them. "It would be ridiculous to
36infer that they lack sense or intellectual subtlety."
However, the Nazi order does violate flagrantly some
of the principles of rationality, and specific instances can
be profitably examined. First, then, is the principle of
consistency. For example, Hitler professes to despise Jews
for their lack of culture, their lying, their racial exclu-
37 38
siveness, and their cunning. Yet Hitler has at various
times extolled at least racial exclusiveness and cunning for
the German people, and has made no apology for lying when it
35. See above, pages 4-17.
36. Kolnai, WAW, 57; cf. 18.
37. Hitler, MK, 414-18, 420, 430, 434, 437.
38. Ibid., 425.
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suited his, purpose. He has declared that the state cannot
be "founded only on the classes which represent intellect
39
and intelligence" for it seems that too much culture makes
a weak state. He has also said, "we will pursue no other
ultimate aim than to win freedom for our German people and
40
to secure a living-space for the German family."
But the story is so familiar now as to need no rep-
etition. In the second place, the Nazis are irrational in
being fanatical and extreme. Hitler said, "extremes must
be fought by extremes. Their distinctions are absolute.
Haiser's separation of the "free born" and the "unfree"^
is a case in point; and the sharp distinction between the
German and the foreigner or enemy,^ "between the pure and
the impure races, between complete devotion to the state
or treason, illustrate the intense, burning fanaticism of
nd ]
„45
44
the Nazis. "And if others speak of the World a Humanity
we say the Fatherland—and only the Fatherland!
In the third place the Nazis are sub jectivistic and
arbitrary. Their selection of values is based upon feeling,
39. Hitler, MNO, 171.
40. Ibid., 946.
41. Ibid., 46.
42. Kolnai, WAW, 382.
43. Ibid., 436 ff., 459-461.
44. Ibid., 129.
45. Hitler, MNO, 46.
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and the self-stimulated consciousness of superiority of
both race and nation.^ Goering has said, "as for me, I
am subjective
, I commit myself to my_ people and acknowledge
LI
nothing else on earth. n*' The justification for one strong
nation using force on weaker nations round about is that it
fun, and that it is nature's way, like a hawk slaying a
dove.^ "Youth is always right, because it sees things in
49
an unspoilt manner, without inner check," says Goebbels.
A person without inner checks is likely to be extremely ar-
bitrary in his actions.
Fourth, the Nazis reject the principle of widest in-
clusiveness. The efforts they put forth for improvement are
ry
51
50
nationalistic—for Germans alone. Enemies are necessa
for national growth, and the Jew makes a good scapegoat.
If there were no Jews, other enemies would have to be found;
attention must be directed to the fact that inferiors are
CO
enemies. There is no "goal of mankind."-'
Finally, German National Socialism is a revolt against
the kind of reason which produces so-called civilization.
46. Hitler, MNO, 50; Kolnai, WAW, 194-195, 397.
47. Kolnai, WAW, 30; see MNO, 923.
48. Kolnai, WAW, 473.
49. Ibid., 296.
50. Ibid., 352.
51. Ibid., 502 ff.
52. Ibid., 397, 407.
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Hitler has said: "In my eyes criticism in itself is not an
important function in life. The world can live without crit-
53ics, it cannot live without workmen." This revolt against
54
reason, however, is not so much
hostility to intellectual capacity as such; the perse-
cution is directed against "reason" not as a power of
thought, but as an organ of spiritual objectivity lift-
ing individual man above the mental coercion of the
tribe, above the identification of "truth" with the ideo-
logical trend of the particular group and its rulers.
Reason is persecuted as the general bond of the spirit-
ual unit of humanity, as the guarantee of union in place
of domination, local oligarchy and trifcal self-exaltation,
as the hall-mark of a free community.
The Nazis deny to the capacity of reason the universality
and objectivity which make it rational.
The strength of totalitarianism rests in its organi-
zation, unification, and its control of all factors related
to the welfare of the state as a whole. Although individuals
are subordinated to the state and considered only as instru-
ments, they enjoy a fairly high degree of economic security,
and the sense of having a part in a great enterprise.
On the other hand, the lack of freedom of expression,
and the strict regimentation of persons makes for the des-
truction of the only really intrinsic goods there are. A
progressive and successful state must deal in realities, for
this is the only way to be rational; nature, it has been
55
said, favors the rational and tends to expel the irrational.
53. Hitler, MNO, 283.
54. Kolnai, WAW, 58.
55. Lotze, MIC, I, 429.
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Therefore, any state which ignores the good that lies in
individual persons rests upon shaky foundations.
iii. Estimate of the principles of democracy . De-
mocracy seems to come nearer to the rational acknowledge-
ment of the good of personality than any other type of gov-
ernment in operation today. To he sure, it is not the last
word in -progressive government. "Democracy requires re-
56
thinking in relation to the changing world." It has many
defects and may acquire still more. It is loosely con-
structed, tolerant of evils which may destroy it, often
lawless and uncontrolled to the point of anarchy and chaos,
and inclined to permit competitions within its borders which
blight its best features. "It is entirely wrong," says
Julian Huxley, "to equate democracy with a system of free
57individual enterprise." Such an uncontrolled process op-
erates neither for the best interests of the individual nor
the group.
Such "free individual enterprise," however, has been
all too common in the democracies, and has been the source
of numerous injustices and inequalities, especially in Eng-
land up to about 1830 and in America from the Civil War un-
58
til the present. It is the economic heritage from an era
which could not know from experience the incipient evils of
56. Huxley, art. (1942), 3U.
57. Loc. cit.
58. See Leighton, SPC, 206.
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uncontrolled competition. The present generation has thus
inherited the system of profit-taking, the concentration of
wealth in the hands of an aristocracy, and the concentration
of poverty among the ranks of those who have only their la-
bor to sell in order to earn a livelihood. Such economic
upheavals as that of 1929> and the hardships of the succeed-
ing years must convince anyone that something is wrong. Es-
pecially since war prosperity has appeared the question is
being asked, if it is possible to bring prosperity by such
concentrated and unified efforts in war time, why not in
peace time also, and with ten thousand fold more benefi-
59
cent results? It is safe to say that the laissez -faire
doctrine is definitely in the discard for the present gen-
eration, perhaps for the duration of the civilization that
now exists.
In place of the older atomistic, individualistic or-
der must arise a new one of economic planning where the prin-
ciple of freedom within rational limits may be exercised.
The rank inequalities, exploitation of the laboring man and
other men, and the affront and harm to human personality must
be eliminated. The progress already made is encouraging, but
it is only the beginning. It is hindered by the excesses
which arise from the newly distributed powers and privileges,
and there is much correction and criticism that is necessary
in order not to become unbalanced in the opposite direction
59. Huxley, art. (1942), 337-347.
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in the process of gaining a stable economic and social equi-
librium.
Three sound principles of democracy may be noted
here: (1) The emphasis upon the dignity of individual per-
sons; (2) The conviction that truth is a fundamental good;
(3) The belief that permanency is a good which can best be
engendered by pacifistic and conservative policies of gov-
ernment.
The autonomy of the individual person is the oufc-
60
standing principle of democracy.
The yardstick by which we can measure democratic
achievement is the satisfaction of the needs of human
individuals, and the yardstick by which we can measure
democratic method is their active and voluntary partici-
pation in all kinds of activities.
Every human born into the world has in the eyes of
true democracy a certain individual birthright—a birth-
right of health, strength, intelligence, varied enjoy-
ment, and free interest.
Democracy recognizes the values and goods in the pur-
suits of men at peace far more than it does the values and
goods of militarism. Good will and good persons are not
usually products which come out of a continuous atmosphere
of hatred, bloodshed, and strife. War is an abnormal phe-
nomenon in which the individual person is necessarily swal-
lowed up in the exigencies of the emergency. Only in peace-
ful pursuits is there "liberty and justice for all." In war
60. Huxley, art. (194-2), 34.4.
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there is necessarily injustice for some, privilege for oth-
ers.
The love of democracy for truth has been shown by
its maintenance of free schools, free press, free speech,
by its tolerance of a variety of political doctrines and
factions within the organization. Only the demand and need
for order limit this devotion to freedom and truth. Diverse
points of view are the result of free expression, and give
each person his chance to be heard, but no one individual
is the yardstick for the whole system. The person "cannot
develop fully or freely except in an organized society.
Hence some particular freedoms must be limited for the sake
of all individuals together.
Whether democracy can endure through the severest
trials of its strength that it has yet experienced remains
62
to be seen, but probably no one thinks that it ought to
endure in the exact patterns of the present. If social
progress is to take place (whether in the framework of
63democracy or any other) , the principles marked out above
must be followed. These are: (1) All governments and peoples
must be recognized, tolerated, and familiarized with the
aims and ideals of personality growth, and with the demo-
61. Huxley, art. (1942), 345.
62. Can it rise to internationalism as the U.S. rose
to nationalism after the Civil War?
63. This chapter, page 145. Here in revised form.
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cratic way of life. (2) All citizens, both of democratic
and nondemocratic nations, must be educated, cultivated, ben-
efited by every possible means
—
particularly must everyone
be shown how to develop his own character, capacities, or
life as a whole, and how to be of service to as many other
persons as possible. (3) The governing power must work for
a minimum of suppression of individuals and a maximum of in-
dividual self-control. No gains are made unless the burden
of the execution of laws becomes lighter, or at least in-
creases less rapidly than the proportionate population
growth and the complexity of the social structure.
6. Modes of achieving rational
democratic ends
How shall these ends be achieved? What is the reason-
able way to proceed? It is not within the scope of this
study to do more than to indicate what is rational and good
and some general rational means for its realization in so-
ciety. The means requires the control of the power by which
social process operates. That power is first of all individ-
ual wills. Therefore the best kind of control is in the
ideals which individual persons can be persuaded to acknow-
ledge, with the resulting self-control. Good will must be
the objective of education; not only technical and factual
knowledge and skills must be taught, but also the apprecia-
tion of goods and values; not only learning but wisdom; not
only science but philosophy and religion. To create ration-
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al wills is the necessary beginning for all agencies in-
terested in promoting social progress. "The coherent will
alone is concretely good. It is the source of the goodness
of objects or things." "The only thing that is intrin-
sically intelligible. . .is a will oriented towards val-
65
ues."
Good will may be fostered by overt action among men
as well as in the cultivation of one's own inner life. Ra-
cial or class superiority, for example, must not only be
frowned upon, but the actual practice of treating all men
as equals must be followed. The practices of unfair com-
petition in trade, of taking advantage of the ignorance or
weakness of others must not only be prohibited by law, but
must receive the condemnation of public opinion and of per-
sonal judgment. Each man of good will is obligated to work
in its behalf, for otherwise he cannot possess good will;
he cannot be rational and fail to promote that which he be-
66
lieves good, for goodness and rationality are inseparable.
i. Ways of securing co-operation . If good will is
to increase among men, some rational means of securing co-
operation must be employed. The possible ways may be re-
duced to five: trickery, barter, emotional persuasion, ra-
67
tional persuasion, and force. The first resort of govern-
64. Paton, GW, 180.
65. Urban, IW, 210.
66. See Chapter Three.
67. Wheelwright, CIE, 293.
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ments has not usually been the best of these, namely, ra-
tional persuasion. From the beginning the most commonly
used means of securing co-operation has been that advocated
by the sophist Thrasymachus. "Justice," said he, "is the
68
interest of the stronger," implying that might is right.
None of these methods should be condemned a priori .
The rational basis of judgment is to include the recog-
nition of the end in the judgment of the best means. Trick-
ery is not always an irrational means. It is certainly jus-
tifiable in situations where the achievement of a good end
is a practical certainty for those tricked, and when it is
an end which they would (at their best) recognize as de-
sirable. The use of force is almost the only rational pro-
cedure in dealing with a madman. A rational good may re-
quire that any or all of these means should be employed.
No end justifies the use of arbitrary, ill-considered means,
but any worthy end calls for rational means which may be
discovered by a wise and thoughtful mind.
ii. Special value of rational persuasion . In general,
it is more rational to reason with a person than to use force
to gain an end, because in the long run (which is a factor
in rational outlooks) such persuasion helps to develop an
inner discipline and control that force would destroy. When
a man perceives reasons clearly and acts upon them, his ac-
tion has a greater value than any action done from compul-
68. Plato, Rep., Bk. I, 338a, b; cf. Rader, NC, 99.
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sion. Thus rational persuasion, while initially more dif-
ficult because of the strain it puts upon the patience of
the persuader, is really more of an economy of effort in
the long run than force. Rational persuasion, in the main,
is advantageous both upon scientific and philosophic prin-
ciples: it employs the principle of parsimony and it views
the ends and means as a whole.
Yet both rational and emotional persuasion must be
based upon fact in order to be effective; and the fact that
self-interest is the predominant motive that governs most
human action must be taken into account. Hobbes and Ben-
tham among others, have assumed it to be a primary ethical
principle. It appears as a paradox, but also as a remark-
able hope for progress, that it is possible for self-inter-
est and social progress to develop concomitantly—that the
good of society is also the good of the individual. The
task of those interested in better things is to demonstrate
to as many persons as possible this truth.
iii. Training in value -appreciation . Social progress
depends upon a deeper understanding of the world than sense-
experience alone yields. In other words, there is a need
for not only scientific, but metaphysical, moral, and re-
ligious approaches to reality as well. A wholeness of view-
point is necessary for man to develop into the best he is
capable of. Few scientists as such attain to such a synop-
tic view, simply because of their primary interest in des-
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cription. A descriptive and factual survey of the physi-
cal world misses important truth. Other facts are present
but are neglected.^
How can we reconstruct society unless we have first
determined the goods , the values or ends , which we
ought to seek? And how can we determine the meanings
of good and value without a reasoned inquiry into the
nature, value and destiny of human personality and its
place in the universe? I hold that even imperfect re-
ligion is a much surer guide to social reconstruction
than a crassly positivistic and utilitarian social pol-
ity, based on pseudo-scientific sociological general-
izations.
The task before this generation is tremendous and full
of challenge. It is one that has rewards, and will have more
of them, for social progress is being realized on the whole,
in spite of the setbacks it has received. The men to pro-
mote it are the present chief lack and need. As Mr. Dewey
70
has recently written:
The mechanical means have already been produced by
science and invention. Physically , the world is now
one and interdependent. Only human beings--interested
that men everywhere have a society of peace, of secur-
ity, of opportunity, of growth in co-operation— can as-
sure its being made morally one.
7. Summary of the chapter
In this final chapter the good individual life was
taken to be one in which the good will predominates, in
which purposes are coherent, and in which knowledge is the
guide. Social progress was taken to mean an increase of
69. Leighton, MC, 547.
70. Dewey, art. (1942), 3

174
participation by more and more men in common interests, to
create, to conserve, and to enjoy together the things they
want and need. Three principles are considered necessary,
and must be observed if such progress is to take place: (1)
Unity in variety, the wide inclusion of experienced facts
with continuous harmonization taking place; (2) Development
of the rational good through and in individual persons; (3)
The persuasive, forward-looking control by intelligence,
first and ideally self-control, but secondly and necessarily,
in view of finite limitations, the control of government.
In governmental control, democracy comes nearer to
the ideals set forth here than the other most typical form
of government of today—totalitarianism. This can be deter-
mined by an impartial analysis of avowed aims and actual op-
eration in specific nations. The saving factor of democracy
is its benevolent conception of the worth of individual per-
sons, and its care for them. Its present prototypes are un-
likely to endure, but its basic principles must endure if
society is to develop toward the ideal of the rational good.
As basic needs are satisfied, as increased voluntary partic-
ipation in all human activities is achieved, with more and
more persons taking part in government, religion, education,
business, industry, and the rest, society presents more var-
iety with greater possibilities for the work of unification
by reason.
The good society on these lines is a civilized soci-
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ety--one in which good will prevails, where the majority of
the people live by the rules, individual persons being as
fully self-controlled as possible, but always under disci-
pline. The good society allows the individual the greatest
freedom consistent with order and harmony, and makes pro-
vision for social progress through individual growth. In
the good society, intelligent choices of the necessary means
of persuasion will be made, but the employment of rational
persuasion will predominate.
8. Some final thoughts
The rational good may be thought of on three levels;
these are the theoretical, the practical, and the ideal. On
the theoretical level, the thought which is grounded in rea-
sons, which finds its support in explanation and comprehen-
sion is rational good. Whatever system of ideas is intel-
ligible, means something, is self-consistent, coheres, and
is most satisfying to the reasoners mind, is rational; and
whatever is rational is in some sense good. Thus a philo-
sophical system satisfies a need by its display of inter-
connection, and a mathematical system gives pleasure in the
contemplation of its rigor, symmetry, and regularity. The
human mind derives pleasure from order. Coherence is a
good, and on the theoretical plane the only good.
On the practical plane, the rational good consists
of results obtained by particular persons in the applica-
tion of reason to problems of experience. It consists of
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the development of virtues in reaction with the world of
persons and things, the vanquishing of evils. Thus the vir-
tue of persistence is built up by contact with an honest per-
son, and other virtues in like manner ad infinitum . No per-
son can enter into any relationship with other persons or
things without undergoing some kind of modification. The
rational good on the practical plane is the actual outcome,
in a person or a society of persons, of greater integration,
self-consistence, more inclusive ends. The rational good
must not be merely understood, but realized.
No finite person is ideally rational, either in the-
ory or practice. The statement may be made practically a
priori , for it seems contradictory to think of a finite per-
son who could not hold ideals, or an infinite person who
could. Complete knowledge of possible goods, with a will
constantly oriented to achieve them or conserve them seems
to be the highest ideal of rationality and goodness. So
much most people can agree upon. But without the conception
of capacity or power the idea of will is meaningless; in fact
will is very often referred to as "will-power." A powerless
will is worthless on the practical plane—how little value
then, must it have on the ideal plane! It is a remarkable
fact that through the will, the rational self is able to ex-
ercise self-control, a prominent characteristic of the good
will. But self-control is, just as much as any exercise of
the will is, the power to carry out a plan of action. Hence
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in the ideal realm, God is conceived as limiting himself as
well as energizing and controlling the world. On the ideal
plane, rationality is something akin to what it is upon the
other two levels, but in their idealizing, human beings must
concede that perfection so far outreaches their utmost grasp
that description beggars the actual circumstance. Still the
attempt must be made, and successive approximations (wider
inclusions) come progressively nearer the end desired—hu-
man development. They do not come nearer to exhausting the
infinite, but that is never the goal of any rational being.
The ideal plane is not merely speculative, but is a viewpoint
of synthesis and wholeness in which the theoretical and the
practical find stimulation to work for the greatest benefit
of the individual and of society.
Men tend to put a high value upon the immediate. It
is easy to be satisfied with the practical goods which can
be gained with a minimum of effort. The values of good will
are not always immediately evident, and they require consid-
erable work and patience to put into practice. The devel-
opment of good will in oneself and society sets a man's task
for a lifetime and is ordinarily not the successful outcome
of a few years spent in his youth to attain it. Persons
who call themselves practical often fall short of genuine
practicality, because their lack of a long-run viewpoint
brings them into chaos after an initial brilliant effort.
All men need the guidance of the theoretical reason and of
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the ideal ends that are available.
It is precisely these ends or levels to which more
and more men must "be brought in order to produce a social
advance. All persons are capable of enjoying the insights
of these levels, but few are willing to exert their intel-
lects to attain them. The average man in the present order
also lacks the time necessary to pursue the reasons for
things to their origins. Yet he needs the poise, the bal-
ance, the comprehension of the meaning of life which such
a background of systematic knowledge supplies. He needs
the guidance and control of ideals which can be gained on-
ly at the cost of effort and time. As society encourages
the expending of effort and provides more leisure time for
these pursuits, both it and the individual will benefit to-
gether in this widening, deepening, and lifting process.
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ABSTRACT
The central problem of this dissertation arises out
of a conflict between the emphasis on irrational or nonra-
tional values, on the one hand, and the emphasis on the ra-
tionality of good on the other. The philosophy of those
who follow immediate and uncriticized preferences, their
unreflective common sense and prejudices, is inevitably op-
posed to that of any who are devoted to the ideals of truth
and reason. Advocacy of the rationality of good encounters
two main objections: that the rational good is impossible
to realize, and that it is undesirable when compared with
good as otherwise conceived.
Some of the objections tend to disappear when the ra-
tional good is defined. In the minds of many the word 'ra-
tional* has unpleasant associations with the abstract and
the formal. However, the term * rational* is conceived to
mean more than any merely abstract or formal thought. Some-
thing in addition to the usual connotation of formal consis-
tency is needed, and this extra meaning is found in the no-
tion of a coherent ideal end which includes the widest pos-
sible scope of experience, of fact, of objective reference.
Defined in this way, 'rational* means that which is coher-
ently, purposively, concretely, and ideally whole.
The term *good* also needs definition. It does not
mean whatever a person happens to like; this defines value.
Neither is the good an ideal of the Platonic kind, as often
conceived, out of meaningful connection with the workaday
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world. The good is the ought-to-be-liked (true value), an
ideal which is relevant to the actual. If it were irrele-
vant to the actual, it could not be a principle having nec-
essary application, or requiredness, or oughtness. Good
differs from value in just this quality; it compels ration-
al assent even when it is not immediately liked. In com-
paring and contrasting the good and the ideal it may be said
that all goods presuppose ideals, but not all ideals are good.
Everything which ought to be liked is an ideal in so far as
it is a concept of a not-yet-appreciated, not-yet-realized
fact or event which ought to be appreciated and realized.
Ideals are of various grades or levels, and no one could
say that those which are impossible to make actual in any
degree ought to be universally striven for. Whatever ideals
a man acknowledges prescribe the good for him, and this pre-
scription contains an imperative which he must heed if he
would be rational.
A search for clues to the nature of the rational good
leads to the examination of the philosophic systems and bas-
ic attitudes of those who oppose it. Natural sciences ab-
stract from and therefore ignore the whole concept of good,
except the good of knowledge. Naturalistic philosophy, al-
though often concerned with moral good and allowing it, de-
nies the whole concept of good any objective reference, ex-
cept for the good of knowledge. Authoritarianism, pessi-
mism, transvaluationism, mysticism, and factualism assume
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partial, subjective, or otherwise inadequate positions of
opposition to the rational good. These views are defective
in the metaphysical picture which they portray.
Rationality and goodness are inseparably connected.
Desire for the true good creates an obligation to be ration-
al. Irrationality, in so far as it is inconsistent, is al-
ways self-defeating; furthermore, it is self-defeating even
when consistent, if reason is subordinated to the status of
a mere instrument. To be rational means to aim at the good.
To aim at nothing, and to spend all one's time in criticiz-
ing means while neglecting ends are equally irrational pro-
cedures.
The connection between the rational and the good may
be variously approached. Bergson has done much to call at-
tention to the complementary relationship between intel-
lect and intuition, and to show that neither alone is ade-
quate for the tasks which the whole mind must perform. A
wholly rational good, therefore, is one which acknowledges
intuition as a recognizer of values, but which also acknow-
ledges reason as critic and establisher of relations. The
compulsion, requiredness, or obligatory quality of true val-
ues is a reaction of the whole mind to them.
Kant demonstrated the connection between the ration-
al and the good by reference to the requirements of the pure
reason and the moral ought. Every rational person feels ob-
ligation, but he also feels that fairness and justice require
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appropriate rewards for fulfilled obligations. In a world
of free agents this is impossible unless there should be a
central co-ordinator who has both the wisdom, the will, and
the power to dispense justice. Thus the situation (the in-
terrelation of pure reason and empirical fact) demands that
such an efficient agent be postulated—an agent in whom
goodness and rationality are united.
Just as the good and the rational are connected, so
the rational good and the real are connected. Reality is
defined as any fact or event which has objective reference
and can be thought about coherently. It does not contra-
dict itself and it has the capacity to endure, Good is
fully capable of conforming to this standard when it is
conceived as inhering in personality, or as the good will.
Negatively, it is difficult to see how anything can have
value or be good except as it comes under the form in which
it is intelligible to minds; in short, unless it is related
to minds. Indeed, value means appreciation or enjoyment by
a mind.
The chief argument for the objectivity of good, or
more exactly, for its identification with the real as per-
sonal, is the element of purpose which is present wherever
anything is conceived as good. On the whole the world acts
so as to promote the rational and to expel or discourage the
irrational. It seems to be aiming at an end, for its changes
are, as a rule, orderly and consistent.
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Further, in history, whenever important decisions
had to be made, individual men have often made better de-
cisions than they knew. That which was not the conscious
design of any single human mind cannot be called the oper-
ation of mere finite intelligence (as Bosanquet suggests).
Purpose is the basic element in personality. If the
real is purposeful, it would seem to be also mental and per-
sonal. The good, the rational, and the real are three dis-
tinct concepts, but they coalesce and find their unity in
personality. Personality is the only realizer of value,
and is the supreme good. The rational good is realized as
persons develop more sympathetic attitudes, sensitive per-
ceptions, good will, and coherent, self-consistent, widely-
inclusive thinking. God, the Supreme Person, works for the
realization of these ends in more and more persons, and is
the guarantor that man's efforts shall not be in vain.
wliile the rational good is an end achieved in human
individuals, it cannot come to full realization unless in-
dividuals achieve it co-operatively. Wider inclusion is a
goal for social order as well as for the individual mind.
A current ideal is a world-community. All forms of polit-
ical organization which adhere to short-sighted, limited
ends defeat the rational end of continuous progress of all
nations; a progress which is the realization of the capaci-
ties for good in every concrete human personality.
Conclusions :
1. The rational good is differentiated by the fact that
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it involves an 1 ought 1 grounded in the coherent relationship
of ends and means, and in the endlessness of the task of rea-
son.
2. Opposition to the rational good comes chiefly from
those who take positions with less complete perspective than
the rational good affords. Unless reason itself be repudi-
ated, the opposition may make a contribution to the more in-
clusive view.
3. The ideal of the rational good is apprehended jointly
by intuition and the discursive reason. Each is complemen-
tary to the other, and each alone tends to fall into error,
which can be corrected only by the joint operation of both.
4. The ideal of the rational good is concretely realized
and exemplified in persons, who are loci of all values. In
abstraction from personality value and good are without mean-
ing.
5. The reality of the rational good requires the endur-
ing validity of the ideal, its presence in the divine mind,
its operation in the world of things, and its capacity to
foster harmony among persons.
6. Social progress consists of the realization of the
ideal of the rational good in increasing numbers of indi-
vidual persons, and in a more compact, efficient social
structure.
7. Forms of political organization have significance
for social progress. Most forms have the defect that while
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they aim at the best possible good, the actual good at-
tained is limited to too few persons, thus violating the
rational principle of widest possible inclusiveness.
8. Whatever means are employed to secure social and
political co-operation, reason prompted by a good will ought
to determine where, when, and how they are to be employed.
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